Political corruption

Political corruption cases

Below are presented a number of examples of political corruption (or what the authors consider to be and have described as cases of political corruption). These examples are taken from the academic literature, media reports, and discussion groups. The cases have been abbreviated and slightly edited for the purpose of clarity.

Please note that many of the larger scams involve both types of political corruption: extraction, and corruption for the purpose of power preservation. Some of the case examples clearly illustrate this.

EXTRACTIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION

The first group of cases provides examples of individual and group enrichment, i.e. the misuse of political power, mainly driven by self-indulgence and private wealth-maximising incentives. The examples are listed 'from the top', with examples firstly of self-enrichment by Presidents and Heads of State (including vice-presidents and president's offices and inner cabinets), secondly of ruling parties and government/ cabinet ministers second, and finally of military officials, top-level bureaucrats, parliamentarians and other senior power-holders.

Presidents, prime ministers and heads of state

South Africa: The arms deal scam

South Africa: The arms deal scam
South Africa's deputy president Jacob Zuma came under investigation for allegations that he attempted to solicit a bribe from the head of the South African branch of the arms company Thomson in return for protecting the company from investigation and giving it his 'permanent support'. The case was brought to an end when the director of prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, announced in August 2003 that Zuma would not be charged because, although there was a strong prima facie case against him, the government could not be sure of winning the case in court. But the charges against Schabir Shaikh, a businessman closely involved with Zuma, have spelled out in considerable detail what the evidence was - the money and other benefits Zuma allegedly received.

Other questions remain unanswered. BAE Systems won a contract for jet trainers with their venerable Hawk in competition with the cheaper Aermacchi MB339, preferred by the South African air force, raising questions about the tender process. (Performance parameters were modified and, when this manipulation did not produce the required answer, the ministers' committee instructed the evaluators to ignore price in the approved value system.) The offset arrangements, touted as the crowning triumph of the financing process and the ultimate justification of the deal, have been questioned. Sweetheart deals abound as part of the offset programme, allegedly giving friends of senior politicians - and even President Thabo Mbeki's brother, Moeletsi - a share of the defence pie under the rubric of 'black empowerment'.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2004:59-62. (Joe Roeber).
For an update on this case, see for instance the Mail & Guardian online: Yengeni to be given hero's send-off.

[top]

Costa Rica: Shady financing of politicians

The first scandal erupted in October 2004 when former president Miguel Angel Rodríguez was forced to resign as Secretary-General of the Organization of American States. He stepped down after allegations implicated him in a bribery scheme involving the French telecommunications company, Alcatel. In mid-2004, details emerged showing that Alcatel had been awarded a contract to improve the country's cellular phone system allegedly after its officials successfully bribed José Antonio Lobo, Rodríguez's protégé and a former director of the state electricity company, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), with a US $2.4 million 'prize'. Lobo said he had been 'advised' to accept the sum by Rodríguez, who is reported to have demanded 60 per cent of it.

Digging deeper into Alcatel's dealings, allegations emerged that it had attempted to influence previous and current Costa Rican politicians as well. José María Figueres, a former president, was forced to step down from his senior position at the World Economic Forum in Geneva in October 2004 following allegations that he had received a US $900,000 bribe from Alcatel during his years of public office. Current President Abel Pacheco has been asked to explain an undeclared US $100,000 donation to his presidential campaign, also by Alcatel. In total, the authorities believe that Alcatel, which enjoys a near monopoly of telecommunications services in the country, has paid more than US $4.4 million to Costa Rican politicians and officials.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:146-147. (Roxana Salazar).

[top]

Uganda: Business-political linkages

Patronage and personal interests are key factors in business-politics linkages in Uganda. Senior military officers and their civilian business associates have profited from military procurements largely because of their personal ties with the powers that be (including the President). This crony capitalism has been worsened by the absence of effective institutions to check the excesses of corrupt officials.

Compounding the corrupt military procurement practices has been the rise of profitable "civilian" businesses (such as Speke Resort, Munyonyo and Mosa Courts) owned by individuals who are connected to leading members of the Movement [ruling party]. Business investors are not given equal treatment. Big local businesses are preferred over small-to-medium enterprises. Government's preference for certain companies - which underpins the Movement's "interventionism" - stifles competition. Vast donor support for privatization, liberalization and institutional reform has also been used to reward loyalists, recruit new supporters and/or buy off opponents.

The cosy relation between foreign business and local political elites is evident in the case of Sudhir Rupharelia, a real estate tycoon of Asian origin. Sudhir reportedly has strong connections with leading members of the Movement government. The controversial Tri-Star company (a "manufacturer" of textiles for export to the USA under the African Growth and Opportunity Act - AGOA) is also important. The company obtained unusually generous favours from the Movement government - start-up capital, tax holidays, labour commitments, and an assured external market access - leading some Parliamentarians to suggest that Kananathan, the formal owner of Tri-Star is perhaps a mere front of President Museveni.

The second example mentioned by our informers is Zimwe Construction Co. Ltd., one of the most successful bidders for government construction work (under the Movement regime). The Company is successful because its owners have important connections with technocrats (eg. Sebaana Kizito, Mayor of Kampala City Council and the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works). However, the company's technocratic connections would probably have little effect without its political ties with high-level politicians (such as the President). By some accounts, Zimwe Construction Co. Ltd is the "official" contractor of State House.

Excerpts from Julius Kiiza: "Business-Politics Linkages in Uganda", a Medium-Term Dynamics Consultancy Report, commissioned by DFID. Kampala March 2004.

[top]

Uganda: Military-political corruption

One of the most notorious areas of corruption everywhere is that concerned with the procurement of military equipment and defence supplies. In the case of the NRM Government, in power in Uganda since 1986, it has been mainly since the late 1990s, when the government began acquiring more and larger military hardware. A number of major tenders were entered into for aircraft, guns, and tanks as well as items such as food rations and uniforms. These deals invariably involved bribes and kickbacks and also massive overpayments from which many officers, top government officials, and middlemen profited.

Senior military officers and their civilian business associates have also profited whenever military operations have had to be concluded to combat insurgencies threatening Uganda's security. For instance, Ugandan soldiers have been deployed in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo since August 1998. But Ugandan military involvement in the Congo was extended well beyond the border security zone. By most accounts, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) advanced into areas of eastern Congo to profit financially from the plunder of natural resources. Indeed, Congo has proven to be a veritable treasure trove for a small number of high-ranking army officers who, together with their civilian business partners, have become rich from smuggling and resource plunder.

We argue that the prevalence of military corruption has been the result of government and army leaders not being subject to public accountability. Not a single leader has been faced with prosecution or punishment for corrupt military behaviour.

In 1996, the RNM Government decided to buy Russian helicopter gunships because of their potential effectiveness against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) […]. The gunships have, however, remained grounded at Entebbe air force base, and the Government has lost over $12 million on the deal. In December 1998 the Ugandan army took delivery of a consignment of 62 tanks which were to be used to intervene against Sudan. They turned out to be obsolete Russian T-55s, all but eight of which were not operational on arrival in Uganda. In early 1998 they arranged the sale with the defence ministry and reportedly received $4 million in commission payments while the total cost of the deal was $28 million, at least four times above the market price for outdated tanks.

Serious cases of military corruption occurred in Uganda in the late 1990s. These were prevalent predominantly in the procurement of defence equipment and army supplies but occurred also where the UPDF was deployed in war situations Most of those involved in diverse corrupt military behaviour were army officers, but senior defence ministry officials and civilian business people also participated. Many of these military and political figures were closely connected - at times related - to President Museveni and his wife. And indeed, it was President Museveni who was responsible for permitting an environment to emerge conductive to much military corruption by a handful of his relatives and supporters.

We conclude by arguing that military corruption has been used to maintain the NRM regime in power. Corrupt military procurement and economic plunder have benefited key UPDF officers as well as promoted their loyalty to the regime.

Excerpts from Tangri, Roger & Andrew M. Mwenda (2003): "Military Corruption & Ugandan Politics since the late 1990s" in Review of African Political Economy no.98, pp 539-553, 2003.

[top]

Kenya: The Goldenberg affair

A key suspect in Kenya's biggest ever corruption scam said he got ex-president Daniel arap Moi involved in this gold and diamond re-export plan. Kamlesh Pattni, a major shareholder of Goldenberg, told the inquiry into the scandal that Mr Moi was keen to earn foreign currency for Kenya. Mr Moi denies any part in the affair, in which Kenya lost up to $600m between 1990 and 1993.

Current President Mwai Kibaki set up the inquiry a year ago to investigate why Mr Moi's government paid Goldenberg for the supposed exports, which proved fictitious. Mr Pattni, who is the main defendant in the trial, said the scam had started out as a noble idea but turned into a scandal after it was sabotaged by greedy individuals who wanted a share. His idea had been to legitimise the re-export of gold and diamonds coming into Kenya from third countries. Kenya itself has negligible amounts of either commodity. He said things started to go wrong when he sought the support of senior government officials to help him clinch the deal. He was able to enlist Mr Moi's help because the former president saw the plan as an opportunity to earn money for Kenya rather than relying on aid from the IMF and the World Bank.

But prosecutors say the exports never took place, although the scandal cost Kenya the equivalent of more than 10% of the country's annual GDP or as much as $600m between 1990 and 1993. Kenyan court of appeal judge Samuel Bosire has drawn the curtains on what is being termed the most expensive government probe into a saga that is blamed for the long-lasting cash-crunch at Kenya's treasury.

A total of 65 witnesses appeared before the commission, including Kamlesh Pattni, now considered the chief architect. They gave details of how former government officials allegedly took part in looting government resources through a fake gold and jewellery export compensation scheme. Those adversely mentioned also include some senior officials in President Kibaki's government, among them former Vice-President George Saitoti, now minister in charge of education.

BBC World News; Suspect 'links' Moi to gold scam and Kenya's biggest scam probe ends, May and November 2004

[top]

Ruling parties and government/cabinet ministers

Kenya: Graft of the Kibaki regime

According to a report of the former leader of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, John Githongo, senior officials in the Kibaki regime were linked to graft. This constituted a clear case of political corruption because although low-level officials may have been involved, it was driven by high-level politicians who were siphoning off the profits. According to Githongo, who is now residing in exile in the UK following a series of death threats, his report contains "incontrovertible evidence that most senior members of our government" were involved in a series of fraudulent contracts with the non-existent Anglo Leasing Company. Not only were Ministers involved in approving these payments, they also actively attempted to cover up this and many other fraudulent transactions once it became clear that they were the subject of ongoing investigations. The scandal resulted in the resignation of the Finance Minister in January 2006 and a number of other high-level Ministers have received summons from the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission who are investigating the Githongo report.

Case example given by participant at U4 online course , February 2006

[top]

France: the ELF scandal

The investigations, which Britain's Guardian newspaper called 'perhaps the biggest financial scandal in a western democracy since the end of the Second World War', illustrate the problems of political corruption that have characterised the French oil industry for decades. Elf Aquitaine had no monopoly on political corruption but it makes an excellent case study, because it 'got caught'.

In France in 2003, 37 defendants were accused of accepting nearly €400 million (US $457 million) from the former state oil group Elf Aquitaine for personal enrichment and political kickbacks during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The company's senior executives subsequently admitted that the money was routinely used to finance French political parties and presidential candidates.

In January 2003, Roland Dumas, foreign minister under François Mitterrand, was declared innocent of enjoying the fruits of corruption from Elf Aquitaine. Dumas had not known that a 17 million franc (US $3 million) flat where his mistress and meeting were held - or the thousands of dollars lavished on him from her unlimited credit card - had been corruptly supplied by Elf. Nor was it even suggested that he had received any of the 65 million francs (US $12 million) she had allegedly paid to induce him to change government policy to permit the sale of frigates to Taiwan for 14.6 billion francs (US $2.6 billion). Policy was indeed changed and, according to Dumas himself, the shipbuilder, Thomson-CSF, paid US $500 million in 'commissions' to people known to himself and President Mitterrand. In effect, the court appears to have judged that Dumas, a lawyer to the rich and famous, close friend of the president, government minister and president of the highest court in France, had simply been naive.

Meanwhile, some of Dumas' co-defendants went back to court along with others, mostly Elf managers, charged with bribing African politicians and helping themselves on the way. Evidence of payments to French politicians was declared a 'defence secret' by the government and not allowed into court.

The ramifications of the Elf case blew across the border to Germany, where they helped to destroy the reputation of ex-chancellor Helmut Kohl. At the heart of the matter were the 'commissions' allegedly paid by Elf to 'facilitate' the purchase of the moribund Leuna refinery in East Germany. According to Elf's director general, the company bought the refinery at Mitterrand's insistence to help his friend Helmut, whose modus operandi allegedly included buying the allegiance of the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) regional agents with money from a party slush fund.

The trials have identified many corrupt or questionable mechanisms: overpayment for assets generating hidden subsidies, payments through chains of offshore accounts, the use of Gabon as an offshore financial turntable for generating hidden payments, and the use of secrecy and commercial intelligence as keys to financial success. There are 'revolving door' problems: the use of politically networked intermediaries to win deals; specialised trading companies that confuse revenue flows; persistent links between oil and the covert arms trade; and the assumption by oil firms of diplomatic functions. As revealed also in the Elf trials, political corruption in oil is tied up with banking.

Case example taken from TI Global Corruption Report 2004:63-69.

[top]

Croatia: The Imostroj affair

The most controversial conflict of interest allegation in 2004-05 was the 'Imostroj affair', whose chief protagonist was the then minister of foreign affairs, Miomir Žužul. The local media alleged that Žužul took a bribe from a friend and businessman in return for pushing the cabinet to cancel the debts of Imostroj, a company the man planned to buy. Although the State Attorney and Audit Offices did not identify any conflict of interest, the public remained sceptical.

In parliament, the opposition Social Democrat Party (SDP) and Croatian People's Party (HNS) demanded the minister's resignation. The majority Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned the tables by appointing a committee to inquire into conflicts of interest by senior officials during the 2000-03 coalition government, naming Zlatko Tomciç, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) and former parliamentary speaker, and Radimir Caciç, a former minister of public works and member of HNS, as ripe for investigation.

Miomir Žužul, considered Prime Minister Ivo Sanader's right-hand man and head of the team negotiating Croatia's entry to the EU, resisted calls to step down for two more months, but finally resigned in January 2005, several days before the presidential election.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:151. (Ana First).

[top]

Kenya: State Firms' Officials to Be Charged

Eight permanent secretaries and 18 heads of state corporations are to be prosecuted over corruption. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission director, Mr Justice Aaron Ringera, said yesterday that the 26 officials feature in 145 cases recommended to the Attorney-General for prosecution.

At the same time, Mr Justice Ringera, who was addressing students of Chuka High School, Meru South, vowed to wage a relentless war on graft, saying that nobody was untouchable. "No sector will be immune from investigations," he said. "We shall continue to investigate corruption, subject to the law. Nobody is so small or high to be above the law." And he told off Health minister Charity Ngilu over her claim that his investigations were being focused only on petty cases of corruption. "How can eight permanent secretaries and 18 parastatal chief executives be petty corruption?" he asked.

The anti-graft chief confirmed that Mrs Ngilu was among top government officials being investigated. "The receipt of an allowance that a minister is not entitled to cannot be described as petty corruption," he said. "Any corruption at that level is not petty corruption. I do not want to board the same plane of pettiness, ignorance and malice with the minister."

KACC was also probing graft at the Nairobi city and Mombasa municipal councils. Politicians in both the Government and the opposition were also being probed, he added. Mr Ringera said KACC had been assured by foreign governments represented in Nairobi and law enforcement agencies that they would help in tracing and recovering stolen Kenyan funds stashed away in foreign bank accounts. He said KACC had also identified illegally held government assets and was preparing prosecutions and their possible seizure.

Source: The Nation (Nairobi), February 26, 2006

[top]

France: The "Ile de France" trials

The Ile de France trial, one of the biggest trials involving alleged corruption in public procurement ever held in France, opened in March 2005. Seven years of investigation were required to expose an extensive system of corruption in procurement contracts for the construction or renovation of 300 of the 470 high schools in the Ile de France, the region around Paris. The case involves 47 defendants, who if found guilty face up to 10 years in prison for collusion, concealing corruption and influence peddling.

The accusations centre on allegations that companies paid major political parties to win contracts to renovate schools around Paris. The defendants include a former cooperation minister, an ex-president of the Ile de France regional council and a former labour minister, as well as the former treasurers of three political parties and business executives.

Following a decision by the Ile de France regional council to upgrade the school facilities, it reportedly signed 114 10-year construction and maintenance contracts valued at close to €1.4 billion (US $1.68 billion) in total, with only five multinational companies. It was alleged that these companies made an unofficial and secret deal, involving the payment of 2 per cent of the value of the contracts to various political parties: 1.2 per cent to the ruling Rassemblement Pour la République and 0.8 per cent to the Socialist Party, with smaller allocations to the Republican and Communist parties. The payments took the form of apparently legal gifts to finance the parties' campaigns. Between 1991 and 1996, some €30 million (US $36 million) were paid out under the scheme.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:158-159. (Antoine Genevois).

[top]

Israel: Money and party financing

In February 2005, Attorney General Mazuz indicted Omri Sharon, son of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and a member of the Knesset, for campaign finance violations during his father's campaign for the leadership of the Likud party in the 1999 and 2001 national elections.

The attorney general stopped short of indicting the prime minister, although according to the state comptroller, Ariel Sharon took illegal donations of NIS5.9 million (US $1.3 million) to enhance his chances of winning the 2001 national elections. The money was funnelled through a number of 'straw' companies, including a US corporation, Annex Research Ltd, founded by Sharon's lawyer, Dov Weisglass, and run by Omri Sharon. Sharon said the money was used to finance a campaign against Benjamin Netanyahu.

The comptroller accepted Sharon's defence regarding the lion's share of the donation, but insisted that 20 per cent of it, or NIS1.4 million (US $310,000), be charged against Likud. Sharon took steps to return the illegal contribution in October 2001 by borrowing NIS4.2 million (US $920,000) from the bank.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:177-178. (Doron Navot).

[top]

Kazakhstan: The Baikonur scandal

Despite a reasonably progressive law on procurement passed in May 2002, Kazakhstan has had serious problems in implementing it. The alleged embezzlement of funds in an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan over the use of the Baikonur space facility is a case in point. The case was particularly salient since it appeared to involve the head of the presidential administration, Imangali Tasmagambetov. In August 2004, two deputies from the Russian Federation Duma (parliament) wrote to the Kazakh parliament enquiring about Russia's payments for rental of the Baikonur complex in the Kazakh steppes.

In August, the Kazakh newspaper Respublika revealed that the one person who could shed most light on the missing funds was Tasmagambetov, head of the presidential administration, who had been prime minister when the deal was struck, and had both signed the agreement and nominated the preferred operator. Moreover, Amangeldy Ermegiyaev, son of the vice-president of the ruling OTAN party, had supervised the tender commission, and Alexander Pavlov, the deputy prime minister, had monitored the execution of the deal. The officials who were allegedly linked to the Baikonur scandal denied any wrongdoing.

In late September, the finance minister, Arman Dunaev, insisted that all the rental money had been paid into the national budget in January and February 2004. However, in February 2005, Omarkhan Oksikbayev, chairman of the Kazakh audit chamber, announced that the findings of the Russian audit chamber had been forwarded to the prosecutor general's office and the finance police.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:185-186. (Sergey Zlotnikov).

[top]

Military officials, top-level bureaucrats, MPs

South Africa: MPs incriminated in 'Travelgate'

South African MPs are issued with vouchers each year to defray travel expenses between their constituencies and the parliament in Cape Town. Allegations of misuse of the vouchers first surfaced in 2003, leading to an investigation in which more than 100 MPs and seven travel agencies were questioned. The alleged frauds included the exchange of vouchers for cash; use of vouchers by family and friends; use of airfare vouchers for accommodation and vehicle hire; and MPs holding shares or receiving financial benefits from the travel agents involved. When two of the travel agents involved were closed down, 40 MPs entered plea bargains with the elite Scorpions investigation unit. The first five MPs were convicted in March 2005, with sentences ranging from R40,000 (US $5,800) or one year's imprisonment, to R80,000 (US$12,000) or three years in prison. Under the constitution, an MP can only lose a seat if sentenced to more than 12 months' imprisonment, without the option of a fine. South Africa now finds that nearly a quarter of its legislators have been incriminated in questionable behaviour.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:243. (Ayesha Kajee).

[top]

POLITICAL CORRUPTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRESERVING POWER

The second group of examples are of political corruption for the purpose of maintaining power, i.e. the use of political power and position by various power-holding groups mainly driven by the incentives of maintaining and strengthening their hold on power. The means of downward political corruption include the distribution of financial and material benefits (inducements), and will usually take the form of favouritism.

The examples are listed in three categories: the buying of individual politicians (co-optation) to build majorities and secure specific policy decisions; the manipulation of elections and buying of voters; and the manipulation of various institutions of checks and balances, oversight and control.

Co-optations

Australia: public service job provided

In New South Wales in 1989 the Premier, Nick Greiner, was accused by the anti-corruption commission which he had established on coming into office, of acting corruptly in providing a public service job for a former supporter so as to enlarge his majority in the New South Wales Parliament. This was done against the law and in conflict between the demands of politics and the demands of public office.

Case example taken from Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston [eds] 2002:53.

[top]

Nepal: The 'Dashain allowance'

in March 2005, the RCCC (Royal Commission for Corruption Control) began the prosecution of six former ministers for misusing the prime minister's relief fund to distribute some NPR4 million (US $57,000) to political supporters in the guise of relief aid to Maoist insurgency victims. The media dubbed the alleged scam the 'Dashain allowance', Dashain being an important Hindu festival. According to the RCCC, the six former ministers misused monies from the relief fund to cover 'Dashain expenses' for 21 party supporters.

Then in June 2005, the RCCC made an abrupt U-turn and cleared the former prime minister of these charges, as well as the six members of his cabinet and the 21 beneficiaries of the expenses. According to the RCCC chairman: 'The decision to distribute cash could not be established as a case of corruption under Clause 17 of the Anti-Corruption Act 2002'. Critics saw the move as evidence of the commission's excessive discretionary powers.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:207. (Rama Krishna Regmee).

[top]

Manipulation of elections and vote-buying

Brazil: Vote buying

A national survey of vote-buying on behalf of Transparência Brasil showed that in the presidential and legislative elections held in October-November 2002, about 3% of Brazilian voters were subjected to offers to sell their votes by candidates or go-betweens. Money was the most common offering (with 56%), followed by material goods (30%) and favours extended by the public administration (11%). In a similar survey in early 2001 (right after the municipal elections), 6% of the sampling voters said they were offered money in exchange of their votes.

Case example cited from Speck & Abramo (2001).

[top]

Brazil: Vote buying in congress

Lacking a majority in Congress, the Labour party PT was accused of paying a monthly allowance of R30,000 (US $12,500) to congressmen from two allied parties in return for their votes. The two parties implicated are the Progressive Party (PP), led by Severino Cavalcanti, the low-profile ultra-conservative chairman of the Chamber of Deputies; and the Liberal Party (PL), whose president, Waldemar Costa Neto, became the first lawmaker to step down in a widening corruption scandal. Dirceu resigned as the president's chief of staff in June 2005 and returned to his seat in the Chamber of Deputies where he is under investigation by the Chamber of Deputies Ethics Committee.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:135. (Ana Luiza Fleck Saibro).

[top]

Brazil: Changing parties

Parliamentarian performance is far from the image of a legislator concerned with checking on government's actions, guided by principles and a follower of party lines. Due to the strong political relationships between the Executive and the Legislature, parliamentarians swap parties frequently. Thus, during 1999, a total of 112 parliamentarians from the lower federal house changed parties; in 2000, they were 41; and in 2001, until February 14th, 23 moved over from one party to another.

After each election, there is a growth of the government's support basis. This happens because parliamentarians loyal to the government influence both the budget and the budget's execution, appoint people to occupy "trust positions", vote legislation that the government is interested in, and exert pressures to expedite transfers and federal sponsored state and municipal projects. One of the big scandals brought to light during 1993-1994 involved the lower chamber Budget Commission. Parliamentarians used to negotiate kickbacks with firms holding contracts for projects included in the budget; they also diverted transfers to "social" and "educational" organisations under their control.

Support for government projects is frequently incumbent on negotiations with the Executive. In 1997, a number of parliamentarians literally sold their favourable vote to amend the Constitution in order to allow President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (as well as governors and mayors) to run for re-election. The main suspicions fell on one the most intimate political collaborators of the President (and also a partner in business ventures), the powerful Communications minister, already deceased, Sérgio Motta. Pressures and political favours allowed the Executive to avoid investigation by Congress, illustrating the deep interdependency of the two republican institutions, directly arising from the weaknesses of the party structure.

Country example cited from Transparência Brazil, Report on Brazil, presented to the Global Forum II on Fighting Corruption, The Hague, May 2001. (0).

[top]

Tanzania: the misuse of Takrima

The National Parliament of Tanzania a few years ago amended the Election Act by including what is known as the Traditional Hospitality (takrima) clause, which defines takrima as a (material) gift, ostensibly given in good faith. However, nowadays the takrima phenomenon is no longer the desired hospitality as depicted in the respective law, but has come to encourage corrupt tendencies. Politicians vying for political posts now apply this controversial clause, coupled with poverty and illiteracy problems facing many Tanzanians, to offer for free to the voters, pretending to be in good faith, things such as clothes, food, hard cash, and construction materials during campaigns just to win the elections. Eventually the poor people and especially women fall into the takrima trap by electing dishonest representatives/leaders. The example of traditional Takrima hospitality when applied for political motives translates into political corruption. It can be practised at the highest levels of the political system, and may involve state agents such that the Parliament is formed by corrupt members.

Case example given by participant at U4 online course , February 2006.

[top]

Latin America: Vote buying

In Brazil's municipal elections in March 2001, for example, 7 per cent of voters were offered money for their votes. Different surveys in Mexico place the frequency of vote buying at between 5 per cent and 26 per cent, while a 1999 Gallup survey in Argentina found that 24 per cent of interviewees knew someone who sold his or her vote.

The object of transaction is not always cash. Offers include food, clothes, household goods, medicine, infrastructure, construction material, agricultural inputs and the provision of other services. Short-term jobs and public contracts were traded in Colombia's 2002 presidential campaign. Voters may be granted access to social programmes or other public services in exchange for their vote; they may also be threatened with deprivation of benefits if they do not vote as 'commissioned'. Such threats were one of the foundations of Alberto Fujimori's re-election strategy in Peru in 2000: beneficiaries of the national programme of food assistance, Pronaa, were pressured into giving their vote to Fujimori, attending his campaign events and wearing stickers that promoted his party, as a tacit condition for continuing to receive food subsidies.

In Colombia, mayors from the south-western department of Nariño were accused of using funds from Plan Colombia (a US-sponsored initiative aimed at tackling drugs production and trafficking) to finance their vote buying activities. In another example, governors from Mexico's ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), threatened voters that vouchers distributed in southern states via the Progresa poverty-alleviation programme would be withdrawn if they voted for the opposition in the 2000 elections.

Case examples cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2004:76-77. (Silke Pfeiffer).

[top]

Bangladesh: Questioned impartiality of Election Commission

There is no denying that in Bangladesh, there are still a number of constraints against holding of a free and fair election, and establishing transparency in the entire election process. It is the constitutional duty of Election Commission (EC), first and foremost, to carry out the election freely and fairly. Unfortunately, however, the EC continues to be dependent upon the Government for key management and financial decisions. There are allegations from different quarters that in appointments to various positions in the Commission political considerations have been getting increasing priority. Impartiality of the Election Commission is, therefore, widely questioned.

The political parties play a vital role in ensuring free and fair election in a representative democracy. But there is no well-defined and legally binding provision yet in our country on the important issues of the formation of political parties and their funding. An unhealthy competition of buying the entire process starts as soon as election comes. Though there is a set limit regarding election expenses of the candidates, hardly anybody abides by it, for which the undeclared cost of election has been skyrocketing day by day. The primary reason for this is the absence of political will and institutional strength to enforce it. Violation of election code including expenditure limit is hardly punished so that there is practically no deterrence against violators, rendering the election an investment.

Country example cited from TI Bangladesh, Waves, vol. 9, no. 4, December 2005 (Editorial)

[top]

Manipulations of institutions

Nicaragua: The pact

Bolaños, who came to power at the helm of an alliance of five political parties, lost the support of his party, the PLC, in 2002 when his government prosecuted Alemán, head of the PLC and former president, who had originally picked him as presidential candidate. Since then, the PLC and the main opposition party FSLN, which together control over 90 per cent of the National Assembly, have gradually tightened their hold over the institutions of state, making it practically impossible to act against corruption.

The two parties' leaders, Alemán and Daniel Ortega, reached an informal pact in 2000 to push through a constitutional change that enhances their control of institutions and grants Alemán an automatic seat in the National Assembly and therefore parliamentary immunity. The pact has since widened in scope and plays a critical role for their political survival since both face high rates of disapproval within their parties and externally, and are being investigated for corruption in Nicaragua and third countries. They are both unpopular with the US government, and featured on a list of high-level party officials who have been denied entry visas to the United States on the grounds of corruption.

Case example cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:214. (Roberto Courtney).

[top]

Angola: the Presidential "Christmas bonus"

One of the tactics used by the Government of Angola to make a split in (the rival party) UNITA and force people into the new, regime-loyal "UNITA-Renovada", was to strip the non-compliant parliamentarians of their parliamentary privileges like homes, cars and cellular phones. Furthermore, according to Hodges, 'worthy' members of the political establishment, including parliamentarians, receive an annual 'Christmas bonus' (also members of UNITA and other 'opposition' parties, if they have behaved well). This bonus has "in some years run as high as $30,000, dwarfing their annual salaries".

Case example cited from Anthony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, pp. 61 and 64.

[top]

Algeria: Lack of follow-up

In Algeria, there have been several serious allegations of extractive corruption involving senior officials, in particular irregularities in public procurement processes (including excessive private agreements). IMF has noted that Algeria only partly observes the norms on fiscal transparency.

In terms of favouritist corruption and institutional manipulation, the auditor general's department (Cour des comptes) that was created in 1980 and is required under the constitution to publish annual reports has only submitted two reports in the entire quarter century of its existence. In spite of an order in July 1995 that set out its mandate, the status of its investigators has still not been clearly defined. Its association of officers has repeatedly protested against the department's marginalisation, most recently at a public meeting attended by the press in August 2005, but the authorities have never given any explanation of their behaviour towards it. The freedom of information is also restricted, and libel action taken by authorities against the media.

Country example cited from TI Global Corruption Report 2006:125. (Dilali Hadjadj).

[top]

Canada: Government corruption

Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin and Jean Chrétien, his predecessor as head of the Liberal government, testified under oath in February 2005 at a public inquiry investigating alleged government corruption. Only once previously did a sitting or past Canadian prime minister give public testimony in a like judicial proceeding. That was in 1873, when Canada's first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, responded to charges his government had awarded a railway contract in return for massive election campaign contributions to his Conservative Party.

Canadian justice is investigating a federal government program under which Ottawa paid out $250 million between 1996 and 2002 to sponsor sporting and cultural events. Much of the money was funnelled through Liberal-friendly advertising firms. It is not uncommon for Canadian governments, whether federal or provincial, to steer government advertising and consultancy work to firms known to be friendly to the party in power. But in this case, internal government audits found the program improperly managed, with financial records either nonexistent or replete with errors and gaps.

A government study of contracts given to Le Groupe Polygone Editeurs, which received $40 million in sponsorship money, said that there appeared to have been "systematic and egregious overcharging for what was delivered." A subsequent investigation by Canada's auditor-general found repeated instances of Groupe Polygone and other firms receiving large payments in return for little or no work. Criminal charges have been laid against several advertising company executives.

There is little doubt some people criminally profited from the sponsorship program. There are also good grounds to believe that the program - whose ostensible purpose was to raise the profile of the federal government in Quebec and thereby counter the Quebec indépendantiste movement - was used to finance the Quebec wing of the Liberal Party. According to Alfonso Gagliano, who for much of this period was both the minister responsible for the sponsorship program and the boss of the Quebec Liberal machine, the Liberal Party was "not rich". It, however, did receive substantial donations from many of the firms and executives of the firms that received sponsorship contracts from Gagliano's Public Works Ministry or to which sponsorship work was subcontracted.

If the sponsorship scandal has become such a major political issue, it is because it has served as a mechanism through which Canada's corporate and political elite have fought out matters of leadership and policy direction.

Country example cited from Keith Jones (2005): Martin and Chrétien testify in corruption scandal, World Socialist Web Site, 19 February 2005. See also Wikipedia on the Sponsorship Scandal

[top]