The creation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) and the establishment of an independent judiciary have become important features of anti-corruption approaches in the world.b2af8672f789 These institutions are essential to ensuring accountability and justice within a functioning democracy. Strong and competent ACAs play a pivotal role in identifying, investigating and prosecuting corruption offences, holding perpetrators accountable regardless of their status or influence.8fae6d25f08b Meanwhile, independent courts serve as the ultimate arbiter, assessing the evidence presented, upholding due process, and delivering fair and unbiased judgments, whether in the form of convictions or acquittals.

However, in nations with unconsolidated democracies (eg hybrid regimes, fragile democracies, defective democracies),ce2463bdd478 establishing and maintaining the independence of these institutions is facing several challenges.11afb8c8c3d3 These challenges are often rooted in systemic issues such as entrenched political interference, weak institutional safeguards and limited public trust.4bdd792579fa Political elites may attempt to exert control over ACAs and the judiciary, leveraging these bodies as tools for settling political scores or shielding themselves and their allies from accountability.ad2ac0b4a1bb This undermines not only the institutions’ credibility but also the broader anti-corruption efforts, perpetuating cycles of impunity and eroding public confidence in governance.

Among the solutions to ensure the independence of the ACAs is the transparent selection and appointment of candidates with high-integrity profiles. These processes must be designed to identify individuals with the requisite expertise, ethical standards and independence to lead anti-corruption and judicial institutions. Transparency in these mechanisms not only strengthens public confidence but also acts as a deterrent against political manipulation. There are several mechanisms to ensure the selection of the heads of the ACAs, some of which involve civil society representatives.0f8268993e3c Ukraine has adapted such mechanisms in its own way by establishing multistakeholder commissions on vetting and selecting anti-corruption high-level officials and judges which we call Integrity Councils (ICs).a7adeb1a2e8b These councils serve as independent bodies tasked with vetting and assessing candidates for leadership roles in ACAs and the judiciary. In 2014, Ukraine introduced ICs to select and vet the heads of newly created ACAs. This approach was later extended to the judiciary. In this context, ICs were tasked with two main functions: first, to assess the integrity of candidates for judicial appointment – a practice broadly consistent with international standards; and second, to evaluate the integrity of sitting judges – a more controversial measure.eb9ca92510ca

Ukraine’s experience offers valuable insights into the potential and the challenges of using ICs to strengthen institutional integrity of the ACAs and judiciary. This U4 Issue analyses Ukraine’s experience with ICs, focusing on their evolution, their challenges, and the practical lessons they provide for strengthening ACAs’ governance and ensuring their institutional integrity in other countries.

This U4 Issue is based on desk research of Ukrainian legislation on anti-corruption institutions and judiciary, content analysis of national and international media publications and reports on the topic, and a review of relevant literature on national and international mechanisms for enhancing the integrity and independence of ACAs. Additionally, it incorporates insights from an unpublished academic article on the same topic, providing a deeper analytical perspective on the challenges and lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience.4b091c436fa0 For this U4 Issue, we have not conducted interviews with relevant stakeholders (IC members or participants in integrity checks; selecting, screening and vetting processes) and therefore certain aspects, such as candidate motivation or perceptions of fairness, which may also influence the effectiveness of ICs, remain unaddressed.

Selection and vetting processes in Ukraine and the emergence of Integrity Councils

Most of Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms began after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, which prioritised addressing corruption, establishing justice and upholding the rule of law. Achieving these goals required broad reforms, particularly in the justice sector. Among such reforms, civil society proposed and political actors supported the idea of establishing ICs – bodies substantially composed of national or international experts that verify the integrity of (prospective) anti-corruption justice officials to ensure the integrity of appointments in ACAs and the judiciary. Since their first establishment in 2015, ICs have gone through their own historical path and have changed in accordance with the current reform context.

ICs are part of a broader ecosystem of vetting and competitive selection mechanisms designed to enhance transparency and accountability in Ukraine’s public sector. This section provides an overview of these mechanisms, including their evolution and impact, to contextualise the role of ICs and highlight the foundational principles they built upon.

Ukraine has long-established mechanisms for vetting and competitive selection to ensure the integrity and professionalism of individuals appointed to positions in the justice sector. These mechanisms include procedures for vetting and competitive selection for management and administrative positions. Vetting processes, in particular, have been developed across distinct areas, including special verification, lustration, competitive selection, integrity checks and screening of judges, each serving a critical role in promoting accountability and transparency.

Special verification

The (special) verification (спецаільна перевірка) is a mechanism designed to ensure that candidates for public office meet the necessary legal, ethical and professional standards before their appointment. The process typically includes verification of personal data, educational credentials and professional qualifications, along with medical fitness for the role. Asset declarations are reviewed for conflicts of interest or illicit enrichment, while criminal record checks and national security assessments ensure eligibility and safety for sensitive positions.

Established after Ukraine’s independence, the mechanism was shaped by the Anti-Corruption Concept for 1998–2005, which highlighted the need for special verification of ‘anti-corruption justice officials or candidates for such positions’.4d9379b197c2 However, it wasn’t until 2010 that special verification became legally mandated.2adb4197df1f The process now includes thorough checks on criminal liability, financial integrity, corporate rights1b695e7f51da and health, creating a comprehensive framework for assessing candidates’ suitability for public service.

In 2014, the Revolution of Dignity occurred in Ukraine – protests that were aimed primarily at countering corruption and supporting the country’s European integration course. Following the Revolution, the newly appointed Ukrainian government adopted two laws – the law On Lustration and the law On Restoration of the Trust to the Judiciary in Ukraine. These two laws brought two separate procedures, which were both aimed at dismissal of officials and judges considered to be involved in supporting the corrupt and anti-democratic policies of the previous political regime: lustration of officials and judges and screening of judges. Both processes primarily targeted officials and judges associated with the Yanukovych government or those whose actions directly undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic governance.e95e7751c7f2

Lustration and judicial vetting 1.0

Lustration sought to restore public trust by removing individuals who had compromised the integrity and independence of state institutions. The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine was responsible for implementing this procedure. The law on Government Cleansing applied to officials and judges who were either involved in the activities of the communist regime of the Soviet Union or the activities of the regime of former President Yanukovych. The law prohibited the appointment of such officials or judges for ten years from the date of adoption of the law (16 October 2014). Unfortunately, lustration did not bring the desired results, as a significant number of dismissed officials were reinstated through the courts. According to the latest update of the Unified State Register of Persons Subject to the Provisions of the Law on Lustration of 2 July 2024, the register contains records of 589 persons of whom only five are judges.7d57b0346c43 Additionally, publicly available data shows that about 90% of those dismissed are reinstated due to flaws in the procedure and model of this procedure such as violation of the procedure of fair trial, lack of rights and guarantees for persons subject to lustration, non-compliance with the principle of individuality of the lustration procedure, etc.a3c914b6e7e4 The ten-year ban on holding office by officials and judges under this law expired in October 2024.05bed2e40b9a

Beyond the selection of leadership for ACAs, vetting/screening procedures were also introduced in the judiciary with the adoption of the 2014 law On the Restoration of the Trust to the Judiciary in Ukraine. The screening of judges, along with broader lustration efforts, did not go as planned and achieved limited success. The specially created Temporary Special Commission for the Screening of Judges was tasked with conducting judicial screenings within one year from the date of its formation based on submitted complaints. The goal of the effort was to dismiss judges whose prior decisions or affiliations raised concerns about their impartiality (so-called Maidan judges), thus contributing to the broader goal of judicial reform.930ae8591394 The overall results of the screening of judges were not remarkable: Only 25 judges were dismissed out of 234 complaints concerning 305 judges by the end of 2019. While not insignificant, this figure represents a small share of the judiciary in a system that employed 8,433 judges in first instance and appellate courts in 2014 and 7,983 judges in 2015.a9eada533755 As a result, public trust in the judiciary remained largely unaddressed.d22c088e7800

The peculiarities of the above procedures could not fully satisfy the public demand for justice and integrity in public service. With this in mind, new procedures for competitive selection and integrity checking were introduced in most of the newly created state bodies (including ACAs).

Competitive selection mechanism

The competitive selection mechanism was introduced along with integrity checking mechanisms after the Revolution of Dignity. It was first introduced for the heads of the newly established ACAs: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP). Each legislative act regulating the activities of a particular ACA contained provisions on the competitive selection of candidates for the positions of heads of the respective ACAs.e808616a2871 Specially created competition commissions, comprising national and international experts, oversee the process. They establish principles, criteria and methodologies to evaluate candidates based on professional competencies, legal knowledge, practical skills, leadership skills and integrity. Integrity assessments ensure that candidates meet ethical standards and demonstrate accountability. The process includes application reviews, testing, interviews and integrity checks, culminating in a shortlist of qualified candidates. The commission then submits its recommendations to the relevant body, for instance, the Cabinet of Ministers, for final appointment.

The competitive selection mechanisms for the heads of newly established ACAs incorporated integrity checks as a key component to promote public trust from the outset by assessing the candidates’ integrity and professionalism. This reform aimed to ensure that individuals entering public service adhered to high ethical standards and demonstrated personal integrity, replacing entrenched corrupt practices with transparency and accountability. Unlike the special verification process, which focuses on legal and procedural compliance, integrity checks evaluate the moral and ethical suitability of candidates – although in practice, these processes often overlap, particularly when legal obligations reflect broader standards of integrity. These checks address limitations in the previous system by identifying individuals whose behaviour, even if not legally questionable, might undermine public trust. Integrity assessments verify asset declarations, compliance with anti-corruption laws, and consistency between income and lifestyle while also screening for conflicts of interest or unethical conduct. Integrity checking is applied to candidates for critical public service roles, including positions in ACAs such as the NABU, SAPO and NACP.3d53728a9bfb

Integrity Councils

The introduction of competitive selection procedures, along with integrity checks as an integral part of those vetting/screening procedures, and limited success of other mechanisms contributed to the emergence of ICs, which were first formed as so-called competition commissions. In October 2014, Ukraine established three new ACAs to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption offences respectively: NACP, NABU and SAPO. For each authority, a competition commission was set up to select and conduct integrity checks of candidates for leadership positions and submit suitable applications to the appointing authorities on an ad hoc basis (2015 for NABU and SAPO; 2016 for NACP). The establishment of such a mechanism was proposed by the Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition0c8926ee420a in its Roadmap of Reforms. The Roadmap contained, among other things, anti-corruption reform, which provided for the creation of relevant legislation and specialised ACAs which should conform to the international standards of independence and efficiency (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013; autonomy from other government agencies, transparent and competitive selection of the head and main personnel, impossibility to dismiss the head for political reasons, and sufficient resources [Reanimation Package of Reforms 2015]). Civil society played an essential role in advocating for these reforms in the anti-corruption sector, pressuring political leadership, drafting the necessary legislation and taking part as members of such competition commissions.

A parallel process started in the judiciary. Considering the limited impact of judicial vetting efforts and the pressing need to reform the justice system and its supporting legal institutions, the Judicial Reform Council, created in 2014, developed the 2015–2020 Strategy for Judicial Reform,333b629cca79 emphasising qualification assessments for judges.

Judicial vetting 2.0 and the introduction of international experts in Integrity Councils

As part of the reform, the judicial governance bodies were to be restructured: The High Council of Justice (HCJ) was established and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) was relaunched (although in practice, it retained many of its members appointed under the previous 2010 law of Ukraine On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges).6abf7303f7a3 The HQCJ was empowered with, among other things, the authority to conduct the vetting (qualification evaluation) of judges to determine their ability to administer justice in a given court, based on legally established criteria: (1) competence (professional, personal and social), (2) professional ethics, and (3) integrity. New features compared to the old HQCJ were, first, the definition of the criteria for qualification assessment, and second, the establishment of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which consisted of 20 representatives of non-government organisations (NGOs) selected by the congress of NGOsbf4748001fc5 and was tasked with assisting the HQCJ in determining whether a judge (or candidates for the position of judge) meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity for the purposes of vetting.4b1cbe940dfb

PIC was established to balance the work of the HQCJ and to help ensure that the judicial system would not continue operating according to outdated patterns. Its creation aimed to promote greater objectivity in the evaluation process and to strengthen public confidence in judicial reform.1c0f1a27b84f Despite such a role, the PIC’s work was limited to providing advisory opinions which could be overridden by the HQCJ – requiring two thirds of the commission members’ votes (but not less than nine votes). According to civil society experts, this affected the PIC’s productivity and efficiency. Information about a judge (candidate) that the PIC managed to obtain was overcome by a simple majority of votes of the HQCJ as a judicial governance body, which led to the HQCJ rejecting negative PIC opinions in 2/3 of the cases, even if it was a case of gross human rights violations by judicial candidates, declaration of false information or income discrepancies.99deab9280a4 During the competition, with the newly reestablished Supreme Court, the HQCJ selected 120 candidates, 30 of whom (25%) were vetoed by the PIC as not meeting the criteria of professional ethics and integrity.1832a53566af

Recognising the PIC’s challenges and its withdrawal from qualification assessment of judges,0a78d6146c5d in 2018 the reformers advocated for the establishment of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) to help HQCJ assess candidates‘ compliance with the criteria of integrity (morality, honesty, integrity)b49192d76ff4 for the newly created High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). Composed entirely of international experts, the PCIE had a decisive role in the integrity checking process: If at least three members of the PCIE raised concerns about a candidate for the HACC, a joint meeting with the HQCJ was convened. A candidate could proceed only if supported by a majority of the joint members, including at least half of the PCIE members – otherwise, the candidate was disqualified from the competition. Such a decision-making mechanism ensured impartial and transparent selection processes.15a9e15a8092 The HACC’s creation was supported by domestic advocacy and international pressure, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) tying financial aid to its establishment,d9f954b7a58b reinforcing global support for its robust mandate.d7c95e9cb81d One of the main reasons for the HACC creation is that judges should be assessed for integrity by national or international experts, whose candidates are determined on the basis of proposals from international organisations and donors.4da7ca1d74e4 Building on the PCIE’s success, international experts were incorporated into selection processes for other ACAs. In 2019, civil society advocated for reforming the NACP’s management structure, leading to the inclusion of national or international experts nominated by the international organisations or donors as its selection commission. This reform aligned with the expectations of Western partners, who aimed to enhance the NACP’s capacity, including by supporting its relaunch.b7463cc8f9ab Legislative changes embedding international expertise in these processes have since been applied to NABU, SAPO, NACP, and other authorities – the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, HQCJ, HCJ and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The further involvement of international experts in ICs was largely driven by conditionality mechanisms established by Western partners.61e65a5e938c Their participation was tied to specific political and financial incentives, such as macro-financial assistance or progress in European integration efforts.

Challenges in the functioning of Integrity Councils

By examining the evolution of ICs and analysing the context of their establishment and functioning, we can identify several challenges. These challenges can be divided into institutional design, political, resource-related and operational, each of which has had a certain impact on the activities of the councils.

Institutional design challenges

As illustrated in the table above, each model of ICs possesses distinct characteristics that distinguish it from others. Over time, these models have evolved, incorporating new features to address the limitations and lessons learned from previous experiences. To better understand these developments, we will analyse the main institutional components of ICs separately: mandate, composition, decision-making mechanism and appointing authority.

Mandate: The mandate of each IC model has been clearly defined in the respective legal framework, outlining its authority and responsibilities in the vetting and selection processes. Despite these well-defined regulations, disputes have frequently arisen, leading to legal challenges in court. These cases often involve appeals on procedural grounds,1e3a46249978 on the progression of a certain candidate to further stages of selection,d586f3e107f9 or on negative integrity assessments concerning professional ethics and integrity compliance.978876051796

Another problem with the mandate may arise from the legal status of the IC itself. In Ukraine, the decision of any state authority can be reviewed in court. Given this, one could argue that ICs qualify as state authorities, making their decisions subject to judicial review. However, ICs can hardly be considered as such, since their decisions are recommendatory in nature and the decision on evaluation and (non-)appointment is made by the body under which ICs are established (eg the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine or the prosecutor general).3693619556fc This particular issue was raised before the Supreme Court, specifically regarding the status of the PCIE. In its decision of 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that the HQCJ, as a state body of judicial governance, is vested with the authority to organise and conduct qualification assessments to determine the ability of a judge (candidate for the position of judge) to administer justice. The PCIE only assists the HQCJ in fulfilling this task.f2f29a9a4fcc

In addition to legal disputes and uncertainties surrounding the formal status of ICs, other challenges related to their mandate have emerged in practice, in particular the standard of proof and criteria of integrity. As noted in recent analyses of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, a major unresolved issue concerns the substantive definition of integrity criteria – particularly, what types of facts constitute evidence of a lack of integrity. Despite nearly a decade of integrity checks conducted by various bodies, consistent and unified standards have yet to emerge. While institutions such as the PIC, PCIE, the Ethics Council and the Selection Commission for the HQCJ (the latter two have not been considered by this material) have adopted their own methodologies to improve transparency and predictability, these efforts have not resolved the issue at the systemic level. It was only in December 2023 that the Ukrainian Parliament authorised the HCJ to approve unified indicators for assessing judicial integrity and ethics, following consultations with other judicial governance bodies – a first step towards creating standardised criteria applicable across the judiciary.5481d5324a81

Composition: Initially, ICs relied primarily on national experts (both government and non-government), most of whom were appointed by state authorities. This structure allowed the government to exert indirect influence over the competitive selection of ACAs leaders. The involvement of experts nominated by international organisations introduced a new dynamic. In ICs where such experts (whether international or nationally based) were included, the selection processes tended to demonstrate greater impartiality and transparency compared to those composed solely of nationally appointed members.2a9273cb6934 Moreover, the legal framework for ICs, which has changed over time, allows international organisations to nominate both international and national experts, offering flexibility and access to a wider pool of qualified candidates.

The overall effectiveness of these mixed structures has varied depending on the specific design of the commission, particularly regarding decision-making powers. In some cases, international experts participated without having a decisive vote, which limited their ability to influence outcomes. In contrast, structures such as the PCIE granted international experts a more substantial role in decision-making, which contributed to more rigorous integrity checks.7ea1db7c4c73 Despite this progress, half of the commission members continued to be appointed by national authorities, leading to cases where national representatives deliberately sabotaged or delayed selection processes to prevent the appointment of independent and reform-minded candidates.e9e4e4270323

Decision-making mechanism: To prevent the integrity assessment process from becoming a mere formality, some ICs were granted specific powers to strengthen their role in selection procedures. However, these powers have not always been sufficient to ensure meaningful impact on integrity, selecting, screening and vetting processes. A clear example is the PIC, whose negative conclusions on judges or judicial candidates can be overridden by the HQCJ. This limitation was originally linked to constitutional and sovereignty considerations, as the full delegation of decision-making to an external or non-judicial body was seen as incompatible with Ukraine’s legal framework. Consequently, the PIC was given a consultative rather than binding role, reflecting a balance between integrity oversight and institutional independence. This legal provision remains in force, allowing judges with integrity concerns to pass qualification assessments and retain their positions.d90461b9c996 That said, with the relaunching of the HQCJ, the dynamics of overruling PIC opinions may be shifting, and the level of deference to PIC assessments could vary depending on the evolving institutional culture and practice. Similar mechanisms also differ across countries, depending on their legal systems and constitutional arrangements.

Appointment authority: the appointment of IC members by state authorities is inherently politicised, as it introduces the risk of governmental influence over institutions meant to ensure impartiality and transparency. Even when formal procedures for selection appear neutral, state-appointed representatives may be subject to political pressure, conflicts of interest or loyalty to the authorities that appointed them. This dynamic undermines the purpose of ICs, which is to provide independent integrity assessments and prevent undue influence in judicial and anti-corruption appointments.

Political challenges

Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms often face political resistance undermining the country’s progress. This resistance often manifested in delayed voting on legislation,a818b4f65e40 excessive amendments to weaken reformsf2297232ead8 (and the suspension of the powers of the ACAs).cd5caeda4183 ICs were no exception to such challenges.

From the beginning of the establishment of ICs, political elites sought to influence the selection and appointment of ACAs’ leadership, aiming to maintain control for political gain or to avoid scrutiny. Early efforts included attempts to place politically aligned individuals within these councils to take control of their decision-making. One instance of such interference was the former prosecutor general’s attempt to place his first deputy on the competition commission for the selection of the head of SAPO.bee10dbd3358 However, this attempt was countered by a combination of internal and external factors. Externally, public pressure played an important role, as civil society organisations and investigative journalists exposed these efforts, drawing the attention of the public.6a48f239b4d6 Additionally, international partners, particularly the EU, responded by publicly reinforcing the need for transparent selection and political support for the integrity of anti-corruption appointments.ef4fe6762329 Internally, the composition of the commission, specifically the presence of civil society actors, helped to expose the attempts of political interference in the competition. The combination of internal oversight within the commission and international pressure eventually led to the appointment of more neutral committee members.

Another political challenge relates to the mandate of ICs, particularly competition commissions, and their authority to recommend either a shortlist of candidates or a single finalist for appointment. The NABU competition commission has the authority to recommend three finalist candidates, from which the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine selects one as the NABU director. The three-candidate model, according to civil society experts, was deliberately introduced by political leadership to create space for behind-the-scenes bargaining and to increase the chances of appointing a loyal candidate.14a3b345c4a3 In contrast, the NACP competition commission can recommend one finalist candidate for appointment. These rules have remained unchanged for both commissions since their establishment.

However, the experience of the SAPO competition commissions highlights a different approach. During the first SAPO selection process in 2015, the panel was allowed to recommend multiple candidates for the prosecutor general to choose from. However, this raised concerns about potential political bias, namely, that prosecutors general could appoint the weakest candidate from the best or choose the politically dependent candidate in case they get into the shortlist of finalists. The amendment of this rule was envisaged by the Extended Fund Facility, signed between the IMF and Ukraine in 2015. As a result, since 2016, the law On the Prosecutor’s Office stipulates that the SAPO competition commission can recommend only one finalist candidate for the prosecutor general’s consideration.33d9516e8fa3 The most recent competition for the head of SAPO lasted nearly two years (August 2020–July 2022) and was marked by significant delays. These delays stemmed from the questionable actions of commission members appointed under Parliament’s quota – at one point, they refused to vote for the candidate who scored the most points during the competition. Later, the commission’s head further obstructed the process by repeatedly stalling decision-making.76a43a160e2b

Judicial resistance has also posed significant challenges. Many long-serving judges avoided the integrity assessments simply by not appearing for them.0a96eaee9f9d According to civic experts, in some cases, the HQCJ and HCJ may have undermined public participation in the qualification assessment process, thereby contributing to limited accountability.f2fd1c627126 As a result, judges with negative PIC evaluations retained their positions.3ba96baf4eaf This challenge to PIC activity has not yet been addressed and will require the use of existing legal disciplinary mechanisms on judges avoiding the qualification assessment and strengthening voting mechanisms to prevent the HQCJ from easily overriding PIC decisions.

To ensure the impartiality of IC members, civil society organisations such as the Anti-Corruption Action Centre, Transparency International Ukraine, and international partners, the OECDb627a80c055b and IMF,6c2bf97326e0 proposed including international experts in ICs to enhance transparency and impartiality.59adbd698484 While international experts now make up half of ICs, the other half consists of government-appointed members, which has led to deliberate obstruction. For instance, during the recent selection of the SAPO head, in addition to the failure to vote for the candidate with the highest score, there were other procedural delays. Even when quorum of the commission was present, the head refused to open the meeting, claiming quorum was not met. Further delays were caused by procedural obstacles ‘invented’ by the head, including an unnecessary request for candidates to undergo special verification, which was later deemed unwarranted by the Prosecutor General’s Office.731b0cd6e7bc These issues were addressed by the recent law on Strengthening the Independence of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

Judicial appeals have also been used as a political tool to obstruct ICs’ work. Compromised courts, such as the Kyiv District Administrative Courte6e122c9b7c2 (which was abolished only recently),1bd9a5cb57cb frequently overturned decisions and reforms. In addition, the recent constitutional petition by 58 members of parliament challenging the legal provisions on the engagement of foreign experts75ddad1f5ecc could be seen as an example of resistance to the involvement of international experts in ICs that jeopardises the impartiality and effectiveness of these mechanisms.

Resource and sustainability challenges

ICs also face resource challenges that impact their sustainability and effectiveness. A primary concern is funding. National experts often work on a voluntary basis, relying on salaries from other institutions, while international experts are typically compensated through donor funding.d9180f9c7854 This disparity can create tensions, discourage national participation and raise sustainability concerns if external funding ceases. The recent suspension of USAID projects also showed that the progress of ICs could be jeopardised when one of the largest donors stops work in the country – the government needed to urgently find other resources to fund several ICs in the judiciary.db91e4d8a3ec The stop-working order also affected the ability of the United States to nominate experts to ICs.

Another challenge is the recruitment of qualified experts as there is a limited pool of professionals with the necessary technical knowledge, regional expertise and understanding of Ukraine’s legal system, integrity assessment processes and anti-corruption framework. The involvement of international experts places a certain burden on international organisations and donors that support such activities. However, allowing national experts to be nominated under the quota of international organisations can help address the challenge of insufficient contextual understanding.817ba265f9f8 Given that Ukraine has been implementing integrity- and veto-based reforms for several years, a pool of both national and international experts with relevant experience and qualifications has already been formed. In this context, it would be appropriate to formalise a ‘personnel reserve’ and engage these experts as needed, depending on their availability.

Operational challenges

Operational challenges also affect ICs’ effectiveness, such as the capacity of their secretariats (hired by the donors578f0c77c77f and placed in donor offices), which provide critical administrative and analytical support.

Technological and logistical issues further strain resources. Secure digital infrastructure is essential for managing candidate dossiers and maintaining confidentiality, yet limited resources hinder these processes. Proper facilities and tools for remote and in-person meetings, particularly for international experts, are also necessary but often lacking. Logistical issues, such as accessing dossiers remotely (eg between HQCJ and PIC), further complicate operations.

Finally, assessing realistic deadlines for vetting and integrity checks is critical. Balancing efficiency with thoroughness is challenging, especially with large caseloads, such as assessing 1,800 sitting or future judges, which is ongoing,e3321849193f a figure that must be understood in the broader context of Ukraine’s judicial system. The HQCJ is currently engaged in several overlapping areas of work, including competitions for local (first instance) and appellate court judges, competitions for the HACC and the qualification assessment process itself. Due to limited institutional capacity, qualification assessments are progressing slowly. For example, in March 2025, the HQCJ conducted only one interview as part of the qualification assessment, received PIC opinions on 12 judges and scheduled moral-psychological testing for 41 others. These are distinct steps within the broader assessment procedure and should not be interpreted as completed evaluations of 54 judges. At the same time, as of 2024, there were 2,150 judicial positions in local and appellate courts that remained vacant.ef2962f3bd0d Proper planning and resources are needed to address logistical hurdles and ensure effective evaluations.

What lessons can be learned from Ukraine’s experience of establishing Integrity Councils?

Ukraine’s experience in establishing ICs offers useful insights into the challenges and opportunities of implementing judicial and anti-corruption reforms in a transitional democracy. The process of establishing ICs has evolved since 2015, providing lessons that can help improve their future work in Ukraine and offering insights that may be useful for other countries seeking to strengthen their anti-corruption and judicial integrity mechanisms.

Integrity Councils as a tool for reforming biased institutions

First, ICs can serve as an important tool for selecting/vetting public servants, especially those who will work in the anti-corruption sphere. Countries that have biased law enforcement or judicial agencies should pay attention to this tool, as it can help select among current law enforcement officers and judges, honest people who are ready to change the system. The path to success of such ICs will be their independence. Beyond addressing existing biases in law enforcement or judiciary, ICs can also function as a preventive mechanism, ensuring that individuals appointed to key positions uphold integrity standards from the outset.

Civil society as a driver of reform

Civil society plays a crucial role in vetting processes through ICs. Beyond their participation in these councils, civil society organisations contribute by overseeing the vetting process, advocating for transparency, and shaping legislative frameworks to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of these institutions.

This leads to the next conclusion – civil society can provide strong advocacy for the establishment of ICs with the support of international partners – the so-called sandwich effect, when civil society is pushing on one side and international partners on the other, so the Ukrainian government in between must implement the reforms.cb60fe9b22e5 The experience of cooperation between civil society and the Ukrainian government shows that the latter is not always ready to compromise on reforms from within.

International involvement: Who is nominating versus who is nominated?

While discussing international involvement in integrity checks, selecting processes, screening processes and vetting processes, the focus should be not only on international experts themselves but, more importantly, on the bodies responsible for their nomination or appointment (whether international organisations or domestic state authorities). The key issue is not who is appointed, but rather who is making the appointments (nominations) and how that influences the overall integrity and impartiality of the process. This can help ensure the independence of ICs. Ukraine’s experience shows the intention of certain political circles to take control of specialised ACAs to protect themselves from criminal prosecution and use these bodies as a tool for political reprisals against opponents. The major consideration in maintaining impartiality is not just the nationality of the experts but the neutrality of the appointing authority. International experts selected by the Ukrainian government could be as biased as national experts and be used or manipulated with the same political motives due to the absence of specific rules for integrity checks, selecting, screening and vetting.599694dd7b78 Appointment of members of ICs through international organisations helps maintain their impartiality and reinforces trust in the process. Many of these organisations maintain a diverse roster of both national and international experts, focusing not on nationality but on qualifications, ethical standards and professional independence.

As might be expected, the engagement of international organisations or experts alone is not a panacea for solving all the problems that may arise in the anti-corruption sector in a country. However, they can provide a good start and a solid foundation for further reforms. Additionally, their presence provides a necessary safeguard during periods of political interference and institutional vulnerability. International participation in ICs is necessary as long as political interference remains a risk and institutional processes lack full independence. The role of international experts helps safeguard impartiality and ensure transparent selection mechanisms. In Ukraine, their involvement should continue until the country institutionalises clear, self-sustaining procedures that prevent undue political influence and guarantee the integrity of appointments without external oversight.

To facilitate expert engagement, a structured, pre-vetted pool of experts, particularly those who could be nominated by the international organisations, should be considered. This roster would not serve as a list of final appointees, but rather as a pool of qualified professionals who meet baseline criteria of integrity, expertise and contextual understanding, and who are available for nomination when relevant selection processes are launched. Such a mechanism could help reduce delays in forming selection commissions and ensure a degree of continuity in institutional memory, even as the list of nominating organisations changes across different procedures.

Importantly, the composition of nominating organisations varies by process and over time, depending on the specific legal formulations and donor agreements in place. Some international organisations may qualify to nominate experts under one framework but not under another, and even when eligible, may choose not to participate due to potential conflicts of interest or internal policies. While these factors limit the universality of a shared roster, developing such a tool, under the coordination of a consortium or trusted neutral actor, could still provide a more sustainable foundation for expert engagement, while preserving the independence and credibility of ICs. Naturally, this would require additional coordination and resources, but it would also create a more sustainable system for selecting qualified individuals while preserving the independence of ICs.

Ensuring the operational capacities of Integrity Councils

ICs (and their secretariats) should be provided with all resources necessary for their effective functioning, including appropriate premises and access to relevant databases. Reformers must consider how to ensure council members have access to databases on declarations, assets and state property registers (if available). Such access would not only facilitate direct review of information by ICs but also enable them to verify data received from external actors, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the assessment process.

Establishing legal safeguards

In addition, it is crucial to anticipate and address potential avenues for interference in IC activities. During the legislative establishment of ICs, special attention should be given to defining their legal status. One crucial consideration is whether their decisions can be contested in court. Clarifying and limiting the grounds for procedural appeals can significantly reduce delays associated with legal challenges to IC’s decisions. By embedding these safeguards into the legislative framework, reformers can ensure ICs’ uninterrupted operation and their ability to fulfil their mandate effectively.

Design matters: Key structural elements that determine effectiveness of Integrity Councils

Beyond the role of civil society and international organisations/experts, the composition, mandate and powers of both ICs and appointing authorities could determine their overall effectiveness/success. Examining these elements provides insights into how ICs function in practice and where improvements are needed. These three elements could function as interconnected building blocks – modifying one can either strengthen or weaken the overall system. Therefore, it is essential to find the right balance that aligns with the specific context and conditions to ensure ICs operate effectively.

In Ukraine, an effective model has included the involvement of international or independent national experts, nominated by international organisations and donors, with a casting vote or veto power over decisions made by members appointed by the national authorities’ quota, along with clear procedural safeguards to ensure continuity and consistency. Based on this experience, several essential features emerge that may enhance the success of similar mechanisms in other reforming democracies:

1. Composition and appointing authority: The inclusion of national and international experts, both nominated by reputable international organisations or donors, can enhance ICs’ independence and impartiality. The method of appointment plays a critical role in insulating the IC from domestic political pressures.
2. A clearly defined mandate: The legal framework should specify the full scope of ICs powers, procedures and processes for approving or rejecting candidates within selection/vetting. Legal clarity helps prevent disputes over jurisdiction and ensures predictability in the council’s work.
3. Decision-making mechanism: Granting national or international experts, nominated by international organisations or donors, a decisive vote or veto power has proven effective in safeguarding the impartiality of integrity checks, selecting processes, screening processes and vetting processes. Such power ensures that candidates who fail to meet required criteria and standards cannot be appointed solely through national-level political influence.

Ultimately, the success of ICs depends not only on their initial establishment but also on sustained efforts to ensure their independence, inclusivity and operational effectiveness, making them a cornerstone for long-term judicial and anti-corruption reforms in transitional democracies like Ukraine.