Political Corruption
Amundsen, Inge (U4 Issue 2006:6)

Political corruption undermines political and economic development in many countries, and raises difficult chal­lenges for foreign aid. What is political corruption? What are the main mecha­nisms? What can donors do when partner governments are corrupt? These are some of the questions addressed by these focus area pages. The purpose is to extract and present the latest knowledge on issues of political cor­ruption, and we invite advisors in the field of good govern­ance and economics (agency staff and academics) to share opinions, lessons learned and best practice on all aspects of this challenging topic.

'What does not get measured, does not get done'. The methods and limitations of measuring illicit financial flows
Fontana, Alessandra (U4 Brief 2010:2)

Estimates of the size of illicit financial flows have been questioned because data used to measure the phenomenon is fraught with problems. However, such estimates are necessary to inform policy making on this issue. Improving the quality of data gathering in poor countries and asking questions beyond statistics can improve the understanding of and response to illicit flows.

The uses and abuses of social programmes: the case of conditional cash transfers
Alcázar, Lorena (U4 Brief 2010:3)

Social programmes have been increasingly used by developing countries to fight poverty and have attracted growing budgets. However, it has been empirically shown that there is a weak correlation between social spending and outcomes, even if we account for national incomes (World Bank 2008). Many factors have been identified as possible causes of this situation, including market failures, composition of spending, corruption and effectiveness of social service delivery. A body of research on public expenditure in democratic regimes argues that one of the reasons for such underperformance is manipulation by political leaders of the timing and allocation of expenditures with the aim of re-election. Increases in public expenditures have been timed to coincide with elections and expenditures have been directed toward areas in which their political impact was likely to be largest, discriminating against other areas on the basis of political calculus rather than social or poverty-based criteria.

Unpacking the concept of political will to confront corruption
Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (U4 Brief 2010:1)

Quite often, "lack of political will" is identified as the culprit for poorly performing anti-corruption programmes. Yet despite the frequency with which it is used to explain unsatisfactory reform outcomes, political will remains under-defined and poorly understood. Further, assessments are often conducted retrospectively, looking back at failed programmes. By applying a model of political will that specifies a set of action-based components that are observable and measurable, and amenable to external reinforcement and support, more clarity regarding the degree of political will can be achieved.

Regulating conflicts of interest in challenging environments: The case of Azerbaijan
Reed, Quentin (U4 Issue 2010:2)

Current approaches to regulating conflicts of interest, often encouraged by international anti-corruption standards, are commonly judged by how restrictive they are. Such interpretations reflect a mistaken view that a conflict of interest itself is corruption. This paper critiques current treatment of conflict of interest regulation through the lens of experience from Azerbaijan. It concludes by suggesting how the implementation and evaluation of compliance with international standards might be modified to encourage more meaningful ethical regulation, especially in difficult contexts: by prioritising standards, achieving the right balance in the types of regulation enacted, and encouraging partial rather than across-the-board regulation.

Squeezing a balloon? Challenging the nexus between organised crime and corruption
Reed, Quentin (U4 Issue 2009:7)

Corruption and organised crime are of great concern to the international community: while the first is regarded as one of the greatest barriers to development, the second is seen as a key threat to international security and stability. In this context, corruption is best understood as the way in which organised crime infiltrates the state. Corruption is one of the primary enabling activities of organised crime, it makes possible and/or facilitate the conduct of this type of criminal activities.

This U4 Issue argues that understanding the connections between both phenomena requires a deeper analysis of the relationships between organised criminals and public officials at different levels of the state. First, international standards and conventional wisdom tend to embrace a limited range of the possible policies that may be employed to tackle organised crime and the corruption, and are heavily oriented towards criminal law and enforcement. Second, policies to tackle both problems are usually developed without applying sound principles of policy‑making. The author argues for the development of policies based on proper analysis of the specific context, breaking down the problem into clear components, identifying their causes, and selecting specific and appropriate measures to address each component or causal factor. In particular, the author suggests there is a pressing need to correct the current bias towards criminal law enforcement solutions.

Profiting from corruption: The role and responsibility of financial institutions
Palmer, Robert (U4 Brief 2009:31)

This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.

In pursuit of policy influence: Can lobbying be a legitimate alternative to corruption in developing countries?
Campos, Nauro F. (U4 Brief 2009:1)

This Brief reviews recent research on transition countries which suggests, conceptually and empirically, that lobbying is not only more prevalent in non–developed countries than currently thought, but can be more effective than corruption as a means of influencing policy, if adequately regulated.

Reforming corruption out of Nigerian oil? Part one: Mapping corruption risks in oil sector governance
Gillies, Alexandra (U4 Brief 2009:2)

Oil dominates the Nigerian economy and generates the vast majority of government revenues. At the same time, Nigeria is perceived as one of the world's most corrupt countries, and significant levels of corruption are said to exist within its oil sector. The complex and largely opaque operations of the oil industry make it difficult to establish exactly how, when and to what extent corruption takes place. This U4 Brief attempts to shed light on how public sector institutions governing the Nigerian oil sector permit the existence of corruption. Six areas of corruption risk are addressed: the awarding of licenses; the awarding of contracts;  bottlenecks and inefficiencies; the role of bunkering; the exportation of crude; and importing refined products. The Brief is the first in a two-part series, the second of which addresses policies and programs that aim to stem corrupt practices in the Nigerian oil sector.

Reforming corruption out of Nigerian oil? Part two: Progress and prospects
Gillies, Alexandra (U4 Brief 2009:6)

In Nigeria, as elsewhere, corrupt practices impair oil sector performance. This U4 Brief looks at five approaches to advancing anti-corruption reform in Nigeria’s oil sector: the legal and regulatory framework; open and competitive award procedures; process and revenue transparency; investigation and prosecution of corruption; and oversight and accountability measures. The state of reform in each area is addressed, as are ways forward of potential interest to donors in the country. The Brief is the second in a two-part series: the first describes the most likely sites of corruption in the governance of Nigeria’s oil sector. The series aims not only to provide insights into anti-corruption related reform in Nigeria but also in other oil-rich countries that receive development assistance.

Income and assets declarations: Issues to consider in developing a disclosure regime
Messick, Richard (U4 Issue 2009:6)

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires state parties to consider establishing policies requiring officials to reveal “to appropriate authorities … their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits” (Article 8, UNCAC). The World Bank has advised a number of countries on whether an income and asset disclosure programme is an appropriate response to the corruption issues they face, and if so, what type of programme they should establish. Assistance has ranged from advice on drafting legislation to furnishing model disclosure forms to providing financial and technical support to an agency created to administer the programme. Drawing on this experience and studies underway by several Bank units, this U4 Issue paper describes the issues policymakers should weigh in deciding whether to adopt a financial disclosure law, and if so, what provisions it should contain.

Sitting on the Fence: Conflicts of Interest and How to Regulate Them
Reed, Quentin (U4 Issue 2008:6)

This paper describes the problem of conflict of interest of public officials and the main ways in which it may be tackled, with particular focus on regulation of elected officials. The paper describes three main types of regulation - prohibitions on activities, declarations of interests, and exclusion from decision-making processes - and how these may be best implemented in practice. The author underlines the need for regulation to be realistic, tailored specifically for different categories of officials and to the specific circumstances of the country in which they are to be applied. The author also suggests possibilities for the engagement of the donor community, in line with the implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption.

Anti-corruption Measures as Political Criteria for EU Accession: Lessons from the Bulgarian Experience
Todorov, Boyko (U4 Brief 2008:5)

The issue of corruption featured high on the agenda of the two latest enlargements of the European Union, in particular with respect to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007. There were few assistance programmes in these countries that did not include a good governance/anti-corruption component. However, differences of approach between the EU and bilateral aid agencies were significant enough to allow some generalisations that could be of use to future efforts in this area. This brief seeks to summarize the lessons learned from the terms of engagement employed by the EU and aid agencies of individual governments in respect of Bulgaria. It highlights some of the inefficiencies, assuming worst practice can be as valuable a learning tool as best practice.

International Assistance for Political Party Development
Carothers, Thomas (U4 Issue 2008:1)

Political party assistance should be a key component of international donors' governance agenda. Efforts to reduce corruption that do not address this domain will be incomplete, as they leave out actors essential to political processes. In this U4 Issue, Carothers reviews traditional approaches to supporting political system-building, and points to some new ways in engaging with political parties.

Political Finance: State Control and Civil Society Monitoring
Speck, Bruno Wilhelm (U4 Brief 2008:12)

Modern politics face the challenge of reconciling the presence of money in politics with the risks it poses to democratic values and good governance. This U4 Brief describes the nature of common risks and challenges, and looks at avenues for mitigating the corruption-related problems with political funding.

Money in politics: Transparency in action
Fontana, Alessandra (U4 Brief 2007:10)

Fostering disclosure of political finance information regarding public as well as private funds is key to address money's undue influence over democratic processes. However, aid donors are still reluctant to engage in what they see as a country's ‘internal politics'. This case-based brief, based on the experience of the Crinis Project, discusses the issue of transparency in political finance as an attempt to curb money's disruptive role in politics.