The formal basis of the budget process is specified in laws and regulations.
In reforming budget processes, a technocratic approach is often taken,
by which the focus is on improving the formal rules and structure of the
budget process. The technocratic approach largely ignores the fact that
reforming the budget process, though it has important technical aspects,
is also a social and political phenomenon driven by human behaviour and
local circumstances. The incentives facing agents in the budget process
influence the degree to which formal rules are adhered to. Moreover, in
many countries informal institutions and practices often take precedence
over formal rules. To go beyond the technocratic approach, this section
therefore looks at both formal rules/regulations, incentives, and informal
institutions as determinants of corruption:
The budget process must have a basis in laws/regulations and administrative
practices. Practices differ between countries. For instance France and
other continental countries tend to have practices and procedures codified
in detail whereas the UK budget laws focus on broad principles of handling
public funds, with the details being set out in administrative instructions.
Developing countries have followed either the 'French' or 'UK' legislative
model whereas countries in transition are in the process of building a
legal framework. The legal and regulatory framework controlling the budget
process consists of several levels as depicted in figure 1:
Figure 1. Hierarchy of budgetary system laws and regulations
Countries differ as to exactly where the legal instruments and regulations
that govern the budget process are spelt out. It is fairly normal that
the constitution deals with the existence and explicit roles of the President,
Parliament and the Auditor General in the budget process. In some countries
the constitution also establishes planning organs which may be involved
at the strategic and macro levels of the budget process. In other countries
a Budget Law may deal with the institutional division of roles. In other
cases a Public Finance Act will do the same but usually also include more
specific Treasury instructions. An important part of the lower level of
regulations and instructions is the Code of conduct for Officials.
There is fairly wide consensus about the key elements of the formal framework.
In terms of corruption, the IMF
Manual on Fiscal Transparency captures four basic requirements:
Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities - The structure and functions
of government should be clearly specified. Relations between the government
and non-governmental public sector agencies (i.e. the central bank,
public financial institutions, and non-financial public enterprises)
should be based on clear arrangements. If these dividing lines become
blurred doubts as to which set of e.g. accounting rules apply may arise
and open up possibilities for corruption. A state of society in which
prevailing social norms make no distinction between private and public
spheres - often called neopatrimonialism - is commonly associated with
large scale inbred corruption.
Public Availability of Information - The budget documentation,
final accounts, and other fiscal reports for the public should cover
all budgetary and extra-budgetary activities of the central government.
The consolidated fiscal position of the central government should also
be provided. The central government should publish full information
on the level and composition of its debt and financial assets as well
as the fiscal position of sub-national levels of government. The publication
of fiscal information should be a legal obligation of government. If
such information is not available the oversight function exercised by
the press and the general public will be made difficult and corrupt
activities remain hidden.
Open Budget Preparation, Execution, and Reporting - The annual
budget should be prepared and presented within a comprehensive and consistent
quantitative macroeconomic framework, and the main assumptions underlying
the budget should be provided. Budget data should be reported on a gross
basis, distinguishing revenue, expenditure, and financing - with expenditure
classified by economic, functional, and administrative categories. Data
on extra budgetary activities should be reported on the same basis.
There should be a comprehensive, integrated accounting system which
provides a reliable basis for assessing payment arrears. Mid-term reports
should be published. Final accounts should be legally required to be
presented to the legislature within a year of the end of the fiscal
year. Insight into the budget preparation will make the public aware
of results to be expected from public spending, and thus create more
awareness of deviations that may involve corruption. Unclear, imprecise,
and delayed accounts may conceal cases of corruption.
Assurances of Integrity - Budget data should reflect recent
revenue and expenditure trends, underlying macroeconomic developments,
and well-defined policy commitments. The annual budget and final accounts
should indicate the accounting basis (e.g. cash or accrual) and standards
used in the compilation and presentation of budget data. Specific assurances
should be provided as to the quality of fiscal data. In particular,
it should be indicated whether data in fiscal reports are internally
consistent and have been reconciled with relevant data from other sources.
A national audit body or equivalent organisation, which is independent
of the executive, should provide timely reports for the legislature
and public on the financial integrity of government accounts. Poor fiscal
data impairs the chance of discovering corruption, and if the national
audit body is a part of the executive - independent scrutiny of public
accounts is likely to be prejudiced.
It is not only the absence of a legal framework which creates opportunities
for corruption. Laws and regulations must also be clear and well known
by relevant officers and the public, as well as being backed by a well-functioning
enforcement machinery. Having rules and regulations in the statute book
is of little use if judicial corruption is prevalent.
“It is our money. Where is it gone?” is a short documentary, released by the International Budget Partnership, on an initiative, in Mombasa (Kenya) to involve communities directly in monitoring the Constituency Development Fund, a fund managed by Kenyan parliamentarians. Through social audits, communities monitored budgets and held their government accountable for managing the public’s money and meeting the needs of the poor.
This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.