Main points
- Kenya’s devolved climate finance model offers an important route for locally led adaptation, but it operates within county systems where patronage, weak public financial management, and limited enforcement create significant corruption risks.
- The main risks arise where county executives and politically connected actors can influence project selection, procurement, budget execution, inspection, and payment processes.
- Participatory planning improves local ownership, but it does not by itself prevent elite capture. Community influence often weakens after priorities are selected, while financial and procurement decisions remain concentrated in county institutions.
- Corruption in devolved climate finance is not only a fiduciary problem. It can also weaken adaptation outcomes by producing incomplete projects, poor-quality infrastructure, maladaptation, inequitable benefit distribution, and conflict over shared resources.
- Safeguards in the Financing Locally-Led Climate Action programme rely heavily on county public financial management systems, grievance mechanisms, and national oversight institutions. These mechanisms are important, but they remain constrained by weak enforcement, limited public disclosure, and insufficient follow-up on audit findings.
- Reducing corruption risks requires stronger ring-fencing of climate funds, routine publication of project and expenditure data, better coordination with oversight institutions, and sustained support for civil society and community monitoring.
