Types of contracting in this sector vary depending on the type of education policy (public/private schooling or school management, education oversight system, provision of school texts and supplies, and types of infrastructure.
Corruption in procurement can occur in the provision of educational material, of school supplies and equipment, meals and also in the construction of educational facilities.
Risks of corruption in contracting in the education sector are similar to those that appear in contracting processes in other sectors, and therefore should be treated in a similar way. However, some special characteristics create particular challenges, including the following:
Service provision may imply long-term contracts (such as management and operation of school facilities), while procurement of textbooks is implemented immediately. Service contracts may therefore present more monitoring challenges in assessing the quality of the service provided.
The nature of the textbook industry is such that in some areas it
is almost monopolistic, and in others not, creating strong incentives
to bribe to secure sales or creating confusion about the availability
of providers.
National beliefs about the content of textbooks encourage non-transparent,
closed bids.
Difficulties arise in managing conflicts of interest amongst authors and teachers in textbook selection committees where their expertise is needed.
For all types of contracts, it is important to avoid seeing the contracting
process in isolation. For example, the provision of school supplies involves
three related activities that entangle different risks:
the selection of the textbooks to be procured;
the procurement of the textbooks;
the delivery of the textbooks to students.
Textbook procurement in the Philippines: monitoring
is important
In 1998, suppliers to the Department of Education (DepEd) in the
Philippines claimed that bribes in the provision of learning materials
ranged from 20-65% of the value of the contract. Some suppliers
even got legislators to sign requisition issue vouchers, which was
against existing auditing rules. The Commission on Audit (COA) found
that the DepEd bought P17.9 million (US$320,000) worth of idle,
unused textbooks, without consulting principals and superintendents.A
regional director of the DepEd also bought 1,000 copies of an unendorsed
dictionary for P1.89 million (US$33,000).
Investigative journalists revealed that, although the reforms implemented
by the DepEd in 1999 were far-reaching, they had mixed results.
The clean-up was conducted at the top, as the reform clipped the
powers of regional directors, but corruption remained pervasive
in local school boards, as the boards received greater autonomy
and discretion. Hence, it became difficult for the DepEd to monitor
what its field offices were buying, especially as the reform allowed
for superintendents to choose titles themselves.
Despite the reform, bribery remained the norm and decisions were
made based on payoffs, not needs. However, while payoffs remain
substantial - between 15-30% - they have been significantly reduced.
Furthermore, textbook prices decreased by 40% due to the fact that
publishers no longer sold their goods to legislators. NGO monitoring
was also incorporated into the procurement process. In 2001, the
DepEd posted the biggest audit suspension totalling P6.9 billion
(US$123.5 million), or one quarter of all audit suspensions. The
COA regularly uncovered new examples of irregular textbook purchasing.
Like in any contracting process, the identification of the texts needed risks the requirements being tailored for a specific provider, and conflicts of interest or plain private interest may be a source of corruption. A small market size may also result in the selection of texts automatically implying the nomination of a particular supplier. In other cases, appropriate publicity may enable other providers to present offers opening up the process. Whether this is the case or not, the process needs to be transparent from the start. Even if for nationalistic reasons a domestic source of supply is preferred, it can be performed transparently. Moreover, once the texts have been acquired and the contract implemented, care needs to be taken to make sure that the purpose of the contract is fulfilled and the textbooks reach the students. Distribution may or may not be a feature of the text procurement contract, but even if it is not, monitoring and transparency will facilitate delivery and accountability. Facilitating civil society participation can enable monitoring and promote accountability, especially in contract implementation. The use of good rules and guidelines for contracting is always necessary.
Getting the textbooks right: case study from
Argentina
One recent example of a successful strategy was a consultation procedure, implemented by Poder Ciudadano, Transparency International’s national chapter in Argentina, on the procurement of 3,315,000 books for use nationwide. An initial textbook selection phase was halted by objections to the textbook selection criteria, to the jurors that intervened in the selection and to the local management procedures. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology then invited Poder Ciudadano to participate in the second attempt and to help them to develop a transparent process. The TI chapter introduced three strategies.
Firstly they organised participatory discussions of the criteria for selecting the textbooks to be procured and of the tender documents to procure them. These discussions involved representatives of the Ministry and textbook publishers and were mediated by Poder Ciudadano.
Secondly, they implemented a no-bribes TI Integrity Pact, which was subscribed to by both the bidders and the Ministry to create common and clear ground rules for the procurement process.
Finally, they set up mechanisms to prevent and manage conflicts of interest among members of the advisory committee in charge of pre-selecting the texts. This, in addition to transparency and publicity measures during the contracting procedure, resulted in a transparent process with no objections and a broader diversity of textbooks and publishing houses (56 publishers participated and 48.3% of those were awarded at least one contract).
Corruption is rampant in construction and construction of education facilities is no exception. Preventive measures that apply to general contracting problems also apply here.
Learning the wrong lessons in Malawi schools
In 2000, serious fraud amounting to K187 million (US$2.3 million) was exposed at Malawi’s Ministry of Education relating to the issuing of contracts to build schools.
Following the government’s decision to introduce free primary education, the education ministry embarked on projects to build schools. Contracts were not awarded by way of fair tender, but in many cases to members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) - the party of then President Muluzi - who registered as building contractors. The ‘contractors’ were paid for the projects, but these so-called ‘ghost’ schools were never constructed.
It is alleged that the contract money was used by the president’s party loyalists in campaigning in the 2000 general elections. Eleven parliamentarians were named and three cabinet ministers lost their jobs. Two cabinet ministers were charged and taken to court, but later acquitted.
UN Public Procurement Resource Website
The UN Procurement Capacity Development Centre (PCDC) has launched a new website at www.unpcdc.org, which aims to link a broad network of individuals and organizations in both developed and developing countries, from governments, the private sector, civil society groups, educational institutions, and other organizations. This website provides a forum for the exchange of information on procurement capacity development research, analysis, approaches, tools and lessons from experience.
