Corruption in Natural Resource Management

Selected literature

• Barnes, J I and de Jager, J LV (1995)
  Economic and financial incentives for wildlife use on private land in Namibia and the implications for policy
  Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Research Discussion Paper No 8
  This paper presents estimates for wildlife populations and species diversity on private land in Namibia for 1972 and 1992. The results suggest that there are financial incentives for private landholders to group together and form large scale wildlife conservancies.
  

• Barnett, R and Patterson, C (2006)
  Sport hunting in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region: an overview
  TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa
  Although sport hunting has the potential to raise significant sums of foreign income for a country, the industry can be subject to abuse, corruption and mismanagement. This TRAFFIC report notes that, to remain lucrative, management of the sport hunting industry in the SADC region should focus on realising maximum conservation, economic and social benefits from the hunting resource, while ensuring good governance and accountability.
  (http://www.traffic.org/)

• Contreras-Hermosilla, A (2000)
  The Underlying Causes of Forest Decline
  CIFOR - Occasional Paper No. 30
  This is a broad look at the underlying causes of forest decline, including illegal logging activities and corruption. It provides a useful catalogue of illegal acts that promote deforestation and forest degradation. It also contextualises the debate on corruption in the forestry sector, noting that forest decline is part of an elaborate “cocktail” incorporating different proportions of various causes. Solutions to forest decline are said to be complex and, in most cases, need to involve a rearrangement of the forces dominating the political and economic scene of a country. Initiatives that make illegal and corrupt activities more visible, however, can help combat inappropriate deforestation and forest degradation. These can be complemented by open bidding processes in timber concessions, unambiguous procurement rules and clear timber concession contracts.
  

• Gibson, C C (1999)
  Politicians and poachers: the political economy of wildlife policy in Africa
  Despite hundreds of studies addressing the biological and ecological aspects of Africa’s wildlife, this 1999 book argues that relatively little is known about the political economy of wildlife policy on the continent, particularly how political and economic institutions can shape government wildlife policy over time.
  (http://www.google.com/...Xy-22MH2vCsJML0XdfI#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

• Gillies, A (2010)
  Reputational concerns and the emergence of oil sector transparency as an international norm
  International Studies Quarterly, 54, 103–126
  This study argues that the reputational concerns of several high-profile actors drove the emergence of oil sector transparency as an international norm. Thanks to successful advocacy campaigns, developing country oil sector operations began to pose increasing levels of reputational risk to Western governments, international institutions, and corporations. These actors responded to this scrutiny by facilitating the evolution of transparency into a widely cited oil sector ‘‘best practice.’’ However, the self-interests of these actors also altered the course of the norm’s definition and institutionalization in ways which may constrain its eventual impact on industry behaviors. This study narrates the surprising and rapid spread of the transparency norm in developing country oil affairs, a process which suggests that reputational utility should be considered as a possible explanation for norm emergence.
  

• Global Witness (2005)
  A Guide to Independent Forest Monitoring
  A report by Global Witness
  Global Witness has carved out a reputation for itself as the pioneer in revealing exploitation of natural resources and its link with corruption and conflict, and has carried out monitoring in over 20 countries on the basis of a unique methodology for ‘Independent Forest Monitoring’ (IFM). This guide, available in English, Spanish and French describes the Global Witness approach in exhaustive detail. Starting with an agreement with the host forestry enforcement authority and an appointed monitoring organization, IFM identifies illegal practices in logging according to a detailed typology and strict procedures for recording evidence, which are then used to carry out systematic advocacy. This publication is essential reading for any organization intending to carry out monitoring related to corruption. Also available on the Global Witness website are numerous reports detailing corruption in the extraction of natural resources.
  (http://www.globalwitness.org/...a_guide_to_independent_forest_monitoring)

• Global Witness (2009)
  Country for Sale
  A report by Global Witness
  Cambodia could eventually earn enough from its oil, gas and minerals to become independent of foreign development aid. This report details how this future is being jeopardized by high level corruption and nepotism in the allocation and management of public assets. It highlights how rights to exploit oil and mineral resources have been allocated behind closed doors by a small number of individuals.
  (http://www.globalwitness.org/...brary_detail.php/713/en/country_for_sale)

• Kishor, N and Damania, R (2007)
  Crime and Justice in the Garden of Eden: Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption in the Forestry Sector
  The World Bank
  This chapter in a World Bank volume on corruption in specific sectors, addresses forest sector characteristics that enable corruption. If offers a typology of the actors and kinds of corruption that plague the forest sector. It also offers a set of mini case-studies on measures in countries including Cambodia, Ecuador and Bolivia. The chapter concludes with examples of illegal logging and associated illegal practices in forestry.
  (http://web.worldbank.org/...058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:384455,00.html)

• Leader-Williams, N, Baldus, R D and Smith, R J (2009)
  The influence of corruption on the conduct of recreational hunting
  in Dickson, B, Hutton, J and Adams W M (eds.) Recreational Hunting, Conservation and Rural Livelihoods: Science and Practice
  This book chapter discusses how corruption might allegedly influence the conduct of recreational hunting. It outlines some key challenges for proponents of recreational hunting who wish to reform its governance practices.
  (http://www.google.com/...+Practice&lr=&hl=no#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

• Lindsey, P A et al (2007)
  Economic and conservation significance of the trophy hunting industry in sub-Saharan Africa
  Biological Conservation 134(4) pp. 455-469, (Purchase required)
  There is a lack of consensus among some conservation NGOs and African governments concerning the acceptability and effectiveness of trophy hunting as a conservation tool. This lack of consensus is due partly to a lack of reliable information on the economic significance and ecological impact of the industry. This article provides a review of the scale of the trophy hunting industry, and assesses both positive and negative issues relating to hunting and conservation in Africa.
  (http://www.sciencedirect.com/...=10&md5=0094537cc6edbd6ec3ab03a8b0e06efc)

• Marmon, T (2009)
  Corruption in the Forestry Sector and Illegal Logging: The Problem, its Implications and Approaches to Combating it
  Division 47 Environment and Climate Change - Sector Project "International Forest Policy" - Policy Briefs No. 1/09
  This GTZ Policy Brief provides an overview of corruption in relation to illegal logging. It outlines the environmental, economic and social consequences of corruption in the forest sector and suggests policy approaches in three arenas: politics, society and economy. It is particularly interesting for its discussion of donor engagement with the political dimensions of the problem, including support to enhanced political competition. It cautions, however, that political competition can itself be perverted with corruption, and must be supported by consistent and reliable law enforcement systems.
  

• Martinez, G and Shordt, K (2008)
  Sealing Water Aid against Corruption: Donor Interventions, Donor Responsibilities
  in Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector
  This chapter in Transparency International’s 2008 Global Corruption Report critically assesses the reach of donor policies and government agreements with regard to corruption in the water sector. It argues that generic corruption-fighting agreements and tools have not yet been tailored to the water sector’s specific features, or applied at a large enough scale to make a difference. The authors suggest next steps for donors for addressing corruption in the water sector, including building anti-corruption measures more systematically into their water sector programming.
  (http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2008#4)

• Milledge, S A H et al (2007)
  Forestry, Governance and National Development: Lessons Learned from a Logging Boom in Southern Tanzania
  TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa
  This report describes how Tanzanian forestry policy, as set out in the formal laws and regulations governing the management of forest resources, was systematically being manipulated by domestic and foreign private sector interests in concert with senior Tanzanian and foreign government officials. It notes that, though there is growing acceptance by policy-makers of the need for longer-lasting measures to improve governance in the sector, a greater realisation is needed of the number of people affected, the financial implications, the consequences for the environment and the geographic scope. The report calls for a higher priority to be allocated to forestry governance, with measures to implement, among other things, standardised reporting and monitoring for timber harvests.
  (http://www.traffic.org/)

• Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (2008)
  Namibia’s communal conservancies: a review of progress and challenges in 2007
  Communal conservancies provide legal structures for management of wildlife resources. At the heart of conservancy programmes is the realisation that, if people are provided with sufficient management authority over wildlife, and are enabled to derive long-term benefits from it, then wildlife will be managed sustainably, with uncontrolled exploitaition reduced. This publication reviews Namibian experience with communal wildlife conservancies.
  (http://www.nnf.org.na/NNF_pages/publications.htm)

• Nelson, F and Agrawal, A (2008)
  Patronage or Participaton? Community-based Natural Resource Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa
  Development and Change, 39(4) pp. 557-585 (Purchase required)
  This article focuses on the political nature of institutional processes associated with decentralisation of wildlife management in sub-Saharan Africa. It provides a comparative analysis of wildlife management reforms in seven east and southern African countries, arguing that institutional reforms are largely dependent on state authorities’ patronage interests. Practical implications for the design of community based natural resource management initiatives are drawn.
  (http://www.ingentaconnect.com/...bpl/dech/2008/00000039/00000004/art00003)

• Nordstrøm, S (2008)
  Fragility and Natural Resources
  DIIS POLICY BRIEF
  Many of the world’s fragile states have become dysfunctional, despite vast resource endowments. This brief argues that problems with natural resource governance are frequently associated with situations of extreme state fragility or lack of economic development and the persistence of repressive regimes. For donor countries, this amounts to a challenge when it comes to promoting policies that enable fragile states to make the best of their resource endowments without falling prey to resource conflicts or authoritarianism.
  (http://www.diis.dk/sw63621.asp)

• Plummer, J (2007)
  Making Anti-Corruption Approaches Work for the Poor: Issues for Consideration in the Development of Pro-poor Anti-Corruption Strategies in Water Services and Irrigation
  Swedish Water House, Report 22
  This Swedish Water House report highlights the need for greater attention to the poor in the development of anti-corruption strategies in the water sector. It provides pointers for how pro-poor anti-corruption strategies might be developed in the sector, considering some of the key factors that determine corruption-in-water as it affects the poor. The report borrows from efforts in other sectors in exploring ingredients that might be considered in the development of a pro-poor anti-corruption water sector strategy.
  (http://www.siwi.org/)

• Setiono, B (2007)
  Debt Settlement of Indonesian Forestry Companies: Assessing the Role of Banking and Financial Policies for Promoting Sustainable Forest Management in Indonesia
  CIFOR No. 11/2007
  Recounts the failure of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to effectively regulate companies in the forest sector and expose their links to illegal forestry activity. The study notes that creating well-funded, powerful administrative institutions (as in the case of the IBRA) does not necessarily solve forest management problems. Rather than becoming an agent for change, such institutions risk becoming a “selling agent” for the forest industry.
  

• Smith, J et al (2003)
  Illegal Logging, Collusive Corruption and Fragmented Governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia
  International Forestry Review 5(3), pp 293-302
  This paper distinguishes between collusive and non-collusive corruption in the forest sector, analysing their interaction with the political and institutional environment. It argues that, though corruption in relation to the timber industry was pervasive during the Suharto regime, now a more insidious type of corruption has developed, that is harder to root out. A wider reform effort than has previously been attempted is required to address this problem, focusing on the development of political stability, the removal of inconsistencies in the legal framework, judicial reform and the encouragement of public oversight.
  

• Stålgren, P (2006)
  Corruption in the Water Sector: Causes, Consequences and Potential Reform
  Swedish Water House Policy Brief Nr. 4.
  This Swedish Water House policy brief provides an overview of the diversity and scope of corruption in the water sector, drawing on examples from a range of water usages - including water resources management, supply and sanitation, agriculture and hydropower production. It also contains a critical examination of anti-corruption measures available for the water sector.
  (http://www.siwi.org/)

• Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (2008)
  Wildlife for all Tanzanians: stopping the loss, nurturing the resource and widening the benefits
  Within Tanzania, wildlife management is most importantly an issue of social and economic development. This policy brief focuses on several factors that should be recognised by Tanzanian policy-makers in response to the challenge of developing sustainable wildlife management policies.
  (http://www.tnrf.org/)

• World Bank (2008)
  Putting Tanzania’s hidden economy to work: Reform, Management, and Protection of its Natural Resource Sector
  A World Bank Country Study
  This World Bank study reveals a hidden economy in Tanzania’s natural resources, one that is unseen in traditional analyses, but one, when brought to light, shows great potential for economic growth and poverty reduction.
  (http://books.google.no/...&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false)