In this section we present strategic options available to donors confronted
with three broad challenges when key persons in recipient governments
are corrupt:
CHALLENGE: HOW SHOULD THE LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
BE ADDRESSED?
When political corruption is endemic the political will to address it
is weak. Sometimes government policies and individual government members'
actions will contradict what donors see as sound approaches, sometimes
there will be lip-service paid but circumventions in practice, and sometimes
there will be direct resistance to anti-corruption efforts. Corrupt politicians
will defend their vital interests, vehemently and sometimes even violently.
The means and tools available to donor agencies for addressing this problem
are constrained. The political leverage of donor agencies is limited.
Furthermore, the political will of the donors themselves can be questioned.
Aid priorities and other political concerns motivating aid may work in
direct opposition to apparent interference in the domestic affairs of
sovereign states. Certain aid policies and modalities, such as direct
budget support, decentralisation and privatisation, may become rather
problematic when seen from an anti-political corruption perspective. Donor
coordination on such politically sensitive issues is a formidable challenge.
The ambitions of donors differ greatly, and so does their emphasis on
corruption. There have been instances where some donors have withheld
or withdrawn support, at least temporarily, because of corruption, whereas
at the same time others have increased their support. How can donors ensure
that they speak with one voice and send a clear message?
There are at least three types of strategic option available to donors
- to support democratisation processes, to improve information on and
analysis of how political systems work, and to strengthen the coordination
of responses among donors.
It can safely be argued that democratisation is the only long-term sustainable
strategy available to eradicate systemic political corruption. Democratisation
includes two basic processes: increased horizontal accountability (efficient
and credible institutional checks and balances), and increased vertical
accountability (deepened popular control through voice and participation).
Horizontal accountability is of particular importance in combating political
corruption. This refers to the system of institutional checks and balances,
of constitutional and institutional controls in-between elections. These
include, among others, the executive (government and state administrative
agencies), the judiciary and the legislature, and the various special
institutions of oversight and control like ombudsmen, investigators, attorneys
and auditors. Most political systems include formal rules and procedures
meant to restrain the exercise of political power and to safeguard human
and political rights, but the formal establishment and existence of institutions
of horizontal accountability does not in itself mean that they are efficient.
In developing countries with embedded political corruption these institutions
are particularly weak.
There are two basic institutions of checks and balances that have not
received sufficient donor attention as yet: the parliament and the judiciary.
Both are pivotal for any meaningful, democratic control of political corruption,
but at the same time they are in many countries an important part of the
corruption problem.
Strengthening parliaments
The basic approach to strengthening parliaments is to push for
constitutional reforms that help to secure their autonomy. Parliamentary
autonomy refers to its independence from the executive branch. It
is its ability to carry out its mandate, to interact with and not
be subjected to pressure from the presidency, and to play the vital
democratic role of checks and balances. In practical terms, it is
about constitutional guarantees, and autonomy in respect of personnel
and finance. This is a long and cumbersome process, but should nevertheless
be the ultimate aim of any engagement with parliamentary systems.
There are medium-term possibilities in terms of support to specific
parliamentary committees, research and evaluation capacity, administrative
capacity, and issues like the disclosure of parliamentary votes
and better communication between legislators and their constituencies.
One example is the Vietnamese parliament, which is weak in terms
of its mandate and in terms of one-party rule. Still, with some
donor assistance it has become a relatively proactive institution,
fulfilling some of its accountability functions.
To assist courts to fulfil their accountability function and serve
as institutions of political checks and balances, the most promising
approach is to push for constitutional reforms that help to secure
their autonomy. A main aspect of this autonomy would be freedom
to choose personnel (e.g. in many countries judges are nominated
by the president) and financial security.
One should also demand transparency, and justification for court
decisions and actions (answerability). Even within presidential
systems with little autonomy, the accountability function of courts
can be strengthened through improvements in infrastructure (library,
computers, and court records), court administration, education of
judicial personnel and support staff, legal aid and literacy, and
research assistance, in addition to reform of appointment procedures
and budgetary autonomy.
See Project
Database for Utstein group projects on judicial independence,
integrity, and efficiency.
Much of the failure and lack of impact of donor-assisted efforts to combat
political corruption has its root in a lack of proper problem analysis
and weak research-based programming. Although the ambition of donor coordination
and working groups as well as of individual donor agencies has been to
collect and share information, inadequate analysis and contradictory interpretations
have sometimes got in the way of strong, unified donor approaches. The
problem of political corruption varies considerably in form, magnitude
and structure. A government rich in mineral wealth (for example, an 'oil
cursed' country) is very different from a resource-strained, indebted
and aid-dependent regime, both in terms of how resources are extracted
and in terms of donor country leverage.
In-depth political economy studies are necessary to get the targeted
action right. Political economy is most commonly used to refer to interdisciplinary
studies that draw on economics, law and political science in order to
understand how political institutions, the political environment and capitalism
influence each other. In the donor community, political economy analyses
have mainly been used to understand informal and customary political systems,
patrimonialism and patronage, predatory political elites and authoritarian
government, and the relationship between economic and political power
within states.
Two types of analysis in recent years have been important in building
this type of knowledge: National Integrity System studies and Drivers
of Change analyses:
Drivers of Change analysis
Although the Drivers of Change (DoC) approach is broader than political
corruption per se, the development community increasingly recognises
that effective programmes must be grounded in an understanding of
the economic, social and political factors that either drive or
block change within a country. The Drivers of Change approach has
emerged within the UK's Department
for International Development (DFID) as a way of applying political
economy analysis to the development of donor strategies. Various
DoC studies have been carried out involving in-depth, country-level
analysis in order to identify the opportunities, incentives and
blockages to pro-poor change in a given country. The DoC methodology
seeks to identify the political institutions, structures and agents
that can act as key levers for enabling pro-poor change and therefore
improving the effectiveness of aid.
See Governance
and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), which has
developed special resources on Drivers
of Change (DoC), and lists a number of downloadable reports
on the methodology, approach and country analyses. Various DoC
studies have been carried out involving in-depth, country-level
analysis of countries like Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia,
Georgia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
The concept of National
Integrity System studies (NIS) has been developed and promoted
by TI as part of its holistic approach to countering corruption.
The NIS consists of the key institutions, laws and practices that
contribute to integrity, transparency and accountability in a society.
When it functions properly, the NIS combats corruption as part of
the larger struggle against abuse of power, malfeasance, and misappropriation
in all its forms. The NIS approach provides a framework with which
to analyse both the extent and causes of corruption in a given national
context, as well as the adequacy and effectiveness of national anti-corruption
efforts. By diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
integrity system, an evaluation based on the NIS can help inform
anti-corruption advocacy and reform efforts.
The main 'pillars' of the NIS are considered to be the following:
Executive, Legislature and Judiciary
Political Parties and Electoral Commissions
Supreme Audit Institution
Public Sector institutions like Police and Prosecutors, Ombudsmen,
Anti-corruption agencies
Public Procurement
Media
Civil Society
Private Sector
Regional and Local Government
International Institutions
The NIS approach underpins many aspects of TI's work, including
much of the national and international advocacy undertaken by the
TI movement. It also provides the conceptual basis for many TI publications.
NIS studies say a lot about legal and institutional loopholes and
bottlenecks, but the NIS approach has been criticised for a weak
emphasis on the supply side, on international companies as bribe
payers and corruption drivers. The studies have also sometimes adopted
a legalistic approach, emphasising the legal framework (that needs
reform) but less the political framework for democratic control.
See TI's NIS
studies pages, with the full text of NIS studies from the
following countries (September 2006): Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Bangladesh Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Caribbean (composite), Colombia, Cook Islands, El Salvador,
Fiji, Ghana, Gambia, Guatemala Honduras, India, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lithuania, Malawi, Marshall Islands,
Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal Netherlands, New Zealand ,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Panama, Paraguay Peru, Romania, Serbia, Samoa, South Africa,
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
United Kingdom, Zambia. Please note that some of these studies
are as old as from 2000 and in need of updating.
Donor coordination is increasingly being understood as pivotal for donor
agencies to have any influence over political corruption. In particular,
it is seen as important to send a single message and to speak with one
voice in cases where sanctions are needed. Therefore, donor cooperation
is happening at international, regional and local levels..
DFID recently commissioned a study of in-country donor coordination mechanisms
for anti-corruption work (Green, Hubbard and Larbi (2004) Cooperating
against corruption [PDF]). Not surprisingly,
the report revealed that donor harmonisation and aid alignment are inadequate
in most countries where donors are active. More efficient cooperation
and coordination can be undertaken at the country level in terms both
of programmes and of projects.
The positive initiatives and the organisation/coordination of donors
into consultative and working groups in Uganda can serve as a model for
others to learn from. The U4 pages on donor
coordination as well as the Uganda
pages highlight specific examples of donor coordination on the ground.
Here you will find interesting analysis, literature and information on
donor coordination.
The OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and its Network on Governance
(GOVNET) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with
issues related to co-operation with developing countries. DAC has
identified corruption as a core issue and donor collaboration as
a priority. In the light of the growing need for strengthened donor
collaboration in anti-corruption work, the GOVNET Task Team has
drafted the DAC
Revised Principles for Donor Action in Anti-Corruption [PDF].
CHALLENGE: HOW CAN THE HOLES OF ILLICIT EXTRACTION
BE PLUGGED?
This question has a supply and a demand side. The supply side issue concerns
donor country companies offering bribes in business transactions, while
the demand side issue concerns opportunities for enrichment used by recipient
governments. How can donors help remove such opportunities?
Option: International and supply side issues
Among the options available to donors for assisting in curbing extractive
political corruption, the international and supply side issues are indeed
important. See for instance the U4 overview pages on anti-corruption
conventions for an update on the scope and powers of international
legislation, and the OECD
Fights Corruption [PDF] brochure for an
overview of OECD approaches, which focus largely on supply side issues
like export credits, tax deductibility and business conduct. Indeed, the
OECD convention itself, which bans the bribery of foreign public officials,
has a strong international supply focus.
On the supply side we also have issues like transparency in international
banking and trade, the role of market power, monopolies, competition and
anti-trust measures, which are addressed for instance by the International
Competition Network. In this category, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) is particularly interesting.
EITI is supported by DFID and other donors, and aims to ensure
that the revenues from extractive industries contribute to sustainable
development and poverty reduction. The EITI works to ensure due
process and transparency in payments by the extractive industries
and companies to governments and public bodies, and that the revenues
collected are properly reported by those governments. At the core
of the initiative is a set of Principles and Criteria that establish
how EITI should be implemented. A number of companies and two countries
(Nigeria and Azerbaijan) have now signed the initiative.
The internal, demand side issues in partner countries are
addressed to a lesser extent, but there are options for donors also on
this issue. Basically, it is a question of increasing transparency and
accountability, and of strengthening the special institutions of oversight
and control.
In addition to the two core institutions of checks and balances, the
parliament and the courts, there are special state institutions of control
and accountability such as the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, the
Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Police, the Inspector General
of Government and the Office of the Auditor General. These are often in
need of comprehensive reform of their mandate and autonomy, as well as
in their capacity, and they have received much (but sometimes biased)
attention and donor support.
One of the most over-estimated (and over-supported) institutions is the
anti-corruption commission, an institution whose independent role is impossible
in highly corrupt countries and whose effect on political corruption has
been very limited.
African Anti-Corruption Commissions
African Anti-Corruption Commissions
"Our study found a lack of synchronicity and compatibility
between the needs, aims, motivations, capacities and expectations
of governments, donors and ACCs. This leads to a lack of coordination,
complementarity and confidence between the three parties, which,
in turn, is connected to their differing 'lifecycles".
The lifecycle of a new ACC is characterized by initially high expectations
from governments and donors but the ACC is an infant organization
unable to meet the unrealistic expectations imposed upon it. This
failure usually means that there is no sustained support for the
ACC which limits its capacity to develop as an organization. This
failure 'to thrive' encourages disillusionment in governments, donors
and in ACCs themselves.
The lifecycle of governments involves the gradual displacement
of anti-corruption as a high priority and indeed political commitment
is frequently confined to exposing the crimes of previous regimes.
Governments experience periods of instability and, where ACCs investigate
corruption at the highest political levels, the response is not
often supportive. Rather, ACC Directors are dismissed, authority
to prosecute is withheld in sensitive cases and under-resourcing
of the ACC becomes the norm, further undermining its capacity and
reputation.
When discredited governments are toppled or new leaders emerge,
donors become enthusiastic again and the neglected ACC is reborn
or reconstituted. Where once donor support had been difficult to
obtain, or had even been withdrawn, suddenly there is a rush to
support the ACC with a new set of expectations. The previous famine
of resources is replaced by a feast but the ACC often lacks the
infrastructure and capacity to make effective use of the sudden
increase in funds. Donor neglect is, at worst, replaced by donor
competition and, at best, by inadequate and irregular donor coordination.
Excerpts from a U4 commissioned report. For the full report,
with pitfalls, lessons learned and recommendations, see the U4
theme pages on African Anti-Corruption
Commissions.
Other special institutions of control that receive various levels of
donor support are auditors and prosecutors. Without going into detail
on the modality of this support, the principle is simple: without these
institutions, accountability and democratisation are impossible. Even
if they cannot perform and cannot deliver on political corruption control
at the moment, and investigators and prosecutors are frustrated about
lip service and manipulation, these institutions are needed for support.
They should be in place when there is a change in government or a reform-oriented
minister takes over, and they can perhaps impose some counter-balancing
weight in the meantime. Donors should assist their survival in a hostile
climate.
A former Minister of Ethics and Integrity in Uganda said in an interview
with U4 that the Inspector General of Government had never prosecuted
any 'big fish' or 'political untouchables' because of political restrictions,
and expressed doubts that it ever could under the current government.
On our asking whether the donors should then simply withdraw all funding
from the inspectorate on these grounds, she said "Oh no, the institution
will be needed one day! Better to have it, even with a weak mandate and
no impact on political corruption, than to re-invent it when the day comes
and it is needed again".
See the Selected
Literature list on Government oversight and control bodies
for studies with recommendations on audit offices, public complaints
offices, and ombudsmen.
See also the Project Database
for U4 partner agencies projects on auditor general and national
audit offices, ombudsmen and inspectorates, public accounts committees,
and investigation and police.
In addition to the supply side issues, donors also have options in various
methods to assist in curbing demand-driven political corruption and extraction.
Three methods employed with some success, and partly supported by international
donors, are the Publish What You Pay Campaign (PWYP), compulsory declaration
of assets and incomes by senior politicians and bureaucrats, and various
procurement reforms.
The Publish What You Pay Campaign (PWYP) is increasing its momentum.
The PWYP campaign is an international NGO initiative to put pressure on
international companies to publish what they pay in taxes, bonuses, fees
etc. to the governments of certain mineral-rich countries.
Publish What You Pay
The Publish What You Pay campaign aims to help citizens of resource-rich
developing countries to hold their governments accountable for the
management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries.
Natural resource revenues are an important source of income for
the governments of over 50 developing countries. At the same time,
twelve of the world's 25 most mineral-dependent states and six of
the world's most oil-dependent states are classified by the World
Bank as "highly indebted poor countries" with some of
the world's worst Human Development Indicators, including Angola,
Congo-Brazzaville, Kazakhstan and Venezuela. When properly managed,
the revenues could serve as a basis for poverty reduction, economic
growth and development rather than exacerbating corruption, conflict
and social division.
The Publish What You Pay coalition of over 280 NGOs worldwide calls
for the mandatory disclosure of the payments made by oil, gas and
mining companies to all governments for the extraction of natural
resources. This is a necessary first step towards a more accountable
system for the management of revenues in resource-rich developing
countries.
Revenue transparency itself is a fundamental criterion for good
governance: you cannot manage what you cannot measure. Natural resources
are held in trust by the state for the citizens of a country. Those
citizens have a clear right to information about the management
of revenues associated with their resources. The campaign calls
for multinational oil, mining and gas companies to reveal the same
basic information about net payments to a state in the developing
world that they already routinely disclose in the developed world.
State-owned enterprises must also be financially accountable for
payments made to their governments and revenues received. Together,
this information will help citizens of resource-rich but poor countries
to call their governments to account over the management of revenues
and thereby seek a democratic debate over their use and distribution.
Companies can often be perceived to be complicit in corruption
and the deterioration of social conditions in poor countries where
they operate, even though they are providing a valuable source of
investment that, when managed transparently and responsibly, should
be a source of growth and development that will benefit all citizens.
See the Publish
What You Pay homepage for background, objectives, toolkits,
benchmarks, reports and news on the campaign, and
see also Revenue
Watch for country reports and literature.
Many countries have laws and rules governing the declaration of
assets, because disclosure reduces the chance of corruption. The
purpose of obtaining public officials' declarations is to identify
what wealth is not fairly attributable to income, gifts, or loans.
The compilation demonstrates the wide range of approaches to restraining
officials' undesirable conduct. Knowing how other countries have
approached this issue can help those who are drafting officials'
asset declaration laws, or making changes to existing ones.
In Uganda, for instance, independent journalists have taken the
"The Leadership Code Act" of 2002 seriously. The act obliges
all top and middle-ranking officials to declare their assets, and
investigative journalists supported by NGOs have been checking the
accuracy of the publicly available declarations and documented assets
(farms, villas, apartments, cars ) through photos, public registers
and interviews with neighbours and tenants. Huge discrepancies have
been revealed, sometimes leading to criminal investigation.
Public procurement is broadly defined as the purchasing, hiring
or obtaining by any other contractual means of goods, construction
works and services by the public sector. Public procurement is alternatively
defined as the purchase of commodities and contracting of construction
works and services if such acquisition is effected with resources
from state budgets, local authority budgets, state foundation funds,
domestic loans or foreign loans guaranteed by the state, and foreign
aid as well as revenue received from the economic activity of state.
Public procurement thus means procurement by a procuring entity
using public funds. The items involved in public procurement range
from simple goods or services such as paperclips or cleaning services
to large commercial projects, such as the development of infrastructure,
including roads, power stations and airports.
Political corruption takes place mainly within large-scale procurement
controlled by central government, and to a large degree in military
procurement. An assessment of the defence budget in partner countries
is especially delicate but indeed necessary because budget funds
are fungible and because budget support is becoming a more and more
important form of aid.
See the IMF working paper Corruption
and Military Spending by Gupta et al (2000) for the
link between corruption and military spending.
CHALLENGE: HOW CAN THE CORRUPT USE OF RESOURCES
FOR POWER PRESERVATION BE CONSTRAINED?
How can practices of buying political support to stay in power be restricted?
The corrupt use of public and private money by power-holders to maintain
their hold on power is to a large extent a question of democratic accountability.
It is a question of democratic reform to strengthen parliaments, courts
and other institutions of horizontal accountability (see above), but also
a question of vertical accountability.
Vertical accountability is citizen influence through the election channel
(electoral processes) and through direct political action. It entails
giving the people a voice and creating the conditions for political change
from below. It requires real opportunities for citizens to exercise their
basic civil liberties like the freedom of assembly, association, speech
and the press. It also requires basic political freedoms like free and
fair elections (with a level political playing field, real alternatives
and elections with a possible impact on the composition of government).
It includes the right of citizens to change their government.
Option: Strengthened election channel
The formal side of vertical accountability is the election channel. Free
and fair elections are essential, but so are the legal provisions for
and functioning of political parties. Multilateral and bilateral donors
have been supporting and can further support democratisation processes
and the vertical accountability channel through support to the practical
sides of the election systems. This can also be done through assistance
to the enactment of legislation on party and campaign finance. In this
line, electoral commissions and electoral monitoring become important
for securing free and fair elections.
Electoral Commissions
At the core of the administration of an election lies the official
body responsible for its conduct. In some countries civil servants
run the practical aspects of an election with political party representatives
monitoring their conduct. However, the trend is now in favour of
a separate, stand-alone Electoral Commission, which drafts in the
staff needed to run the poll on election days.
The basic approach to strengthening electoral commissions is to
push for constitutional and legal reforms that can secure their
autonomy. At the core of the Commission's independence lies the
constitutional and legal basis for its mandate, the manner in which
the commissioners are appointed, and how the commission is financed.
Ideally, the commission should make voter registration, receive
nominations of candidates and check their eligibility, design ballot
papers, physically arrange and conduct the polls, and compile and
announce the results.
Legal provisions for regulating political parties are important, and
so is their financing. The 'vote for me' one-man party organisations without
a programme, membership base or internal democracy can be reformed through
support to party system regulations and training. The democratic function
of the political parties can be strengthened by enhancing their internal
levels of democracy.
Support to political parties is now increasingly on the donor agenda because
they are understood as an essential part of a representative, constitutional
democracy. However, it is still unclear how political parties can be made
accountable and democratic. See the articles International
Political Party Assistance: An Overview [PDF]and Analysis and Political
Party Aid [PDF].
External technical support to political parties can be important
to "level the playing field", and assistance may include
advocacy for equal access to media coverage or legal reforms to
ensure equitable and transparent party financing. Support to parties
can be oriented to the internal operations of parties, in fundraising,
campaign planning, candidate selection and training. When directed
strategically, and to the public at large, these initiatives can
ensure that parties maintain real links with the community, draw
broad and diverse representation, are accountable to their constituents
and have democratic internal structures.
Political parties often lack favourable conditions and incentives
for accountable and transparent party financing, and may be dependent
upon local political "barons". A sound regulatory climate
should, for instance, ensure openness in who gave how much to whom
- both to candidates and to parties - demand audited accounts (with
a low threshold for disclosure), bans on contributions from suspect
individuals and corporations, and ceilings on contributions.
A project example is the NGO monitoring of the 2000 local and national
parliamentary elections in Romania. This project was conducted by
NGO Asociatia Pro Democratia (APD) and aimed to increase transparency
in party financing by focusing attention on the issue, monitoring
compliance with financing regulations, and drafting and advocating
a new law on political party financing. In the local elections the
project monitored political advertising through newspapers, posters,
billboards, and banners in four major towns. In the national elections
it monitored advertising on TV, radio, press and outdoor ads. Estimates
of expenditure on advertising were compared with parties' official
income declarations. The findings indicated that spending exceeded
declared income tenfold across party lines. The project placed the
issue of political party finance high on the public agenda and produced
benchmark figures on the cost of campaign activities. The draft
law served as input into later legislative amendments adopted by
the government in 2003.
Vertical accountability can also be exercised through other
channels like the media, civil society, and direct political action (demonstrations,
petitions, etc.). Business, traditional and religious communities, and
a number of different organisations can also raise political demands if
they are well organised and not subject to clientelist capture. History
has demonstrated how the trading companies and economic elites ('the city
bourgeoisie') of pre-industrial Europe managed to reduce the power of
the absolutist kings and reform the state. One question is thus what it
would take for business communities and economic elites in weak, corrupt
states to demand the rule of law and institutional guarantees instead
of seeking protection from some 'big men' within the system.
It is still an unresolved question how the donors can support these non-electoral
channels of vertical accountability. What interest groups, business organisations,
civil society organisations, religious and ethnic organisations, and media
can constitute counter-balancing powers and positive change factors? The
Drivers of Change analyses are attempts to bridge this knowledge gap.
Donors can, for instance, consult a range of national stakeholders and
seek opportunities for intervention from outside as well as from inside
the regime, within the governing party, or wherever reform-minded individuals
are located. There will always be groups within a power structure, and
within sectors and institutions, who are able to champion anti-corruption
initiatives. Donors could give special support to these reform-minded
people to give them added leverage in their opposition to the regime.
Strategic donor thinking around 'drivers for change', 'promoters of change'
and 'islands of integrity' fall in line with this perspective, although
these approaches need further development.
“It is our money. Where is it gone?” is a short documentary, released by the International Budget Partnership, on an initiative, in Mombasa (Kenya) to involve communities directly in monitoring the Constituency Development Fund, a fund managed by Kenyan parliamentarians. Through social audits, communities monitored budgets and held their government accountable for managing the public’s money and meeting the needs of the poor.
Developed by the Secretariat for the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) and UNDP, this toolkit aims to facilitate a more active parliamentary involvement in the implementation, oversight and monitoring of UNCAC; highlight the role of parliamentarians in preventing corruption and track parliamentary performance as well as emerging trends and developments; identify gaps where parliamentary strengthening may be needed; and, bolster inter-institutional dialogue on anti-corruption reforms.
Corruption fighters are contradictory figures, loved by what they stand for and hated by what they challenge. Michela Wrong’s account of the story of John Githongo, a Kenyan corruption fighter, explores both sides. But it goes further. It is an important read for international donors because it unveils the somewhat upsetting role played by them in the anti-corruption game. As with any view, Wrong’s stance is just one among many opinions on the issue of the international development cooperation involvement on corruption issues. But it is a good starting point for reflection.
Two worlds which are intrinsically linked - the one of those who fight corruption and those who fight money laundering - have been treated in isolation so far, according to the authors. Their effort, in this publication, is to explain the nexus between corruption at the domestic level in developing countries and the international aspect of the issue, and how dealing with them separately has not been very effective at least in regards to grand corruption. Corruption and money laundering regularly appear in tandem and the presence of one reinforces the incidence of the other. This publication presents a good overview of the links between the two and can inform particularly well those interested in the Asia Pacific region. (This book is available for purchase from the publisher)
Does the incentive for re-election induce mayors to behave less corruptly? It looks like electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. This article’s findings suggest so by analyzing the case of Brazilian municipalities, where data showed that mayors in their first term misappropriated, on average, 27 percent fewer resources than mayors in their second-term. This difference was more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment was lower (Payment requested for access to article).