Management and leadership: Organising anti-corruption efforts

1. Anti-corruption authorities

Often established with the objective of fulfilling the obligations of Articles 6 and/or 36 of the UNCAC, anti-corruption commissions and agencies have been a mainstay of anti-corruption programming, though the rhetoric surrounding the performance of these bodies has changed from enthusiastic support to scepticism. In 2005, a United Nations report concluded that several countries had opted for and/or were considering creating “an independent commission or agency charged with the overall responsibility of combating corruption. However, the creation of such an institution is not a panacea to the scourge of corruption. There are actually very few examples of successful independent anti corruption commissions/agencies.”

Principles for good functioning of ACAs were laid down in the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies in 2012.

With a few exceptions like Hong Kong and Singapore, ACAs have been deemed as ineffective, though the record is changing. Two main reasons stand out:

• the adverse effect of uneven financial flows and unrealistic expectations for the ACAs, as proposed by Doig and Williams;
• or their lack of independence, weak mandate and insufficient resources (including political power), as suggested in a U4 publication on institutional arrangements for corruption prevention.

At the same time, evaluations of anti-corruption commissions and systematic evaluations of ACA support programmes have been few to date. So, there is still much to learn about the reasons for their successes and failures.

Regardless of the evidence on their performance, ACAs in their many shapes and forms will continue to be an integral part of the anti- corruption landscape in the foreseeable future. That being said, such authorities may constitute a limited resource in high-corruption, low governance environments. As stand-alone interventions, specialised anti-corruption agencies are risky, particularly where other state institutions are weak and vested interests are powerful.

ACAs that have been successful have done so by being very politically savvy (see BOX below), and they’ve often taken advantage of other conditions such as popular uprisings and economic pressures, as well as opportunities offered by accession to international communities such as the European Union. Croatia’s anti-corruption agency, USKOK, used all these strategies—you can read the story here. Success does not always continue, however. Nuhu Ribadu, the highly successful head of the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), was fired and his life was threatened when the EFCC’s investigations got too close to powerful political actors. John Githongo, the equally respected Kenyan presidential advisor on governance and anti-corruption sought exile after high-level ministers told him directly that they were involved in corruption, knowing any action against them would risk his life. The Indonesian anti-corruption commission, the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), built on a strong legal mandate and powers and a selectively-recruited professional cadre to establish itself as an effective and respected institution, unlike its Philippine neighbor, the Ombudsman’s office. The KPK’s strong reputation (along with that of the specialised anti-corruption court, the Tipikor court) has helped it survive political threats, with a long history of public support (also this article) against efforts by Indonesia’s political elite to weaken its mandate and undermine its leaders.

2. Anti-corruption strategies

Most donors initially seek to align with national priorities, and that often means looking for a national or sectoral anti-corruption strategy.

The development of a national or sectoral strategy has come to be understood as a necessary step toward defining and achieving anti-corruption objectives. Article 5 of the UNCAC is sometimes interpreted as requiring such a strategy, though in fact it does not do so. Nonetheless, it makes sense that a strategy can be helpful for prioritising and defining goals, clarifying the path toward achieving them, and assessing progress. Strategies are not without their pitfalls, however, as will be discussed at the end of this section.

National anti-corruption strategies (NACS) are the most common form of anti-corruption strategy, and with years of development and implementation (or lack thereof) now behind us, there is a good body of learning about them.

In 2007, U4 published a report on anti-corruption policy-making analysing the design and implementation of NACS in six countries (i.e., Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania and Zambia). In most cases, best practices were not followed.

Through the research and advocacy of U4, Transparency International, the World Bank, and other organisations, a consensus has emerged concerning the characteristics of effective NACS. The findings, which still stand up over time, suggest the following important characteristics.

• locally-driven with high-level political support
• based on robust analysis
• targeted and sequenced
• resource- and capacity-based
• measurable and accessible.

While all these characteristics make for better anti-corruption strategies, there is still no substitute for “rolling up your sleeves and doing hard work” as a country, leader, bureaucrat, NGO, journalist, academic, or “just a citizen.” Perhaps the most important learning about anti-corruption strategies is that they shouldn’t get in the way of action. Governments, their citizens, and their development partners all over the world have fallen victim to delays because “we’re still developing the strategy.” Strategy development should be time-bound, with room for iteration as conditions change and feedback comes in. Strategies can be participatory, or comprehensive, or well-presented, but most importantly, they need to be DONE, and action needs to start.

Locally-driven with high-level political support

Practitioners, researchers and policy makers agree: political commitment and leadership are crucial for the success of national strategies. However, electing an honest head of state does not necessarily guarantee or result in constructive reforms. When anti-corruption policies and strategies do reflect clear commitment and pursue political objectives, the objectives are sometimes to strengthen the government’s power base and maintain the status quo. Conversely, absence of leadership does not mean there is nothing that can be done. Service delivery ministries may need to improve their performance, in part through controlling corruption, communities may seek better performance of local authorities, or local businesses may want to organise to create a more level playing field or better conditions for international investment.

Programmers should consider the social and political dynamics that influence the climate for reform. Windows of opportunity can emerge following an election, a high-profile scandal, or an economic crisis. International factors, such as a country’s commitment to regional treaties, preparations for accession to an international organisation, or transnational forms of corruption can play both positive and negative roles. The “carrot” that EU accession represented for many countries in Europe has been widely considered an important motivation for reform during the 1990s.

Local ownership is also important for long-term sustainability and commitment to national anti-corruption strategies. This ownership can be understood in two ways: ownership of the corruption issue itself (i.e., public support for anti-corruption reform), and ownership of the strategy. Very often, the bureaucrats tasked with implementing a strategy are not involved in the development phase, nor are other influential actors, such as business groups, regularly engaged. Strategy- drafting processes that rely too heavily on input from international experts or consultants, without sufficient local consultation and buy-in, risk simply satisfying the international community. Since they do not enjoy public endorsement and support—and may not respond to the actual needs of key stakeholders—such strategies are unlikely to be sustainable in the long term.

Based on robust analysis

Developing a comprehensive anti-corruption agenda based on a careful diagnosis of the problem may sound logical. Yet, too often, anti-corruption policies derive from superficial assessments that fail to identify either the scope and pattern of corruption, or even more frequently, the opportunities and obstacles to reform. However, as discussed in the last module, there is an increasing array of tools available to guide policy makers and donors in making a robust analysis of the corruption challenges in a given country, including political economy analysis, institutional and sectoral corruption vulnerability assessments, as well as specialised data.

Targeted and sequenced

Anti-corruption strategies often appear not to be strategic, nor to prioritise specific issues. One reason for this is the belief that a multi-faceted problem such as corruption requires a comprehensive solution, with all actors involved from the beginning. External actors may also pressure the government to incorporate a wide range of measures into a plan that may not coincide with actual priorities or with the realistic and feasible opportunities for reform in a country.

Unsurprisingly, such broad and detailed documents tend not to have a significant impact. In the six NACS studied in the U4 NACS report, few provided for sequenced implementation and most were far too broad to facilitate achievement of concrete goals in just a few years. In Georgia, on the other hand, the post-revolution government’s unwritten anti-corruption strategy targeted prosecutions, rationalising the public sector, and deregulation. It had little to do with the written NACS, which covered a much wider range of reforms responding to pressures from European partners.

Even while targeting and sequencing reform efforts, strategies should also allow for flexibility. Corrupt actors will move around in the system to block reform and extract rents where scrutiny is less intense. Even with the best-devised reform processes, unintended consequences, as well as unexpected opportunities, will arise. A good strategy can be helpful in these cases by keeping a focus on clearly-defined goals, but they shouldn’t constrain decision makers from being able to change course in pursuit of those goals.

Resource- and capacity-sensitive objective setting

Objectives should be set realistically in terms of the resources and capacity needed to implement them. Though this may seem like common sense, country strategies are often drafted without any consideration of the available means to deliver them. It is not uncommon for national strategies to include 200 or more provisions to be implemented within a few years! Consideration should be given to the availability of resources, both in terms of preparing the strategy itself, including developing a monitoring plan (baselines data needs to be collected at the beginning of the strategy, so you need to know what data to collect), and delivering the strategy’s various components (i.e., the capacity of relevant institutions to implement the measures included in the plan, and the availability of resources to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation). Overly-ambitious plans that fail to meet expectations can create public cynicism towards the entire reform agenda.

International assistance is often a key source of funding for developing countries engaging in anti-corruption efforts. While donors are often eager to assist with strategy preparation, adequate support is often unavailable for implementation. There is a real risk that ambitious strategies developed with international support will simply be filed away and forgotten once donor assistance runs out. This is, of course, also an indication that there was insufficient national ownership and leadership from the outset. More donor-specific recommendations for supporting anti-corruption policymaking can be found in the U4 Brief, Anti-corruption Policy Making in Practice: Implications for implementing UNCAC (though the Brief is a number of years old, the lessons have remained relevant in current practice).

• Though the availability of resources cannot always be guaranteed, there are several measures that can be taken to minimise the risk that strategies stall as a result of resource constraints.
• Most importantly, reformers should opt to begin with measures that can be realistically implemented with capacity already available, or which require only limited additional support.
• Ambitious plans, such as the computerisation of all municipalities and rural authorities, or e-procurement across all government departments, though perhaps convincing on paper, need to be carefully costed—and resources need to be mobilised—in order to assure implementation.

Measurable objectives

Measuring the success or failure of country strategies is a very difficult task. An accurate picture can only be achieved through on-going monitoring, carried out over extended periods of time. For strategies to be measurable, proper monitoring mechanisms must be in place, enabling evaluation during a strategy’s different various stages (i.e., from design to implementation).

Findings from the U4 NACS report reveal that in most countries under review, there was neither a recent national baseline assessment of corrupt practices, nor a conceptual approach that would establish how to measure the progress and impact of the strategy. Weak and formalistic monitoring and evaluation reported on activities, rather than on results (if they generated regular reports at all). Processes were rarely open to public participation, nor did they consider receiving inputs from civil society organisations or academia. Sometimes, the absence of routine statistical data (the administrative data discussed in Essentials 1 and last week) was an additional difficulty. These significant shortcomings were exacerbated by the absence of strong leadership, weak institutional capacity, and minimal or no documented evidence to hold anyone accountable for results.

As the range and breadth of understanding about monitoring corruption continues to expand, we are learning more and more about effective ways of assessing progress. If you didn’t already go through the optional mini-lesson on monitoring and evaluation at the end of Week 2, you might want to take a look at it now.

3. Legal reforms

Legal reform for anti-corruption is the process of adopting legislation which serves as the legal basis for addressing corruption. Such legislation may include:

• laws making corruption a punishable offence either through criminal or civil sanctions;
• laws aimed at increasing transparency and accountability, including laws regarding
  – political party financing
  – access to information and freedom of expression
  – media freedom
  – asset declarations by elected officials and senior civil servants
  – conflict of interest policies
  – procurement regulations
  – public financial management regulations; and
• laws to establish and define the mandate of institutions involved in addressing corruption, including
  – anti-corruption agencies
  – prosecutors
  – police
  – supreme audit institutions.

International legal instruments such as UNCAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions against Corruption provide frameworks and guiding principles for member states undertaking legislative change at the national level. UNCAC is of particular importance, as it sets out a number of provisions that are mandatory for States Parties (states that have ratified or acceded to the Convention) to incorporate in their national legislation.

While legislative reform is a prerequisite for the fight against corruption, it is not sufficient in and of itself. While many laws have been drafted and passed, experience is clear that the main challenge is actual implementation and enforcement of legislation. Donors have increasingly sought to address this gap by providing training and other capacity building measures alongside legal drafting assistance, to help equip stakeholders to implement the new laws, but the most important step may be to be sufficiently in tune with the political, economic and social dynamics around the desired reforms to allow rigorous testing of assumptions about implementation before and during assistance efforts.