Corruption in public procurementGeneral overview
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| Stage A: Decision to contract ( identification of need) | |
| Description | Main risks (examples) |
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The government decides to purchase or sell goods or services, or to outsource
the management of a unit. |
The decision does not follow a policy rational or an existing need but rather the desire to channel benefits to an individual or and organisation. For example, demand is created for a good no one buys simply to benefit the company's owner. |
| Stage B: Identification/definition of contract characteristics (technical requirements, characteristics of goods and services, etc.) | |
| Description | Main risks (examples) |
| The government determines what it needs to buy or sell or privatise (technical requirements, specific characteristics) and how it will go about it (contracting method, agency responsible, etc) |
Characteristics (technical or not) are made to favour a special
supplier or contractor and not to properly address the need identified; Evaluation criteria are not set from the start or are not objective, thereby making them prone to abuse |
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Stage C: Contracting process |
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| Description | Main risks (examples) |
| A contracting process opens. It should take place according to what method the law determines be used to receive proposals (e.g. open bidding system) or evaluate contractors (e.g. single source) | Invitation to tender (an open bid)
is not publicised, thereby restricting the number of bidders that participate; When short-lists are used, companies bribe to be included or to gain access to them; Invitation to tender is publicised but very little time is given to present offers, making it difficult for bidders without prior knowledge of the contract to present bids; Abuse of confidentiality or lack of publicity creates unequal playing field for bidders; In single-source processes, lack of publicity or transparency leads to unjustifiable decisions; Bidders or contractors collude to influence prices or to share the market by artificially losing bids, or not presenting offers. |
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Stage D: Contract award |
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| Description | Main risks (examples) |
| Contract process ends and a decision is made in order to select the winning bidder (in open bids) or the contractor (in single-source processes). | Evaluation criteria are not clearly stated
in tender documents, leaving no grounds to justify the decision; Evaluation of bids is subjective or leaves room for manipulation and biased assessments; Contract awards are not publicised (nor the grounds for the decision). |
| Stage E: Contract implementation and supervision | |
| Description | Main risks (examples) |
| The contract is signed with the selected bidder or contractor | Contract changes and renegotiations
after the award are of a nature that changes the substance of the contract
itself; Supervising agencies/individuals are unduly influenced to alter the contents of their reports so changes in quality, performance, equipment and characteristics go unnoticed; Contractor's claims are false or inaccurate and are protected by those in charge of revising them; Subcontractors and partners are chosen in a non-transparent way, are unaccountable or are used to channel bribes. |
Additional risks are created by confusing or contradictory legislation. In some cases, for example, donor and credit agencies require their procurement procedures to be used instead of national procedures. In some cases, this has been helpful; but in others, requirements for transparency are higher under national legislation. In this case, an important tool to prevent corruption is lost. An additional burden is created if the local implementation agency is not familiarised with the donor or credit agency's guidelines, or if it has to simultaneously handle several processes under different regulations.
Research has told us that corruption in procurement takes place because of - and is worsened by - the following factors:
Size Mystification
The more high technology involved, or seemingly involved, the more
attractive the project will be to the potential beneficiaries. This kind
of "mystification" reduces the risk of being criticised for
paying too much. (For example: How many people can say whether a particular
fighter aircraft should have cost $21million rather than $23million?)
Immediacy
The term of office may be brief to many politicians, but also to officials.
From this it follows that the most attractive projects are those in which
the full purchase price, or at least a very substantial deposit, is payable
at an early stage.
Discretion
The discretionary authority of public officials often represents a golden
opportunity to obtain bribes. Discretionary power is at its greatest when
the public demand and the public preferences are delegated to the public
agent and defined during a bilateral bargaining process. Then the civil
servant is choosing the private part, while price and other contract conditions
are the result of the negotiation process. The discretionary authority
includes
Added Risks of Corruption in Emergency SituationsSee the following resources: Corruption
in emergency procurement.pdf (U4 Issue 7:2006) |
It is important to distinguish between instances of corruption and cases of inefficiency or lack of capacity. While these problems sometimes go hand-in-hand, and some solutions are helpful in all areas, there are also trade-offs. For example, choosing to speed up a contracting process might reduce its transparency, making it very efficient but more prone to corruption. Moreover, it is important to realise that there is no single solution to the problem. Contracting processes need to be permanently monitored. Supervision and control play a key role since good rules are necessary but not always enough to curb corruption. It is also important to have clear and publicly available procedures and to have regular audits by external parties.
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Corruption, inefficiency or lack of expertise? A case study from Ghana |
It is possible to combat and prevent corruption in public contracting. There is now a global consensus on the need to curb corruption that encompasses companies, governments, donors and credit agencies and civil society organisations around the world.
For many years, it was believed that the only way to fight corruption in public contracting was through law enforcement and control. While this is clearly necessary, it often comes too late, after the damage has been caused. More importantly, corrupt behaviour should be prevented by giving those involved in contracting the opportunity to avoid it and the pressure to do so.
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Control is necessary, but it may come too late: Corruption in health care procurement in Thailand In Thailand, investigations by the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) into allegations of systemic corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies found several cases involving all levels of employees at the Ministry of Public Health and their associations with politicians in schemes to gain kickbacks through large-scale contracting. Community hospitals were being induced to purchase overpriced medicine and medical supplies from a certain company using the Baht 1.4 billion supplemental budget. The supplemental budget was intended to be distributed to provincial and district hospitals in order that they may repay their pharmaceutical debts and/or to purchase medicine; later the Ministry added 'medical supplies' to the proposal as well. In 1997, the Ministry had retained control of the funding coming from this supplemental budget, centralised medicine procurement and cancelled the use of ceiling prices for medicine; this enabled political office holders at the Ministry to induce their deputies in the provinces to purchase highly overpriced medical supplies, up to a 1220-fold increase, from five dealers with alleged political connections involving kickbacks that could range from 5% to 50% of the purchase price. Later, an investigation into the role of the Government Pharmaceuticals Organization (GPO) took place, and it was found that the wider scandal spanned to 34 provinces and had cost the public more than Baht 105 million. Following the release of the NCCC investigation, two ministers resigned; two ministerial advisers were criminally charged, found guilty, and are currently serving six-year prison sentences; seven high-ranking officials were dismissed; and 23 were reprimanded. Civil society groups played a key role in helping to highlight this case and lobby for sanctioning those responsible. |
Good rules, transparency and monitoring are three elements that help to prevent corruption in this area.
Some contracting or procurement problems stem from inefficiencies in the contracting system. Some tools that help to correct these inefficiencies may also prevent corruption and vice versa. But this is not always the case. For example, speeding up the procurement process may increase the risks of corruption if transparency and accountability are not assured. Conversely, a strategy to prevent corruption, if not implemented appropriately, may introduce unnecessary delays. This means that a careful consideration of impact and implementation should be performed. Adequate training of procurement officers, the establishment of multidisciplinary and multi-party evaluation committees, rotation principles for procurement officials and the establishment of accountability and report procedures, are key in fighting corruption. Incentives promoting 'good behaviour' for individuals are also needed, such as the performance-based staff incentive structures. Systems usually plan punishment for 'bad behaviour', but experience proves that rewards for good behaviour can motivate individuals. The development of codes of conduct for staff is also extremely important.
| Corruption public procurement | |
| General overview | |
| Mitigating strategies | |
| Health sector and procurement | |
| Education sector and procurement |
| OTHER SOURCES |
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UN Public Procurement Resource Website |
| U4 BRIEFS ON PROCUREMENT |
Health Sector: |
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| U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre | http://www.u4.no |