From Paris to the anti-corruption project: Examining the feasibility of ownership
Devine, Vera, Marijana Trivunovic, Harald Mathisen (U4 Practice Insight 2010:1)

This Practice Insight summarises lessons learned from four case studies conducted to examine what bearing the notion of ownership has on anti-corruption interventions involving the private sector. By demonstrating how effective ownership is often shared, and evolves over time as partners create results together, it promotes a more nuanced understanding of ownership than that expressed by documents such as the Paris Declaration and the Accra Accords. The recommendations provide guidance on assessing the appropriate scope and objectives of ownership for any development project.

The anatomy of a failed anti corruption project: A case study from Nepal
Manandhar, Narayan (U4 Practice Insight 2009:3)

In 2004 and 2005, the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI) implemented the first anti‑corruption project involving the private sector in Nepal.

Despite the novelty of a supply‑side intervention, however, the effort has not manage to survive the termination of DFID funding. This U4 Practice Insight explores how local ownership, through a combination of actions, inactions, and broader political factors, can dissipate at different stages of the project cycle. Since donor support ended, not a single anti‑corruption activity has been continued by the FNCCI.

Regulating conflicts of interest in challenging environments: The case of Azerbaijan
Reed, Quentin (U4 Issue 2010:2)

Current approaches to regulating conflicts of interest, often encouraged by international anti-corruption standards, are commonly judged by how restrictive they are. Such interpretations reflect a mistaken view that a conflict of interest itself is corruption. This paper critiques current treatment of conflict of interest regulation through the lens of experience from Azerbaijan. It concludes by suggesting how the implementation and evaluation of compliance with international standards might be modified to encourage more meaningful ethical regulation, especially in difficult contexts: by prioritising standards, achieving the right balance in the types of regulation enacted, and encouraging partial rather than across-the-board regulation.

Profiting from corruption: The role and responsibility of financial institutions
Palmer, Robert (U4 Brief 2009:31)

This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.

Approaches to teaching and learning about corruption in the health sector
Vian, Taryn (U4 Brief 2009:30)

Training and education programmes which deal with the topic of corruption and health can help change the way people approach their jobs as public administrators or development agency workers, and increase transparency and accountability. This U4 Brief summarises experiences and approaches to educating new and experienced public health professionals and donor agency practitioners about how to analyse problems of corruption in the health sector and design strategies to address them.

Benefits and drawbacks of per diems: Do allowances distort good governance in the health sector?
Vian, Taryn (U4 Brief 2009:29)

Per diems, or daily allowances, are an important mechanism for reimbursing work‑related expenses, encouraging participation in professional development activities, and motivating under‑paid employees. Yet, sometimes employees may abuse per diem policies by falsifying travel reports or inflating workshop budgets for private gain. In addition, the possibility of earning per diem can have a distorting impact on programme design, management decisions, and how employees spend their time. Drawing on a focus group and interviews with experienced development professionals, this U4 Brief explores the benefits and drawbacks of per diems, especially their potential negative impact on development goals.

Improving the framework? Institutional reform and corruption in the water sector
Butterworth, John and Jean de la Harpe (U4 Brief 2009:28)

It has been recognised that the world’s failure to provide many of its citizens with access to water and sanitation is an issue of governance, and institutional reforms have been a constant feature in the drive for better sector performance. Reducing corruption is sometimes one of the objectives of decentralisation, privatisation, harmonisation and other reforms, but it is often not considered directly. Since institutional reforms may either reduce or even worsen corruption, it is important to include corruption risk assessments and mitigation measures in planning such interventions.

Grand designs: Corruption risks in major water infrastructure projects
Butterworth, John and Jean de la Harpe (U4 Brief 2009:27)

Multi‑million dollar water infrastructure projects carry some of the largest corruption risks in the sector linked to the procurement of civil works and associated design, supply and consultancy services. The potential for grand corruption in big dam projects and upgrading urban water and sanitation systems can be so significant as to skew policy making towards the most lucrative investments. “White elephants” such as overly sophisticated new wastewater treatment plants may come at the expense of maintenance of existing assets and more appropriate lower cost technologies and approaches.

Not so petty: Corruption risks in payment and licensing systems for water
Butterworth, John and Jean de la Harpe (U4 Brief 2009:26)

The water “business” involves large numbers of consumers using water in different ways including households, industries, and farms. Management of water at the user level, and the associated collection of charges or fees, carries a potential corruption risk. This U4 Brief focuses on the risks at the service provider-consumer interface associated with these small but numerous transactions, and how donors may help prevent so-called petty corruption. The related losses of revenue and harm to consumer confidence can seriously threaten the financial sustainability and viability of service providers.

Exploring the links between UNCAC and the Paris Declaration
Hechler, Hannes (U4 Brief 2009:25)

It is acknowledged by donors that the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) should play a central role in country-level dialogue, implementation, and monitoring of anti-corruption work. At the same time, when supporting UNCAC implementation, the principles of the Paris Declaration should be applied. This U4 Brief explores what this can mean in practice.

Maximising the potential of UNCAC implementation: Making use of the self-assessment checklist
Repucci, Sarah (U4 Issue 2009:13)

The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) offers States Parties a unique framework to strengthen their ability to prevent and combat corruption. The self‑assessment checklist, which was developed as part of the review mechanism for the Convention, is one of the few available methods for assessment for which the state provides its own information, maximising its ownership of the process. Moreover, the self‑assessment checklist can have follow‑on effects, bringing several potential positive outcomes as part of the corruption and broader governance assessment processes. However, success with the checklist should not be taken for granted. The valuable information gathered by the checklist process needs to be utilised for reform processes in the country by the country. Achieving its full potential requires a concrete long‑term commitment from the state at the highest levels, and the coordinated support of donors. This U4 Issue outlines the potential benefits as well as the challenges the checklist poses, and makes recommendations for States Parties, donors, and UNODC to ensure that the benefits are realised.

Monitoring judicial integrity: Lessons for implementation of UNCAC Article 11
Armytage, Livingston (U4 Issue 2009:12)

This U4 Issue Paper translates lessons related to monitoring judicial reform to the specific requirements of UNCAC Article 11. Taking the Paris Declaration’s requirement to monitor for development results as a starting point, it asks what this might mean with respect to measures aimed at increasing integrity and reducing corruption. The need to clarify what to monitor, who to monitor, at what cost, and for what purpose, is elaborated. The paper also highlights the links between effective monitoring and an appropriate selection of indicators, capacity for data collection and analysis, and a feedback mechanism to support ongoing evaluation and fine‑tuning of the reform process.

The UNCAC and judicial corruption: Requirements and avenues for reform
Schultz, Jessica (U4 Brief 2009:18)

An independent and impartial justice system underpins the effective implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Where it does not exist, pliant prosecutors, judges, and court staff may ignore criminal acts of corruption or have them improperly dismissed. Biased appointments, promotions, and disciplinary processes mean that justice sector staff may be ill-equipped to handle complex cases, including those involving corruption. The UNCAC’s unique provisions for international cooperation on a wide range of law enforcement matters especially rely on clean, effective judiciaries in the respective states.

Given the centrality of the judiciary for a range of anti-corruption measures required by the UNCAC, ensuring that the judiciary is up to the task should be a primary concern of State Parties to the Convention – as well as their donor partners. The UNCAC itself, in Article 11, includes the requirement to ‘take measures to strengthen integrity and prevent corruption in the judiciary’. This Brief outlines the key requirements of, and considerations for, implementing Article 11.

Beyond the Code of Conduct: Building ethical competence in public officials
Whitton, Howard (U4 Brief 2009:19)

Can Codes of Conduct set realistic ethical standards for officials? Can training in ethics and professional standards make any practical difference in the way public officials behave? Can the notions of ‘ethical competence’ and ‘ethical reliability’ help to identify new ways of thinking about ethical performance on the part of public officials?

These and related questions have been the subject of widespread research over the past two decades. Even so, in seeking to establish ethical standards and norms of professionalism, most public sector agencies today have scarcely advanced beyond the mechanism of the traditional rule-based Code of Conduct, often based on the ‘core values’ of the institution. Such rule-based Codes of Conduct generally aim to prohibit corruption and misconduct, rather than promoting ethical conduct in the exercise of public functions. This U4 Brief outlines the main issues behind these concerns, looks beyond to some of the reasons why traditional methods of managing ethical problems encountered by public officials often fail, and examines how this important deficit might be remedied.

Teaching ethics in highly corrupt societies: Concerns and opportunities
Whitton, Howard (U4 Brief 2009:5)

This U4 Brief explores why a traditional approach to teaching ethics is ill-suited in highly corrupt societies, and outlines key considerations with respect to timing, content, and method when designing and implementing ethics training programmes in such contexts.

Confronting corruption in education: Advancing accountable practices through budget monitoring
Turrent, Victoria (U4 Brief 2009:7)

Education budget work conducted by civil society is a powerful way of holding governments accountable to their citizens, and drawing attention to corruption in the education system. This brief discusses the relevance of civil society budget work for anti-corruption initiatives, focusing on the experience of the Commonwealth Education Fund, in which budget monitoring is employed as an anti-corruption tool in the education sector. It presents its strengths and limitations - arguing for increased access to budget information and greater civil society participation in such processes.

The Power of Data: Enhancing Transparency in the Education Sector in Sierra Leone
Hamminger, Leo (U4 Brief 2008:22)

The best defence against malfeasance are reliable facts and figures. An effectively functioning Education Management Information System can highlight malpractices related to anything from local record keeping, teacher salaries, building new schools, and educational indicators. The cost of setting up such a system will be justified by the easily quantifiable benefits it can provide.

Confronting corruption in humanitarian aid: Perspectives and options
Walker, Peter, Daniel Maxwell (U4 Brief 2009:3)

Humanitarian crises that call for international assistance almost always take place in countries that either can’t or won’t meet the needs of their population at risk. Vulnerable environments, poverty, and poor governance enable these crises. Given this reality, does humanitarian assistance actually increase corruption? How do aid workers and the populations they serve perceive the impact of corruption? Where and how is corruption most likely to occur? And finally, what do agencies do to reduce risk? This Brief summarises key findings from a set of studies investigating these questions, and offers some thoughts about how donors and implementing agencies could better address the challenges of corruption in the context of humanitarian action.

Profiting from corruption: The role and responsibility of financial institutions
Palmer, Robert (U4 Brief 2009:31)

This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.