Political corruption

Literature and links

The literature list and links sections are preliminary. Please report any important references or links that are missing to u4@u4.no

Theory and analysis

• Adetula, V. (2008): Money and Politics in Nigeria
  
  Financing politics is considered to be a good investment in Nigeria. Once a godfather elects his protégée, return is guaranteed. Corruption in financing politics in the country permeates every level of the government and takes many forms. No wonder political parties are among the 3 most corrupt institutions according to governance surveys in Nigeria. However, the problem has not yet received deserved attention. This book, organized by IFES, brings an overview of the situation and prospects for the Nigerian democracy, making it an important reading for those working with governance issues in the country.
  
  
• Amundsen, Inge (1999): Political corruption: An introduction to the issues [PDF]. CMI, Bergen, 1999:WP7.
  
  Corruption is generally defined as the misuse of public authority, and political corruption is here defined as corruption in which the political decision-makers are involved. In addition to a review of the various definitions of corruption a classification of the various forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion), this paper presents two alternative theories on corruption ("extractive" and "redistributive") in order to illustrate the effects of corruption in various regime types. Furthermore, the paper presents some causes and effects of corruption, in particular in economic and political terms. Finally, the various sources of anti-corruption initiatives and endowments are discussed. Even when the effect of democratisation in curtailing corruption is not too strong according to the statistics available, the basic argument in this paper is that political corruption can only be checked and reduced by further democratisation and concerted efforts (noting the dilemma that each of the possible sources of anti-corruption efforts are also possible sources of corruption).
  
  
• Bayart, Jean-François; Stephen Ellis & Béatrice Hibou (1997):
  La criminalisation de l'Etat en Afrique. Paris, Editions Complexe.
  
  Fraud, large scale trafficking, savage plunder of resources, economy of pillage, privatizations of institutions, criminal power politics, multiplication of armed militias, extension of wars … Black Africa seems to be on the point of criminalization of the state. Far from the taboos of anecdotic stereotypes, based on an intimate knowledge of economic, cultural, political and military processes in play on the continent, the three authors of this book suggest criteria, develop an analysis and present a diagnosis; rather dark but still open.
  
  
• Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (2000): "Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework" in Public Administration and Development, vol.20, no.3, pp.239.
  
  This article focuses on analyzing political will as it relates to the design, initiation, and pursuit of anti-corruption activities. The article elaborates an analytic framework for political will that partitions the concept into a set of characteristics/indicators, and elaborates the external factors that influence the expression and intensity of political will in a particular situation. The conceptual model identifies the links among the characteristics of political will and these external factors, and traces their resulting influence on the support for, design of, and outcomes of anti-corruption reforms. The conceptual framework for political will draws upon analysis and field experience with implementing policy change in a variety of sectors, including anti-corruption. The article closes with recommendations on the practical applications of the framework.
  
  
• Blake, Charles H. & Christopher G. Martin (2006): "The Dynamics of Political Corruption: Re-examining the Influence of Democracy", in Democratization, vol.13, no.1, February 2006, pp.1-14.
  
  With the emergence of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), several recent studies have conducted cross-national, empirical analyses of the determinants of political corruption as measured by the CPI. These studies find stable support for the importance of economic factors (such as national wealth and trade) while the role of political factors has been limited. This article develops some conceptual and methodological modifications to the study of democracy's influence on the probability of corruption. These changes demonstrate that the consolidation of a vital democracy maintained over time exercises a more powerful influence over corruption than past research had indicated.
  
  
• Carothers, Thomas (2006) Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C (available for online purchase)
  
  How well does the western model of party aid applies to political parties in developing countries? How can developed democracies help parties with struggling capacity and weak institutionalization? Thomas Carothers tries to answer these – and many other – questions related to the world of party aid. His latest book provides a wholesome picture of the party aid scenario, covering current actors and their roles, funding sources and aid amounts as well as bringing experiences in transition and developing countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and South East Asia.
  
  
• Chabal, Patrick & Chaloz, Pascal (1999): Africa Works - Disorder as political instrument. Oxford, James Currey.
  
  Are there social, political and cultural factors in Africa which aspire to the continuation of patrimony and conspire against economic development? This work addresses this and other questions in its examination of the political instrumentalization of disorder. See in particular the chapter The Ab(use) of Corruption: "For socially and culturally instrumental reasons, the real business of politics is conducted outside of the official political realm. Within such a political 'order', in which there is little meaningful institutionalization, the notion of corruption, as habitually defined in Western polities, is of little significance". Contents: The informalization of politics (Whither the state? The illusions of civil society. Recycled elites); The re-traditionalization of society (Of masks and men - the question of identity. The use and abuse of the irrational - witchcraft and religion. Warlords bosses and thugs - the profits of violence), The productivity of economic "failure" (The moral economy of corruption. The bounties of dependence. What if Africa refused to develop?) and Conclusion - a new paradigm - the political instrumentalization of disorder.
  
  
• Collier, Michael (2005): Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin: Constructing a Theory to Combat Corruption. New York, Routledge.
  
  Caribbean political corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, arrests state economic growth and threatens state security. This book focuses on the political corruption in the Caribbean Basin using historical and comparative approach. It includes issues like key definitions and explanations of political corruption, theoretic issues like the "Constructivist Analytic Framework", "Political Corruption Agency Analysis" and "Political Corruption Structural Analysis", and deals with concrete examples as well as international aspects. This book investigates the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean Basin. The study's theoretical framework centres on an interdisciplinary model of political corruption built within the rule-orientated constructivist approach to social science. Incorporating case studies of political corruption from Jamaica and Costa Rica, the book analyses the political, economic and social factors that affect political corruption and the different levels of regional corruption that can be found. The study highlights the importance of developing interdisciplinary theories of complex social behaviours, such as political corruption, if we are to combat such problems.
  
  
• Della Porta, Donatella (1999): Corrupt Exchanges. Actors, resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption. New York, Aldine de Gruyter
  
  Challenging a longstanding belief that political corruption flourishes primarily in developing countries, authoritarian regimes, or societies that tacitly favour patrimony, this text argues that corruption is a problem in most if not all democracies. Focussing on the more conspicuous Italian case, using a combination of primary research methods (judicial proceedings, in-depth interviews, parliamentary documents press debates, etc.) as well as cross-national comparisons, the authors present a model for analyzing corruption as a network of illegal exchanges.
  
  
• Fjeldstad Odd-Helge and Jens Chr. Andvig, with Inge Amundsen, Tone Sissener and Tina Søreide (2001): Corruption: A review of contemporary research [PDF]. CMI, Bergen, 2001:R7.
  
  During the last decade corruption has become a topical issue in the international development policy debate. Research on corruption has also expanded rapidly, taking many different directions both within and across disciplines. This report provides an overview of contemporary research on corruption. The academic focus is on economic approaches, but perspectives from political science and social anthropology are also included. The presentation is mostly non-technical, although a few expositions of more analytically demanding matters are included. Relevance for development policy is the underlying guide for the selection of topics that are included in the study. The report should be useful for development practitioners and foreign aid officials, as well as for students and journalists interested in development issues.
  
  
• Gerring, John & Strom C. Thacker (2004): "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism" in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, pp.295-330.
  
  A raft of new research on the causes and effects of political corruption has emerged in recent years, in tandem with a separate, growing focus on the effects of political institutions on important outcomes such as economic growth, social equality and political stability. Yet we know little about the possible role of different political institutional arrangements on political corruption. This article examines the impact of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption cross-nationally. We find that unitary and parliamentary forms of government help reduce levels of corruption. To explain this result, we explore a series of seven potential causal mechanisms that emerge out of the competing centralist and decentralist theoretical paradigms: (1) openness, transparency and information costs, (2) intergovernmental competition, (3) localism, (4) party competition, (5) decision rules, (6) collective action problems, and (7) public administration. Our empirical findings and our analysis of causal mechanisms suggest that centralized constitutions help foster lower levels of political corruption.
  
  
• Global Witness (2009): Undue Diligence: How banks do business with corrupt regimes
  
  Grand corruption, involving senior government officials (politically exposed persons), hardly take place without financial intermediaries in rich countries. Tackling this requires efforts at both ends, where the money comes from and where it gets stashed away. Global Witness investigated four cases from the latter perspective -- where illicit financial flows end up. GW has assessed the gaps the Financial Action Task Force, an inter governmental initiative to combat money laundering, needs to cover if the international financial system is genuinely committed to making the life of crooks around the world a bit more difficult.
  
  
• Golden, Miriam (with Lucio Picci (2006): "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1992 [PDF]." (Rev. version, March 2006; originally prepared for presentation at the 2005 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4.
  
  This paper analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country's 92 provinces between 1953 and 1992. Extending implications of formal theories of legislative behavior to the context of open-list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling political parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts, and the extent to which opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that districts characterized by politically more powerful individual deputies from the governing parties received higher amounts of investments. We interpret this result as indicating that legislators with political resources sought to reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, were not able to discipline their own members of parliament sufficiently to target the parties' areas of core electoral strength. In Italy's weak party system, the political influence of powerful individual legislators trumped the political imperatives of the ruling parties. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operated to direct resources to areas where the main opposition party was strong.
  

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• Harris, Robert (2003): Political Corruption. Beyond the Nation State. Routledge.
  
  This book, combining scholarship with readability, shows that political corruption must itself be analysed politically. Spectacularly corrupt politicians - the exception rather than the rule - are usually symptoms, not causes, and much political corruption is simply normal politics taken to excess. But in a world in which anti-corruption strategies themselves are often thinly disguised examples of political corruption, the ways in which political systems address their own corruption are as varied and fascinating in character as crucial to comprehend.
  
  
• Heidenheimer, Arnold J. & Michael Johnston (eds) (2002): Political Corruption. Concepts and Contexts. Third Edition. New Brunswick/London, Transaction Publishers.
  
  Building on a nucleus of classic studies laying out the nature and development of the concept of corruption, the book incorporates recent work on economic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of the problem, as well as critical analyses of approaches to reform. Two-thirds of the nearly fifty articles are especially written or translated for this volume, or based on selected journal literature published in the 1990s. The tendency to treat corruption as a synonym for bribery is illuminated by analyses of the diverse terminology and linguistic techniques that distinguish corruption problems in the major languages. Recent attempts to measure corruption and to analyze its causes and effects quantitatively are also critically examined. New contributions emphasize corruption phenomena in Asia and Africa, contrasts among region and regime types, the incidence U.S. state corruption, European Party finance and corruption; assessments of international corruption rating's, analyses of international corruption control treaties, and unintended consequences of anti-corruption efforts. Cumulatively, the book combines descriptive richness, analytical thrust, conceptual awareness, and contextual articulation.
  
  
• Heywood, Paul (1997): "Political Corruption: Problems and perspectives" in Political Studies, vol.45, no.3, pp.417-435.
  
  (currently no summary available)
  
  
• Jain, Arvind K. (ed.) (2001): The Political Economy of Corruption. London, Routledge.
  
  "Grand" corruption, generally used to define corruption amongst the top political elite, has drawn increasing attention from academics and policy makers during recent years. Our understanding of the causes and mechanisms of this type of corruption, however, falls short of its importance and consequences. This volume provides theoretical analysis of economic and political conditions that allow "grand" corruption to survive as well as case studies and empirical analysis that supports the theoretical models used.
  
  
• Johnston, Michael (2005): Syndromes of Corruption. Wealth, Power, and Democracy. New York, Cambridge University Press.
  
  Corruption is a threat to democracy and economic development in many societies. It arises in the ways people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power, and in the strength or weakness of the state, political and social institutions that sustain and restrain those processes. The book argues that the differences in these factors give rise to four major syndromes of corruption: Influence Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls. The book employs statistical measures to identify societies in each group, and case studies to show that the expected syndromes do arise. Countries studied include the United States, Japan and Germany (Influence Markets); Italy, Korea and Botswana (Elite Cartels); Russia, the Philippines and Mexico (Oligarchs and Clans); and China, Kenya, and Indonesia (Official Moguls). A concluding chapter explores reform, emphasizing the ways familiar measures should be applied - or withheld, with an emphasis upon the value of 'deep democratization'.
  
  
• Kaufmann, Daniel (2005): "Myths about Governance and Corruption". World Bank Institute. Paper, November 2005.
  
  This paper addresses ten myths about corruption and governance: Myth #1: Governance and anticorruption are one and the same. Myth #2: Governance and corruption cannot be measured. Myth #3: The importance of governance and anti-corruption is overrated. Myth #4: Governance is a luxury that only rich countries can afford. Myth #5: It takes generations for governance to improve. Myth #6: Donors can "ring fence" projects in highly corrupt countries and sectors. Myth #7: Fight corruption by fighting corruption. Myth # 8: The culprit is the public sector in developing countries. Myth #9: There is little countries can do to improve governance. Myth #10: There is not much the IFIs can do.
  
  
• Kotkin Stephen & Andréas Sajo (2002): Political Corruption in Transition. A sceptic's handbook. Budapest, Hungary. Central European University Press.
  
  This book, based on two international conferences at Princeton University and the Central European University, is a handy guide to the problem of corruption in transition countries, with an important comparative content. Political Corruption in Transition is distinguished from similar publications by at least two features: by the quality of the carefully selected and edited essays and by its original treatment. Instead of the usual preaching and excommunications, this Sceptic's Handbook represents down-to-earth realism. Combines general issues with case studies and original research. The geographic coverage is wide, though it is ideas rather then a geography that drive the volume's organization.
  
  
• Krueger, Anne O. (1987): "The Political Anne Krueger Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" in International Trade: Selected Readings, by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. MIT Press 1987.
  
  This text collects the most important contributions to the theory of international trade in recent decades, including the many new approaches developed during the 1980s. 28 chapters in major sections covering general equilibrium, trade pattern theories, imperfect competition and market structure, quotas and VERs, theory of distortions, direct unproductive profit-seeking and rent-seeking activities, customs unions, growth and transfers, and foreign investment.
  
  
• Le Billon, Philippe (2003): "Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts", in Journal of International Development, vol.15, no.4, 2003, pp.413-426.
  
  Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions 'fuel war' by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, 'buying-off' belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but 'sticks' such as economic sanctions, rather than 'carrots', have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While 'buying peace' can present a short-term solution, the key challenge for peace-building initiatives and fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes.
  
  
• Lederman, Daniel, Loayza, Norman V., Soares, Rodrigo R (2005): "Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter." Economics and Politics, vol. 17, no 1 (March 2005), pp 1-35.
  
  This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.
  
  
• Manzetti, L. and Wilson, C. (2007): 'Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?' Comparative Political Studies, n.40 - subscription needed for access to article.

  Why do sensible citizens keep voting in notoriously corrupt governments and reelecting crooks? This article suggests that at least the more impoverished groups in countries with weak states institutions do so to access public goods. Jobs, unemployment benefits, housing and health become valuable commodities, controlled and dispensed through clientelistic networks by corrupt elites, in exchange for voting. Despite lacking direct recommendations on how to change the situation, the article provides useful insight for those interested in political parties and election systems.

• Mwenda, Andrew M. & Roger Tangri (2005): "Patronage politics, donor reforms and regime consolidation in Uganda". In African Affairs, 104/416, pp. 449-467.
  
  Using the state and its resources has constituted a vital form of consolidating power for Africa's rulers. However, donor-sponsored reforms have threatened to curtail the opportunities of African leaders to maintain their regimes in power. Donor reforms introduced under structural adjustment programmes have sought to reduce the size and scope of government as well as to cut state spending and thereby curb the possibilities of state patronage. Reforms have also attempted to contain corruption and improve state governance. In Uganda, however, the relationship between donors and the government has reproduced patronage in government. The donors have hailed Uganda as a major case of economic success in Africa. They have provided it with large amounts of financial assistance to support the implementation of reforms. High levels of foreign aid have provided the government with public resources to sustain the patronage basis of the regime. Moreover, in a context where wide discretionary authority was conferred on governing elites in the implementation of reforms, public resources could be used in unaccountable and non-transparent ways to help the government maintain its political dominance. The donors have begun to realize belatedly that they have been propping up a corrupt government in Uganda.
  
  
• Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999): Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press.
  
  Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. Developing countries and those making a transition from socialism are particularly at risk. This book suggests how high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. Corruption creates economic inefficiencies and inequities, but reforms are possible to reduce the material benefits from payoffs. Corruption is not just an economic problem, however; it is also intertwined with politics. Reform may require changes in both constitutional structures and the underlying relationship of the market and the state. Effective reform cannot occur unless both the international community and domestic political leaders support change.
  
  
• Speck, Bruno Wilhelm and Claudio Weber Abramo (2003): Second Survey on Vote Buying in Brazilian elections [PDF]. Transparência Brazil.
  
  This short survey demonstrates that vote buying was common in Brazilian elections in 2001 and 2002, with about 3% of voters (which is 3 million voters!) being offered money, material goods or favours by candidates, middlemen or the public administration.
  
  
• Shleifer, Andrei & Robert W. Vishny: The Grabbing Hand. Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Harward University Press, 1999.
  
  In many countries, public sector institutions impose heavy burdens on economic life: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich corrupt bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. As a consequence of such predatory policies--described in this book as the grabbing hand of the state--entrepreneurship lingers and economies stagnate. The authors of this collection of essays describe many of these pathologies of a grabbing hand government, and examine their consequences for growth. The essays share a common viewpoint that political control of economic life is central to the many government failures that we observe. Fortunately, a correct diagnosis suggests the cures, including the best strategies of fighting corruption, privatization of state firms, and institutional building in the former socialist economies. Depoliticization of economic life emerges as the crucial theme of the appropriate reforms. The book describes the experiences with the grabbing hand government and its reform in medieval Europe, developing countries, transition economies, as well as today's United States.
  
  
• Stapenhurst, Rick, Johnston, Niall, & Pelizzo, Riccardo (Eds.) (2006):
  The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption
  
  In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee government and to hold government to account; often, audit institutions, ombuds and anti-corruption agencies report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability institutions. At the same time, parliaments can also play a key role in promoting accountability, through constituency outreach, public hearings, and parliamentary commissions. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, development practitioners, students of development and those interested in curbing corruption and improving governance in developing and developed countries alike.
  
  
• Transparency International (2009)
  Political Finance Regulations: Bridging the Enforcement Gap
  
  Legislators pass political finance regulations and feel they have done their homework: safeguarded political processes against corruption in financing politics. They soon discover that, in many cases, enforcement of such laws is a much more complicated business. In this policy paper, TI discusses 10 principles to enable such laws to become effective practices, allowing money to play its necessary role in the political game and minimizing the risks its undue influence poses to democracy.
  
  
• Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2004 (Special focus: Political corruption)
  
  This report focuses on corruption in the political process, and on the insidious impact of corrupt politics on public life in societies across the globe. It addresses the following areas in the context of political corruption:
  
  
  • the regulation of political finance
  • the disclosure of money flows in politics and the enforcement of political finance laws
  • elections – specifically vote buying
  • the private sector – with a focus on the arms and oil sectors, and
  • tackling the abuse of office – including reducing conflicts of interest, limiting recourse to immunity, pursuing extradition and repatriating stolen wealth.

The report also evaluates various mechanisms that can curb corruption in politics, from citizen action to the creation of new international norms and standards, such as Transparency International’s Standards on Political Finance and Favours (see below). By focusing on the above topics, the Global Corruption Report addresses particular weak spots in political life: the abuse of money in the political system by candidates and political officials; the lack of transparency about money flows in politics; the potential of the private sector to purchase influence, distorting both the marketplace and the fair representation of the public interest; the corruption of the electoral process; and the ways the legal system can affect the ability of states to pursue justice in major corruption crimes.