U4 Theme:
Political Corruption
Political corruption undermines political and economic development in many countries, and raises difficult challenges for foreign aid.
What is political corruption? What are the main mechanisms? What can donors do when partner governments are corrupt? These are some of the questions addressed by these focus area pages. The purpose is to extract and present the latest knowledge on issues of political corruption, and we invite advisors in the field of good governance and economics (agency staff and academics) to share opinions, lessons learned and best practice on all aspects of this challenging topic. |
| U4 PUBLICATIONS | |
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Political corruption undermines political and economic development in many countries, and raises difficult challenges for foreign aid. What is political corruption? What are the main mechanisms? What can donors do when partner governments are corrupt? These are some of the questions addressed by this U4 Issue.
Conditional cash transfer programmes are promoted as best practice in the social sector for fighting poverty. However, autonomy and discretion make them vulnerable to corruption when beneficiaries and programme officers falsify information to receive transfers, or politicians use them to get votes. Consistent programme design aligned with clear criteria for targeting households, effective complaint mechanisms for users, and surveillance by civil society groups can reduce political clientelism.
Estimates of the size of illicit financial flows have been questioned because data used to measure the phenomenon is fraught with problems. However, such estimates are necessary to inform policy making on this issue. Improving the quality of data gathering in poor countries and asking questions beyond statistics can improve the understanding of and response to illicit flows.
Quite often, "lack of political will" is identified as the culprit for poorly performing anti-corruption programmes. Yet despite the frequency with which it is used to explain unsatisfactory reform outcomes, political will remains under-defined and poorly understood.
Current approaches to regulating conflicts of interest, often encouraged by international anti-corruption standards, are commonly judged by how restrictive they are. Such interpretations reflect a mistaken view that a conflict of interest itself is corruption. This paper critiques current treatment of conflict of interest regulation through the lens of experience from Azerbaijan.
This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.
This U4 Issue argues that understanding the connections between organised crime and corruption requires a deeper analysis of the relationships between organised criminals and public officials at different levels of the state.
This U4 Issue paper describes the issues policymakers should weigh in deciding whether to adopt a financial disclosure law, and if so, what provisions it should contain.
This U4 Brief looks at five approaches to advancing anti-corruption reform in Nigeria's oil sector: the legal and regulatory framework; open and competitive award procedures; process and revenue transparency; investigation and prosecution of corruption; and oversight and accountability measures.
This U4 Brief attempts to shed light on how public sector institutions governing the Nigerian oil sector permit the existence of corruption. Six areas of corruption risk are addressed: the awarding of licenses; the awarding of contracts; bottlenecks and inefficiencies; the role of bunkering; the exportation of crude; and importing refined products.
This Brief reviews recent research on transition countries which suggests, conceptually and empirically, that lobbying is not only more prevalent in non-developed countries than currently thought, but can be more effective than corruption as a means of influencing policy, if adequately regulated.
This U4 Issue paper describes the problem of conflict of interest of public officials and the main ways in which it may be tackled, with particular focus on regulation of elected officials.
This U4 Brief describes the nature of common risks and challenges, and looks at avenues for mitigating the corruption-related problems with political funding.
This U4 Issue reviews traditional approaches to supporting political system-building, and points to some new ways in engaging with political parties.
This U4 Brief seeks to summarize the lessons learned from the terms of engagement employed by the EU and aid agencies of individual governments in respect of Bulgaria.
This case-based U4 Brief discusses the issue of transparency in political finance as an attempt to curb money's disruptive role in politics. | |
| WEB-EDITION OF U4 ISSUE 2006:6 | |
| What is political corruption?: |
Definitions |
Political corruption cases: Examples of corruption organised in three broad categories |
Extractive
political corruption: Political
corruption for the purpose of preserving power: |
Challenges and options: Strategic options available to donors confronted with three broad challenges when key persons in recipient governments are corrupt |
How
should the lack of political will be addressed? |
Literature / Links on political corruption: Annotated recommended readings and resources
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Theory and analysis |
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Political Corruption |
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Introduction |
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Political corruption cases |
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Challenges and options |
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Literature and links |
Query the U4 helpdesk about political corruption |
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U4 welcomes any | CONTACT |
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Alessandra Fontana
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| RECOMMENDED READING |
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“It is our money. Where is it gone?” is a short documentary, released by the International Budget Partnership, on an initiative, in Mombasa (Kenya) to involve communities directly in monitoring the Constituency Development Fund, a fund managed by Kenyan parliamentarians. Through social audits, communities monitored budgets and held their government accountable for managing the public’s money and meeting the needs of the poor. Preventing corruption: a toolkit for parliamentariansGOPAC and UNDP (2010) Developed by the Secretariat for the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) and UNDP, this toolkit aims to facilitate a more active parliamentary involvement in the implementation, oversight and monitoring of UNCAC; highlight the role of parliamentarians in preventing corruption and track parliamentary performance as well as emerging trends and developments; identify gaps where parliamentary strengthening may be needed; and, bolster inter-institutional dialogue on anti-corruption reforms.  Wrong, M (2009) Corruption fighters are contradictory figures, loved by what they stand for and hated by what they challenge. Michela Wrong’s account of the story of John Githongo, a Kenyan corruption fighter, explores both sides. But it goes further. It is an important read for international donors because it unveils the somewhat upsetting role played by them in the anti-corruption game. As with any view, Wrong’s stance is just one among many opinions on the issue of the international development cooperation involvement on corruption issues. But it is a good starting point for reflection.  Chaikin, D and Sharman, J C (2009) Two worlds which are intrinsically linked - the one of those who fight corruption and those who fight money laundering - have been treated in isolation so far, according to the authors. Their effort, in this publication, is to explain the nexus between corruption at the domestic level in developing countries and the international aspect of the issue, and how dealing with them separately has not been very effective at least in regards to grand corruption. Corruption and money laundering regularly appear in tandem and the presence of one reinforces the incidence of the other. This publication presents a good overview of the links between the two and can inform particularly well those interested in the Asia Pacific region. (This book is available for purchase from the publisher) Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments Ferraz, C and Finan F (2009) Does the incentive for re-election induce mayors to behave less corruptly? It looks like electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. This article’s findings suggest so by analyzing the case of Brazilian municipalities, where data showed that mayors in their first term misappropriated, on average, 27 percent fewer resources than mayors in their second-term. This difference was more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment was lower (Payment requested for access to article).
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| RELEVANT ORGANISATIONS |
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International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) |