Clarifying boundaries for private sector contractor participation at the International Seabed Authority

This post draws on a new U4 Issue, Navigating private-sector contractor participation at the International Seabed Authority, based on legal analysis and firsthand observation of ISA proceedings over more than a decade.

How should private sector contractors interact with international governing bodies?

In 2024 and 2025, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) received several applications for ‘NGO observer status’ by entities linked to companies that hold ISA exploration contracts.

The applications from contractor-related entities raised questions about how such entities should be permitted to engage with the ISA, considering the ISA is developing rules that directly impact their commercial interests. Dialogue around how corporate interests disproportionately influence environmental governance has arisen in other international spaces, such as the stalled plastics treaty negotiations, and the annual Conference of Parties (COP) for the UNFCCC.

The ISA presents a higher risk-profile than other international organisations, as it not only set norms, but also directly contracts and regulates private sector entities. But the recent observer applications, and subsequent disagreement within the ISA as to whether to approve them, highlights inconsistencies and gaps in the rules and procedures governing private contractor participation at the ISA.

The importance of private contractor activities within the ISA

The ISA is responsible for issuing contracts and enforcing the rules governing mineral extraction in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, known as ‘the Area’. Contractors play a crucial role as operating partners for the ISA. They provide scientific data and technical information about the emerging deep seabed mining industry and its potential impacts on the marine environment.

However, reliance by the ISA in its decision-making on input from contractors with direct commercial interests in those decisions, presents risk of undue influence that needs to be managed. This exacerbates a tension within the ISA’s dual mandate, which is to oversee resource extraction while also protecting the marine environment from the harmful effects of such extraction. Moreover, as the Area and its resources are designated as the ‘common heritage of humankind’, the ISA is required to ensure that any activities in the Area are carried out for the benefit of humankind as a whole, not disproportionately for private benefit.

The relationship between private financial interests and public authority therefore raises persistent concerns about legitimacy, transparency, and accountability in the regulation of deep seabed mining.

Should NGO observer status be used for private sector contractors?

Within the ISA, NGO observers play a distinct role in enhancing accountability and legitimacy. They provide independent expertise (without a commercial interest in the activities), represent diverse social and environmental perspectives, and act as a check on both member states and corporate actors. Current NGO observers include environmental nonprofits, civil society organisations representing historically marginalised groups (such as indigenous peoples, coastal communities and youth), scientific institutions, universities, and industry associations not directly involved in ISA-regulated activities, such as sub-sea cables).

ISA contractors, on the other hand, whilst being a valid stakeholder, differ from NGO observers in having a direct financial stake in regulatory outcomes. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to give private-sector ISA contractors the same ‘NGO observer’ status as that of civil society organisations at the ISA.

Private-sector contractors already have the ability to participate in and influence ISA processes. This access can be assessed as equal to – and in some cases greater than – NGO observers on current practice. It includes participation in ISA annual session meetings and negotiations through sponsoring state delegations, engagement in inter-sessional working groups, engagement in ISA subsidiary organ working groups and workshops, access through reporting processes and written submissions, bilateral interactions with the ISA, participation in dedicated ISA contractor meetings, and the right to bring disputes against ISA decisions affecting their interests. Contractor perspectives are therefore already highly represented within the ISA.

Weaknesses in the ISA’s observer rules

The ISA’s NGO Observer Guidelines do not distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, nor do they include safeguards against conflicts of interest or corporate capture. Instead, the observer status criteria focus primarily on whether an entity can ‘demonstrate an interest’ in the work of the ISA and contribute expertise.

As a result, private sector contractor-affiliated entities may meet the formal requirements for observer status despite having fundamentally different incentives from civil society actors. This risks blurring the distinction between independent oversight and vested interest representation.

A clearer distinction between roles – denying observer status or creating a contractor observer category

As noted above, contractors already have significant avenues for engagement within the ISA. This could indicate no clear need to extend formal observer status currently. But denying observer status to contractors would not eliminate risk. In fact, it may push contractor engagement further into more informal or opaque channels, making undue influence harder to monitor. It would therefore be prudent to address gaps in participation through more transparent and structured mechanisms.

A broad suite of anti-corruption measures should be introduced at the ISA, including public disclosure requirements, conflict-of-interest rules, anti-lobbying provisions, and cooling-off periods to address ‘revolving door’ risks.

Another component, to respond to the recent observer applications, could be for the ISA to create a distinct observer category for contractor participation. This would allow the ISA to manage groups with fundamentally different functions distinctly and transparently, and to apply differentiated rules based on the risks involved. The rules could include limiting access in situations where conflicts of interest are acute, and requiring contractors to participate through clearly defined channels rather than through state delegations. While this does not address all concerns for opaque contractor engagement, it would significantly enhance transparency and regulatory oversight over differentiated entities.

Precedents to identify and manage potential conflicts-of-interest in observers can be drawn from the World Health Organisation’s 2016 Framework for Engagement of Non-State Actors (FENSA), which requires due‑diligence checks, conflict‑of‑interest assessment, and limits on the participation of actors with commercial influence.

Final thoughts

As an extractives regulator, the ISA is vulnerable to corruption risks. For the ISA’s regime to function effectively and maintain public confidence, it needs transparent, rules-based, and consistently applied systems for managing ISA contractor participation. Those rules should clearly distinguish between public interest actors and private interest actors, and regulate their participation in ISA processes accordingly. Recognising and managing carefully the risk of undue commercial influence is essential to preserving the ISA’s legitimacy as a collective steward acting for the benefit of all humankind.

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For more details, see U4 Issue (2026:9) Navigating private-sector contractor participation at the International Seabed Authority