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Natural Resource Management |
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It has been recognised that the world’s failure to provide many of its citizens with access to water and sanitation is an issue of governance, and institutional reforms have been a constant feature in the drive for better sector performance. Reducing corruption is sometimes one of the objectives of decentralisation, privatisation, harmonisation and other reforms, but it is often not considered directly. Since institutional reforms may either reduce or even worsen corruption, it is important to include corruption risk assessments and mitigation measures in planning such interventions.
Multi‑million dollar water infrastructure projects carry some of the largest corruption risks in the sector linked to the procurement of civil works and associated design, supply and consultancy services. The potential for grand corruption in big dam projects and upgrading urban water and sanitation systems can be so significant as to skew policy making towards the most lucrative investments. “White elephants” such as overly sophisticated new wastewater treatment plants may come at the expense of maintenance of existing assets and more appropriate lower cost technologies and approaches.
The water “business” involves large numbers of consumers using water in different ways including households, industries, and farms. Management of water at the user level, and the associated collection of charges or fees, carries a potential corruption risk. This U4 Brief focuses on the risks at the service provider-consumer interface associated with these small but numerous transactions, and how donors may help prevent so-called petty corruption. The related losses of revenue and harm to consumer confidence can seriously threaten the financial sustainability and viability of service providers. |
UN Convention against Corruption |
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It is acknowledged by donors that the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) should play a central role in country-level dialogue, implementation, and monitoring of anti-corruption work. At the same time, when supporting UNCAC implementation, the principles of the Paris Declaration should be applied. This U4 Brief explores what this can mean in practice.
The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) offers States Parties a unique framework to strengthen their ability to prevent and combat corruption. The self‑assessment checklist, which was developed as part of the review mechanism for the Convention, is one of the few available methods for assessment for which the state provides its own information, maximising its ownership of the process. Moreover, the self‑assessment checklist can have follow‑on effects, bringing several potential positive outcomes as part of the corruption and broader governance assessment processes. However, success with the checklist should not be taken for granted. The valuable information gathered by the checklist process needs to be utilised for reform processes in the country by the country. Achieving its full potential requires a concrete long‑term commitment from the state at the highest levels, and the coordinated support of donors. This U4 Issue outlines the potential benefits as well as the challenges the checklist poses, and makes recommendations for States Parties, donors, and UNODC to ensure that the benefits are realised.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires state parties to consider establishing policies requiring officials to reveal “to appropriate authorities … their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits” (Article 8, UNCAC). The World Bank has advised a number of countries on whether an income and asset disclosure programme is an appropriate response to the corruption issues they face, and if so, what type of programme they should establish. Assistance has ranged from advice on drafting legislation to furnishing model disclosure forms to providing financial and technical support to an agency created to administer the programme. Drawing on this experience and studies underway by several Bank units, this U4 Issue paper describes the issues policymakers should weigh in deciding whether to adopt a financial disclosure law, and if so, what provisions it should contain. |
Judicial Corruption |
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This U4 Issue Paper translates lessons related to monitoring judicial reform to the specific requirements of UNCAC Article 11. Taking the Paris Declaration’s requirement to monitor for development results as a starting point, it asks what this might mean with respect to measures aimed at increasing integrity and reducing corruption. The need to clarify what to monitor, who to monitor, at what cost, and for what purpose, is elaborated. The paper also highlights the links between effective monitoring and an appropriate selection of indicators, capacity for data collection and analysis, and a feedback mechanism to support ongoing evaluation and fine‑tuning of the reform process.
An independent and impartial justice system underpins the effective implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Where it does not exist, pliant prosecutors, judges, and court staff may ignore criminal acts of corruption or have them improperly dismissed. Biased appointments, promotions, and disciplinary processes mean that justice sector staff may be ill-equipped to handle complex cases, including those involving corruption. The UNCAC’s unique provisions for international cooperation on a wide range of law enforcement matters especially rely on clean, effective judiciaries in the respective states. Given the centrality of the judiciary for a range of anti-corruption measures required by the UNCAC, ensuring that the judiciary is up to the task should be a primary concern of State Parties to the Convention – as well as their donor partners. The UNCAC itself, in Article 11, includes the requirement to ‘take measures to strengthen integrity and prevent corruption in the judiciary’. This Brief outlines the key requirements of, and considerations for, implementing Article 11. |
Ethics |
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Can Codes of Conduct set realistic ethical standards for officials? Can training in ethics and professional standards make any practical difference in the way public officials behave? Can the notions of ‘ethical competence’ and ‘ethical reliability’ help to identify new ways of thinking about ethical performance on the part of public officials? These and related questions have been the subject of widespread research over the past two decades. Even so, in seeking to establish ethical standards and norms of professionalism, most public sector agencies today have scarcely advanced beyond the mechanism of the traditional rule-based Code of Conduct, often based on the ‘core values’ of the institution. Such rule-based Codes of Conduct generally aim to prohibit corruption and misconduct, rather than promoting ethical conduct in the exercise of public functions. This U4 Brief outlines the main issues behind these concerns, looks beyond to some of the reasons why traditional methods of managing ethical problems encountered by public officials often fail, and examines how this important deficit might be remedied.
This U4 Brief explores why a traditional approach to teaching ethics is ill-suited in highly corrupt societies, and outlines key considerations with respect to timing, content, and method when designing and implementing ethics training programmes in such contexts.
Most people are familiar with codes of conduct. Often overlooked, however, is the important role that organisational ethics policies have not only as the backbone for such strategies but also for more general policies - such as transparent accounting and non-discriminatory human resources practices - related to the ethical performance of an organisation. This U4 Brief describes the different dimensions of ethics policies and outlines elements of good practice in developing and implementing them. |
Political Corruption |
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Corruption and organised crime are of great concern to the international community: while the first is regarded as one of the greatest barriers to development, the second is seen as a key threat to international security and stability. In this context, corruption is best understood as the way in which organised crime infiltrates the state. Corruption is one of the primary enabling activities of organised crime, it makes possible and/or facilitate the conduct of this type of criminal activities. This U4 Issue argues that understanding the connections between both phenomena requires a deeper analysis of the relationships between organised criminals and public officials at different levels of the state. First, international standards and conventional wisdom tend to embrace a limited range of the possible policies that may be employed to tackle organised crime and the corruption, and are heavily oriented towards criminal law and enforcement. Second, policies to tackle both problems are usually developed without applying sound principles of policy‑making. The author argues for the development of policies based on proper analysis of the specific context, breaking down the problem into clear components, identifying their causes, and selecting specific and appropriate measures to address each component or causal factor. In particular, the author suggests there is a pressing need to correct the current bias towards criminal law enforcement solutions.
This Brief reviews recent research on transition countries which suggests, conceptually and empirically, that lobbying is not only more prevalent in non–developed countries than currently thought, but can be more effective than corruption as a means of influencing policy, if adequately regulated.
This paper describes the problem of conflict of interest of public officials and the main ways in which it may be tackled, with particular focus on regulation of elected officials. The paper describes three main types of regulation - prohibitions on activities, declarations of interests, and exclusion from decision-making processes - and how these may be best implemented in practice. The author underlines the need for regulation to be realistic, tailored specifically for different categories of officials and to the specific circumstances of the country in which they are to be applied. The author also suggests possibilities for the engagement of the donor community, in line with the implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption. |
Education |
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Confronting corruption in education: Advancing accountable practices through budget monitoring
The power of data: enhancing transparency in the education sector in Sierra Leone .pdf |
Corruption in Emergencies |
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Humanitarian crises that call for international assistance almost always take place in countries that either can’t or won’t meet the needs of their population at risk. Vulnerable environments, poverty, and poor governance enable these crises. Given this reality, does humanitarian assistance actually increase corruption? How do aid workers and the populations they serve perceive the impact of corruption? Where and how is corruption most likely to occur? And finally, what do agencies do to reduce risk? This Brief summarises key findings from a set of studies investigating these questions, and offers some thoughts about how donors and implementing agencies could better address the challenges of corruption in the context of humanitarian action. |
Public Financial Management |
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The gaps between approved budgets and the realisation of policy and development goals stand among key governance challenges in many developing countries. Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) play an important role in holding governments to account. However, many SAIs face serious challenges when trying to evaluate the expenditures and performance of government agencies. This U4 Issue Paper explores those challenges in detail and suggests how SAIs can overcome some of them by forming and strengthening alliances with parliaments and civil society. It proposes that in circumstances where the legislature is weak, the SAI may need to stretch the letter of their mandate for the benefit of more effective application of public resources to development challenges. Given their central role in funding governance reform, donors have a potentially key role to play in supporting SAIs. Existing support could be made more efficient if related interventions were better coordinated and if underlying political dimensions were taken into account. Donors could also play an important role in financing innovative partnerships between SAIs, legislatures, and civil society.
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, or PETS, are recognised as an effective tool to improve accountability in public finance and service delivery. A Ugandan success with PETS is one of the most cited anti‑corruption success stories. Expenditure tracking has also become a popular activity among civil society organisations engaged in accountability issues at the local level. This U4 Issue Paper takes a closer look at the experience of expenditure tracking and argues that its successes may have been overstated. It suggests that an uncritical acceptance of the effectiveness of expenditure tracking has hindered the development of a more nuanced approach that is better suited to the particular circumstances of each case. The paper proposes some principles of engagement on how to track expenditures more effectively.
The introduction of ‘new' aid modalities - and in particular general budget support - has increased the interest in the relationship between corruption and aid modalities. This U4 Issue reviews the information that theory and empirical studies provide on the prevalence of corruption in relation to various aid modalities, the degrees to which corruption distorts the developmental impact of different aid modalities, and whether aid modalities affect the governance environment and corruption in a country differently. It concludes that the choice of aid modality will not affect aid allocation nor accountability in countries with relatively low levels of aid, regardless of the level of corruption. With high aid dependency, however, donors have some more control over aid allocation with project than with budget support. Where this is the case, and corruption is high, there are strong reasons for not choosing budget support as an aid modality. |
Private Sector |
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This Brief reviews recent research on transition countries which suggests, conceptually and empirically, that lobbying is not only more prevalent in non–developed countries than currently thought, but can be more effective than corruption as a means of influencing policy, if adequately regulated.
Corrupt dealings by companies are often only a way to avoid inefficiency caused by weak regulations and institutions. While the private sector is commonly perceived to be a source of corruption, it is also a victim - with considerable interest in contributing to solutions. Donors can help by engaging private sector representative organizations in discussions, develop local capacity to instigate and run anti-corruption programs, and support financial media in fulfilling a watchdog role that goes beyond simply reporting on corrupt individuals
Improving the Business and Investment Climate (BIC) has become an important topic in the international discourse on private sector development. Partner governments and donor organisations alike have started to focus more and more on systematically analysing and shaping a country's BIC. |
Health Sector |
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Theft, graft, absenteeism and soliciting bribes in the health sector in developing countries is often blamed on low pay. But does low pay actually explain corruption? Several studies of public hospitals in Latin America suggest otherwise. In particular, they show that low pay may contribute to corruption; however, without some form of monitoring to detect corruption and a real chance of penalties, raising wages is not likely to make a difference.
Donor funding has fuelled a vast increase in service delivery, medical research and clinical trials throughout the developing world. Yet, there is a dark side to this badly needed influx of funding: with pressures to spend funds quickly and achieve results, projects may not pay sufficient attention to internal monitoring and security systems to protect against embezzlement. This U4 Brief analyses how this type of corruption occurred in a donor-funded project, and what can be done to minimise the risk.
The burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic means that more labor and financial resources are being dedicated to the procurement of antiretroviral (ARV) medicines for reatment. While patients, physicians, national governments and development partners are eager to see treatment programs expanded, rapid scaleup often results in circumstances whereby resources have to be spent quickly, and sometimes resources are added to systems that are already weak and vulnerable to corruption. Program expansion in these circumstances can result in more risk, waste and losses, especially in the procurement process. Transparency of ARV prices is the first step towards identifying and minimizing corruption in procurement. This U4 Brief describes how international partners and national procurement agencies have used information technology to improve transparency and increase accountability in procurement of HIV/AIDS medicines. |
Corruption in Aid: Addressing the Bug Within |
AusAID joined U4 and became the eigth partner agency of the U4 anti-corruption online resource centre. |
(U4 training is exclusively for partner agencies and invited partners) 'Essentials of Anti-Corruption' |
Do you have a question related to corruption? Recently published answers (pdf):
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Este documento analisa los logros y los fallos del Fondo Anti-Corrupción (FAC), un programa de la cooperación internacional en Nicaragua, liderado por Noruega en implementación en sociedad con el gobierno nacional.
This U4 Practice Insight explores how local ownership, through a combination of actions, inactions, and broader political factors, can dissipate at different stages of the project cycle.
This U4 Practice Insight explores how ownership is perceived at the levels of donor, international implementer, and national stakeholders involved in the USAID-supported Municipal Economic Growth Activity (MEGA) programme in Serbia. The lessons gathered here both introduce unexpected insights and confirm long-established project design and management practices.
This U4 Practice Insight describes the Norwegian Embassy's decision in 2006 to independently evaluate their long-term support to the Management of Natural Resources Programme in Tanzania. |
| Spotlight |
 It is our turn to eat Wrong, M (2009) Corruption fighters are contradictory figures, loved by what they stand for and hated by what they challenge. Michela Wrong’s account of the story of John Githongo, a Kenyan corruption fighter, explores both sides. But it goes further. It is an important read for international donors because it unveils the somewhat upsetting role played by them in the anti-corruption game. As with any view, Wrong’s stance is just one among many opinions on the issue of the international development cooperation involvement on corruption issues. But it is a good starting point for reflection. Corruption and aid modalities (Verena Fritz and Ivar Kolstad) Rethinking Governance to Fight Corruption (Sue Unsworth) |
