PETS in the education sector
This page will summarise information about, and major findings of the education sector PETS in:
Uganda (I and II) about | findings |
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Tanzania about | findings |
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Zambia about | findings |
Uganda
| PETS - Uganda | ||
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Year of data |
1991-1995 | 2001 |
| Sample | Government primary schools (250 out of 8500). Local governments (18 out of 39). |
Government primary schools (218 of the 250 surveyed
in the 1991-95 survey and, moreover, 170 new government primary
schools from 9 of the 18 districts in the 1991-95 survey). Local governments (all the18 districts surveyed in the 1991-95 survey). |
| Level of administration studied | Government, district, school | Government, district, school |
| Expenditures tracked | Non-salary expenditures (capitation grant) from government level to schools through district. | Non-salary expenditures (capitation grant) from government level to schools through district. |
| Other data collected | Enrolment figures and general qualitative information on school matters. | Enrolment figures and knowledge test of head teacher. |
| Type of PETS | Diagnostic and analytical | Diagnostic and analytical |
| Reference | Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2004), Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119 (2): 679-705. | Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2003 The power of information: Evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture, Working Paper, IIES, Stockholm University. |
| Other comments | The study that developed and first implemented the PETS methodology. | Main focus on the analytic issues, explaining the role of information in fighting corruption. |
| PETS Uganda - major findings | ||
| Financial management systems | Districts lacked reliable records of disbursements to individual schools. Capitation grant almost fully released by central government on monthly basis. | |
| Leakage of funds | On average, in 1991-95, schools received 13% of central government spending. Most schools received nothing. | On average, in 2001 schools received 82% of central government spending. |
| Explanation of leakage | Large variation in grants received across schools in 1991-95. Schools in better-off communities receive more of the funds. Local capture systematically related to the users' socioeconomic status. | The observed reduction in leakage in 2001 was significantly larger for schools with access to the information campaign on PETS. |
| Corruption | Available evidence suggests substantial corruption in 1991-95. | |
Tanzania
| PETS - Tanzania | |
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Year of data |
2002 and 2003 |
| Sample | Government primary schools (210
out of 12 700) Local governments (21 out of 113) Regional governments (7 out of 21) |
| Level of administration studied | Government, region, district, school |
| Expenditures tracked | Non-salary expenditures (capitation grant, development grant, capacity grant) from government level to schools through district. |
| Other data collected | Enrolment figures and general qualitative information on school matters. |
| Type of PETS | Diagnostic |
| Reference | "Tanzania Public Expenditure Tracking Study - Study of the Financial and Non-financial Flows from Central Government to Schools in 2002 and 2003", November 2004, REPOA and Government of Tanzania. |
| Other comments |
The Public Expenditure Review (PER) Working Group in Tanzania commissioned the local research institute REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation, Dar es Salaam) to undertake this study. It is so far only available upon request to the Government of Tanzania or REPOA. See also: |
| PETS Tanzania - major findings | |
| Key characteristics of resource flows | Extremely complex system of disbursements from the central level, involving three different ministries. The system deviated substantially from the official plan. |
| Financial management systems | Poor recording both at central and district level. Seem to be some improvements in the second year of the programme. |
| Leakage of funds | Estimated leakage of 36-46% (capitation grant) and 14-24% (development grant). No estimate of leakage in capacity grant, due to poor data for this part of the programme. Main leakage in capitation grant due to leakage in the book part of the programme. |
| Variation in leakage | Huge variation in the inflow of the capitation grant between schools. Development grant seems partly to have been disbursed according to need. |
| Delays | Huge delays both at the central level and district level, partly due to delays in the donor funding of the programme. |
| Corruption | No conclusive evidence, indirect evidence suggests at least some corruption. |
Zambia
| PETS Zambia - major findings | |
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Year of data |
June 2001-June 2002 |
| Sample | Government primary schools (184,
total not given) Districts (33 out of 72) Regional governments (4 out of 9) |
| Level of administration studied | Government, province, district, school |
| Expenditures tracked | All public funding of the primary education from government level to schools through province and district. The expenditures are classified into three categories: rule-based per-school grant, discretionary per-school grant, and remuneration of staff. |
| Other data collected | Enrolment figures, general qualitative information on school matters, data on other funding of schools. |
| Type of PETS | Diagnostic and analytical |
| Reference | Jishnu Das, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana and Pramila Krishnan (2004), "Public and Private Funding of Basic Education in Zambia", Human Development Sector, World Bank |
| Other comments | The study also focused on how private funding of primary education was affected by an increase in public funding. The study is broader than a traditional PETS, and thus referred to as an Educational Service Delivery Study (ESDS). |
| PETS - Zambia | |
| Key characteristics of resource flows | Complex arrangement of total funding in primary education. Fresh money enters the hierarchy at each administrative level. |
| Financial management systems | The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance have evolved an efficient system of delivery for rule-based allocations. |
| Leakage of funds | More than 90% of the schools and 95% of the teachers had received the rule-based allocations. Less than 25% of the schools had received any of the discretionary funding. The discretionary funding seems mainly to have been spent at the province and district level. One third to one sixth of the total funding of primary education reaches the schools. |
| Variation in leakage | Rule-based funding is pro-poor, while discretionary funding is regressive. Overall funding is wealth neutral. |
| Delays | Delays in updating payrolls and payment of allowances to teachers. |
| Corruption | Not mentioned in the report. |
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PETS |
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Definition |
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Examples & findings |
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PETS as AC tool |
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References |
| CONTACT |
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Hannes Hechler
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