Publication | U4 Brief

Ecuador's schools at risk: organised crime, corruption, and priorities for policy action

How Ecuador became a hub for organised crime

Over the past two decades, Ecuador has transformed from a relatively peaceful nation into Latin America’s most violent country. The intentional homicide rate reached 44.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024, up from approximately 6.7 per 100,000 in 2019 – a 564% increase (Statista 2024). By January 2025, the murder rate had reached a record high, with one person killed every hour (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal, 2025).

Ecuador’s position between Colombia and Peru, two of the world’s largest cocaine producers, its Pacific ports (notably Guayaquil), and porous borders have made it an attractive transit country for global drug markets (InSight Crime 2023). The fragmentation of armed groups following Colombia’s 2016 peace accord displaced trafficking routes southward, increasing pressure on Ecuadorian institutions. The 2018 Peace Accords between the Colombian government and FARC inadvertently led to the rise of dissident groups such as the Oliver Sinisterra Front, which controls drug production and trafficking along the Ecuadorian border (Brown 2024).

Criminal economies have diversified beyond cocaine to include extortion, illegal mining and logging, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering. Ecuador now ranks among Latin America’s highest-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing (Statista 2024b). Highly violent organisations including Los Choneros, Los Lobos, and Tiguerones maintain strong ties with Mexican, Colombian, and Albanian drug cartels, as well as Chinese criminal networks. The Venezuelan organised crime group Tren de Aragua also operates in Ecuador (Sampó and Troncoso 2024). In 2023, fentanyl sales and use were detected for the first time, signalling further diversification of the drug trade.

The 2014 economic recession drained resources once allocated to social programmes aimed at gang pacification, leaving communities especially exposed (IMF 2015; World Bank 2018). Places such as Durán, once beneficiaries of social investment, found themselves particularly vulnerable when funding dried up. These pressures intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted livelihoods and reduced the reach of routine state services (ILO 2020). At the same time, illicit economies adapted quickly to restrictions and enforcement shifts, showing resilience even as legal economies contracted (UNODC 2020, 2021).

This institutional capture extends from law enforcement and the judiciary to education administration.

Corruption across state institutions has been central to this transformation. Organised crime has not merely exploited weak governance; it has systematically captured institutions through bribery, intimidation, and the strategic placement of allies in positions of power. This institutional capture extends from law enforcement and the judiciary to education administration, creating networks of complicity that enable criminal operations and suppress accountability.

This brief draws on peer-reviewed research, organizational reports and news sources to explore manifestations and drivers of these issues, how and why the education sector becomes involved, the consequences for educational outcomes, and the policy responses implemented. Anonymous interviews were also conducted with a handful of educators in Ecuador. The review concludes with recommendations to address the challenges identified.

Impact on the education sector

The impact of increased crime and corruption is particularly acute in coastal regions, where homicides are concentrated along trafficking corridors and at key dispatch points such as Guayaquil port. In Guayaquil, Ecuador’s second-largest city, several schools in the most marginalised areas have repeatedly suspended in-person education since 2023 due to security concerns. In Monte Sinaí, a township in Guayaquil, police reported in 2023 that 16% of high school students were involved in criminal organisations (Primicias 2023). In the nearby neighbourhood of Nueva Prosperina, the homicide rate reached 114 per 100,000 inhabitants, comparable to the world’s most dangerous cities (Statista 2024c).

On January 9, 2024, President Daniel Noboa declared an ‘armed conflict’ against gangs, marking a decisive escalation in the fight against organised crime. The Ministry of Education temporarily suspended all in-person classes nationwide, shifting to online learning (Human Rights Watch 2024)). This measure, while necessary for immediate safety, highlighted the digital divide affecting marginalised communities with limited internet access. More recently, evening classes in several provinces have been repeatedly suspended due to electricity shortages, further limiting access to education (Teleamazonas 2024).

While the entire country and education system are affected, the coastal region remains most severely impacted. However, similar dynamics are increasingly reported in the Highlands and Amazon regions. Indigenous and rural communities face additional vulnerabilities. Limited state presence makes schools in these areas even more susceptible to criminal penetration, and marginalised groups have fewer resources to resist extortion or protect their children from recruitment (Minority Rights Group International, n.d.). Recent reports indicate that scientists and environmental workers in national parks face violence and threats from gangs involved in illegal logging and mining, suggesting that criminal networks are expanding their territorial control (The Guardian 2025).

The corruption-crime nexus in education

Institutional capture and politicisation

Organised crime has thrived not simply because of geography or economic opportunity, but because corruption lowered the costs and risks of operating in Ecuador. Criminal groups have systematically exploited weak oversight, politicised appointments, and under-resourced institutions to secure protection and impunity. The Metástasis investigation revealed deep infiltration of criminal networks into state institutions, including the justice system, where collusion between traffickers and police, judges, and prosecutors has facilitated impunity (The Dialogue 2024; Brown 2024). Officials have been caught leaking information to traffickers in exchange for bribes. In the prison system, corruption has allowed gangs to effectively control facilities, leading to violent riots and the consolidation of criminal power (Valencia & Avilés 2023).

Officials have been caught leaking information to traffickers in exchange for bribes.

The education sector reflects these dynamics. Teaching and administrative posts are often sold or distributed through political connections, weakening merit and oversight. As one interviewee noted: ‘No person can aspire to a position of authority without paying for it. This means that at least in the Intercultural Bilingual Education System you cannot compete for a leadership position without resources and only with your professional merits’. This creates fertile ground for organised crime to exploit these networks.

Education officials, local governments, police, and political parties strike agreements to share financial gains, allocating percentages among themselves to ensure complicity. Organised crime networks embed monitors or enforcers within the public sector to oversee and protect those benefiting from their operations, solidifying control over the system. Drug money has allegedly financed election campaigns and influenced public contracts, creating cycles of obligation that entrench corruption (EcuadorTimes.net 2019).

Corruption in procurement and resource allocation

Public contracts for infrastructure, security services, and other needs are frequently awarded to front companies linked to criminal organisations. Skilled operators fabricate evidence to legitimise fraudulent processes, and oversight mechanisms are either compromised or lack the capacity to detect irregularities (Brown 2024). In Ecuador’s Millennium Schools project, auditors found that between 2008 and 2016 the government approved emergency, no-bid contracts to build new schools. Costs were inflated by 7% to 102% through diversion of funds, leading oversight bodies to request investigations of former officials, including a former president, for organised crime in relation to these corrupt deals (EcuadorTimes.net 2019).

Beyond large-scale procurement fraud, smaller-scale corruption affects day-to-day resource allocation. School budgets may be diverted through ghost employees, inflated supply costs, or extraction of percentages from teacher salaries. In some cases, criminal networks demand payment from schools for “security” or “protection”, effectively running extortion rackets that drain resources meant for education. These practices persist because officials who resist face intimidation or violence, while those who comply are co-opted into networks of mutual benefit.

Criminal penetration of schools and communities

Schools provide access to concentrated groups of young people, making them prime targets for gang recruitment. Limited opportunities for adolescents and youth, coupled with disillusionment regarding education as a pathway to better livelihoods, have fuelled recruitment into criminal networks (The Dialogue 2024). Many young people see education as disconnected from economic prospects, particularly when unemployment and informality dominate local labour markets. Gangs lure young people with promises of money, status and material rewards, while micro-illicit businesses such as drug sales flourish in and around schools (CBS News 2022; Ramírez 2024).

The Education Ministry recorded hundreds of cases of robberies, extortion, and kidnappings targeting teachers.

Criminal groups extort educators, intimidate students, and use school areas for drug dealing – termed microtráfico – (Ecuador Envivo 2025). The national teachers’ union (UNE) received hundreds of reports of teachers threatened with kidnapping or extortion in 2024. The Education Ministry recorded hundreds of cases of robberies, extortion, and kidnappings targeting teachers (Ecuador Envivo 2025). In certain neighbourhoods of Guayaquil, gang members force teachers to pay so-called vacunas: protection money (Ecuador Envivo 2025). Teachers who refuse face escalating threats, and in some cases, violence.

Schools are often among the most prominent state institutions in local communities. In marginalised or gang-dominated areas, the school may be one of the few government presences, making it both a target for extortion and a contested space for territorial control. When the state is unable to provide security, criminal networks fill the vacuum, effectively governing these spaces through a combination of coercion and the provision of certain services or protection. Students navigating gang-controlled routes to school face risks of recruitment, violence, or demands for payment. Some avoid school entirely, contributing to absenteeism and dropout (Torres 2023).

A culture of fear, perpetuated by violence and complicity at all levels, suppresses reporting and reform efforts. Reporting crimes or seeking help is fraught with danger. Police officers collaborating with criminal organisations have leaked information about calls to the national emergency line – ECU 911 – leading to acts of revenge against callers (Brown 2024). This greatly deters accountability across government, including in the education sector. Teachers, administrators, and parents who might otherwise report corruption or criminal activity remain silent out of fear for their safety and that of their families.

Consequences for learning outcomes and educational quality

The intersection of corruption and violence has severe consequences for educational quality and access. Teacher absenteeism, a well-documented corruption problem in developing countries, is exacerbated in high-risk areas where educators fear for their safety (Patrinos 2013). When teachers do not show up, instructional time is lost, continuity is disrupted, and students fall behind. Schools operating under constant threat cannot maintain consistent teaching schedules or quality instruction.

Violence disrupts the continuity of education in multiple ways. Repeated school closures, shortened school days, and suspension of evening classes limit instructional time. Students in affected areas face transportation risks, with some avoiding school entirely due to gang-controlled routes (Torres 2023). The shift to online learning during the 2024 suspension highlighted the digital divide, as marginalised communities with limited internet access struggled to participate. Even when schools are open, the psychological toll of operating in violent environments affects both teaching and learning. Fear, trauma, and stress undermine concentration and academic performance.

The long-term implications are profound. Disrupted schooling and poor learning outcomes perpetuate cycles of poverty and marginalisation, creating conditions in which organised crime continues to flourish. Breaking this cycle requires addressing both the immediate security threats and the underlying corruption that enables it.

Recommendations for reform: oversight, protection, capacity, and cooperation in high-crime contexts

Addressing corruption in Ecuador's education system requires interventions that acknowledge the mutually reinforcing relationship between organised crime and corruption. Solutions must be context-specific, recognising the power and reach of criminal networks and the culture of fear that suppresses accountability. The following recommendations are designed for government officials, education authorities, donors, and civil society organisations working in high-risk contexts.

Strengthen oversight and accountability

Establish independent oversight mechanisms for education procurement with public disclosure of contracts, bidders, and award criteria. Implement merit-based recruitment and promotion through transparent, competitive processes with public disclosure of results (Haider, 2019). Conduct regular financial audits of school budgets, particularly in high-crime areas, examining patterns that may indicate extortion or fund diversion. Ecuador has oversight bodies such as the Rights and Justice Observatory (2024), but their effectiveness depends on adequate resources, political independence, and protection from interference. Donors should support transparent procurement (UNODC, 2013), merit-based appointments, and protected reporting mechanisms through technical assistance for building institutional capacity.

Protect reporting and whistleblowing

Create secure, anonymous reporting channels that bypass potentially compromised local authorities through digital platforms with encryption and third-party oversight (UNODC 2015). Ecuador's Ministry of Education has established official channels for reporting corruption (Ministerio de Educación 2024), but these require strengthening to ensure genuine anonymity. Provide legal and physical protection for whistleblowers, including temporary relocation, legal representation, and economic support. Engage civil society organisations and professional associations in monitoring and advocacy, recognising that they may themselves face intimidation and require protection.

Address school-level vulnerabilities

Implement community-based security approaches involving parents, local leaders, and students, building on the Ministry of Education's Safe and Protective Educational Communities programme (Ministerio de Educación 2024) with adequate resources and genuine participation. Provide alternative pathways for youth through vocational training and employment programmes that connect education to labour market opportunities. Support teacher well-being through psychosocial support, security training, and fair compensation that reflects genuine risks and reduces vulnerability to extortion.

Strengthen institutional capacity and coordination

Invest in digital information systems that track education expenditures, teacher appointments, and student enrolment in real time, with robust cybersecurity to prevent infiltration (Long et al, 2023). Build anti-corruption capacity through practical training in ethical leadership, fraud detection, and risk management that recognises high-crime context challenges. Coordinate across sectors through clear protocols for information sharing, joint investigations, and coordinated responses to threats against education personnel.

Strengthening international and regional cooperation

Support regional cooperation platforms to facilitate knowledge exchange, coordinate investigations, and strengthen responses to transnational criminal networks. Fund research and documentation to build the evidence base on corruption in education in high-crime contexts, with protection for researchers.

Addressing both the symptoms and root causes

Ecuador’s education system faces a dual crisis of violence and corruption. Organised crime has not merely disrupted schooling through insecurity; it has systematically penetrated education institutions through corruption, from procurement fraud to the capture of administrative positions. These challenges mirror patterns observed in other fragile or conflict-affected contexts, where corruption and organised crime become mutually reinforcing, with illicit profits financing political influence and captured institutions enabling further criminal expansion.

Addressing corruption in this context requires interventions that acknowledge the power and reach of criminal networks. As mentioned, strengthening oversight, protecting whistleblowers, addressing school-level vulnerabilities, and building institutional capacity are essential. Yet these efforts must be accompanied by political will, adequate resources, and genuine commitment to the rule of law. In contexts where criminal networks have infiltrated state institutions, technical fixes alone will not suffice. Sustainable reform requires confronting entrenched interests and protecting those who champion change.

Most importantly, anti-corruption efforts must recognise that education institutions sit within broader political and economic systems. Sustainable change requires not only technical interventions, but also addressing the structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, weak institutions and limited economic opportunities – that enable both corruption and organised crime to flourish. When young people see education as disconnected from prospects for dignified livelihoods, when teachers must choose between complicity and personal safety, and when communities lack the state presence necessary to provide security, corruption and crime become rational adaptations to an irrational system.

Corruption and crime become rational adaptations to an irrational system.

Without comprehensive approaches that address both the symptoms and root causes, Ecuador’s education system will continue to operate on the frontline of a crisis that undermines learning, perpetuates inequality, and erodes social cohesion. The stakes extend beyond education outcomes to the fundamental question of whether state institutions can reclaim legitimacy and provide the security and opportunity that citizens deserve. Combating corruption in education is therefore not merely a technical challenge, but a political and moral imperative central to Ecuador’s future.

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