Research agenda: Fragile and conflict-affected settings

This research agenda outlines some frontiers for research for anti-corruption in extremely fragile contexts.

Understanding what makes anti-corruption interventions effective in fragile and conflict-affected settings

Anti-corruption efforts that go beyond managing funds and seek to minimise corruption in the broader environment can alleviate conditions of conflict and promote stabilisation – thus providing a positive foundation for development efforts. In the last ten years, there have been many ideas for how to improve programmatic efficiency through conflict sensitivity, adaptive programming, social norms analysis, and political economy analysis. Despite these efforts to improve programmatic process, there is less developed thinking about what kinds of interventions work.

The dominant paradigm has been to follow an institutional approach. But researchers and practitioners have in the past ten years prior to 2026 come up with an alternative set of intervention ideas, such as indirect efforts, sectoral mainstreaming, social empowerment, and transnational policies. But these alternatives to the institutional approach are mainly informed by opposition to the perceived flaws of the dominant institutional approach. As such, there has been very little reflection on how evidence sheds light on the likely success of these alternatives.

Comprehensive reviews tend not to focus on intervention effectiveness specifically but examine the many different aspects of pursuing anti-corruption in these settings. What we and other actors seek to explore further in this field, is evidence of how, when, and for whom different anti-corruption models work in extremely fragile states.

Diverse governance influences within fragile and conflict-affected states

Non-OECD donors – notably China and Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia – have become increasingly active in fragile and conflict-affected states. These emerging donors often operate outside the traditional Western-led aid frameworks. Their growing influence is uncertain. Non-traditional development partners can increase corruption in conflict settings by bypassing the accountability conditions that often accompany Western development assistance, by engaging in opaque or preferential deals that invite graft, and by reinforcing patronage networks through politically motivated aid. But while they may not emphasise liberal democratic governance, these donors often prioritise state stability, infrastructure development, and service provision, which are essential foundations of governance in fragile contexts.

In these contexts, anti-corruption is geo-political, and more understanding of these dynamics would be very helpful. This is because anti-corruption efforts cannot work around the myriad of interests, ideologies, and mechanisms of influence – they have to work through them. Anti-corruption efforts may challenge certain interests or priorities, and some external actors may disagree with the ideological basis and purpose of anti-corruption.

We know very little about how non-OECD actors may be shaping the anti-corruption agenda in these settings – both positively and negatively. Delving deeper into the evidence around this can help us understand areas for collaboration and where we may find disagreement and discord.

Examining in-country variation for more nuanced guidance

Not all parts of a country move together in consistent ways. The 2025 OECD states of fragility report emphasised how applying a subnational lens on fragility would address a knowledge and analytical gap in ODA allocation. More subnational research perspectives in these contexts can help pin-point some of the core factors that explain anti-corruption outcomes, enabling more nuanced insights. For example, research into the relative post-conflict progress in the governance of Medellin shows how civil society mobilisation and investments in public spaces combined to induce more democratic and responsive structures in the city.

Beyond this, the way different kinds of subnational actors and governance contexts shape or resist anti-corruption is underexplored. Local power is often fragmented across fragile contexts. Local elites, armed groups, or regional officials may dominate particular territories and make decisions with limited oversight. Researchers have sometimes referred to these arrangements as ‘warlord governance’.

At the same time, authority does not always rest with formal state institutions. In many places, non-state actors, such as customary leaders or traditional authorities, may enjoy greater legitimacy and public trust than official state representatives. Differences in these subnational governance arrangements matter. For instance, evidence shows that areas under rebel control in El Salvador from 1985 to 1992 now experience worse economic outcomes than adjacent state-controlled areas. A more subnational research agenda can unlock some of the puzzles of how to sustain anti-corruption in complex circumstances.

Understanding the ‘positionality’ of OECD donors

Anti-corruption work in these contexts is not pursued in a vacuum. External capacity, actions, and discourse shape the mode and effect of interventions. Yet this positionality is rarely subject to critical reflection. Positionality shapes problem diagnosis, affects whose knowledge counts, and influences how things are done.

Unconscious positionality can affect relations between international actors and local communities. External actors may unintentionally become part of local debates about morality and corruption. A report about Afghanistan by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies showed how the concept of fasada – meaning moral corruption – became widely discussed. In some rural areas, social changes linked to international engagement were themselves described as corruption.

For example, political theorist Mark Philp highlights a related paradox of external engagement on anti-corruption. Anti-corruption reforms often introduce new expectations about how public office should operate. As these standards are promoted, behaviours that were previously accepted may begin to be labelled as corruption. In this sense, anti-corruption reforms can disturb established patterns of behaviour, such as the use of social connections to link publics with state-bureaucracies.

Being more conscious about the perspective and influences traditional OECD donors bring to bear because of who they are and the position they occupy can reduce blind spots. It should help practitioners question the assumptions underpinning their work. More research examining these blind spots can establish a basis for these reflections.