Practicalities of donor anti-corruption collaboration
"We are fed-up with coordination meetings",
has been expressed by donor staff. However, there is little hope for
effective and efficient AC policies with long-term effects without
donor coordination.
The below section brings out lessons from the Birmingham
report and sources directly stating to the U4. During the coming months,
U4 will continuously bring forward experience and practical advice
so as to avoid more 'dull' meetings.
Effective coordination mechanisms among donors and government are
essential for collaborative AC work at the country level.
Working groups of donors and government are the principal
forum for policy dialogue, and also facilitate joint funding and collaboration
of subgroups of like-minded donors. Hence, practical issues in managing
donor collaboration on AC affect its progress.
There are several practical issues for a donor community to consider
when starting up collaborative efforts or improving on current arrangements:
whether or not to form a separate AC group. Would AC work be more
effectively coordinated by a general governance reform group, or
within policy/ sector groups
which routines and procedures for group work,
who should lead it,
whether there is scope for division of labour among its members,
and
how to draw on the experience of AC collaboration elsewhere.
There are no definite rules on where and how donors should address
AC within working groups. The appropriate way forward will vary by
the country context, and the important issues to consider are:
the level of political will,
the type, level and location of corruption (grand versus petty;
sector-specific or cross sectoral),
the degree of in-country dialogue/coordination in-between the
donors and donors to the partner government.
Even with such considerations for country context taken onboard some
country experience can serve as guidance. Corruption is a concern
in governance, financial management, public sector reform and general
sector work. It is often being tackled through a range of reforms
and therefore by a range of working groups in many countries.
If corruption is just one issue in the remit of a 'general governance'
group, there may be insufficient time and resources to address AC
in detail. However, several practitioners surveyed in the Birmingham
report also believed that a separate AC working group may be unhelpful,
cumbersome, could hinder cross-sectoral working (unlike tackling corruption
within a 'governance group') and could adversely affect relations
with government.
It is doubtful whether a single governance group can deal with both
general/cross-sector corruption as well as sector specific corruption.
Governance and wider public sector reform groups may address issues
of systemic and general corruption characterised by "state capture".
But this may leave 'point of service' corruption unattended,
which may be better addressed by sector groups more familiar with
the specific issues involved.
Some donor staff believe there is a greater risk that relations
with government will be jeopardised if the issue of corruption is
raised by sector working groups rather than a specific AC/ governance
working group. Also some sectors are not covered by sector working
groups; in such instances governance working groups should necessarily
address point of service corruption.
Experience shows that competence on corruption issues is most
present in the governance/financial management or larger public
sector reform groups. It is therefore important that when the sector
groups working on core reform areas - such as financial management,
legal issues, and local government - are taking initiatives on corruption
that they are given access to the best competence. Inputs specifically
on AC are needed when designing and monitoring reform interventions
or when corruption-related issues have been identified.
A donor-government AC subgroup in Uganda was seen as
a useful tool for coordination and dialogue with government
in Uganda. The AC subgroup is part of a Donor Democracy and
Governance Technical Group. The group meets monthly and includes
representatives from bilateral agencies, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and Government of Uganda (GoU).
The group also coordinates donor support, monitors benchmarks
in the Governance Matrix, and divides labour on progress-reporting
responsibilities.
Zambia also provides a potentially useful way forward.
There is an AC subgroup working within a wider governance donor
group. Then there is also a 'sub-subgroup', which consists of
three AC-specialists who have a (currently informal) advisory
role for other donor working groups. This pool of experts can
provide advice to:
sector working groups, which can identify sector-level
corruption but have insufficient knowledge about AC to be
able to design appropriate interventions,
the governance group which may be addressing sector concerns
but where there is no donor group working,
working groups tackling corruption that is cross-sectoral,
Fundamental is that they are proactive and strategic. This requires
that:
meetings are regular, relevant and effective,
there is an important work programme and significant ongoing work
between meetings,
there is clear and committed leadership of the group, ideally
jointly by government with a lead donor,
donors display a level of flexibility in their operations which
allows their own interest come second to the prospect of an appropriate
development outcome.
In the last years we have seen that motivation to engage in working
groups wanes over time because:
the group being just a 'talking shop',
they are too time consuming,
there are too many, agency staff from smaller agencies may have
to attend the meetings of several groups,
capacity within the groups vary over time and between countries
as expert staff relocate,
double standards - donors discuss corruption during AC working
group meetings but are unwilling to, for example, examine case of
potentially corrupt activities by their national companies,
free riding - where several donors are members of the group but
only a few contribute significantly.
The regularity and effectiveness of meetings may depend on
specific country contexts and individual group members' expertise,
commitment and other responsibilities. In many (PRSP/CDF) countries,
in-country consultative group governance sub-groups (e.g. on specific
issues like procurement, other-AC related work) tend to meet regularly,
for example weekly or bi-weekly, and are coordinated by one donor.
Thus there has to be a driver for donors to coordinate.
Many successful donor driven groups are led by individuals or
smaller groups of individuals "who decide that something should
be done, and eventually things start to happen". But this leaves
the group vulnerable for rotation of staff. Responsibility should
therefore be given to agencies, not individuals.
Transaction costs in donor-government relationships can also be
reduced if the government has only to deal with one organisation,
representing all other donors in dialogue/negotiations.
The chair of the groups could be rotated with fixed intervals
allowing for forward planning. The lead donor may vary in
each initiative and perhaps according to country, but will reflect
an agency's suitability, in particular contexts. Some agencies appear
to have a reputation for being the traditional coordinator and possess
the relevant characteristics to lead/coordinate donor support.
An advisor at World Bank noted that successful examples
of coordination are "often where the government leads
the process and assists in the logistics, timing and setting the
overall objectives of the meetings". This is of course the
best case scenario.
The World Bank is often centrally placed and is the natural interlocutor
for the government. But the Bank has not always been effective in
pushing the AC agenda, so bilateral donors should therefore make sure
that their comparative advantages of being able to raise contentious
issues like corruption is used, and to make sure that their interest
are represented.
UNDP believes it can have such a role at the national level
- through the UN Resident Representative; at the international.
In Nigeria UNDP is coordinating the AC component of a key governance
programme and working with other donors to divide responsibilities
for implementing the programme activities according to available
resources, expertise and individual agency priorities.
Finally, Heads of Mission (HoM) can provide vital support to
donor working groups. This is however not the norm. In many instances
we find that members of working groups on governance, and even more
so for sector specific groups, who want to raise AC are not given
sufficient backing by the HoM.
Uganda though proves the opposite point. The technical level
donor working group on Democracy and Governance reported to
the agency/HoM level working group and asked for support from
that level in approaching relevant GoU ministers about resource
exploitation issues in DRC. Likewise the Anti Corruption Group
three times a year produces a joint assessment on anti corruption
that is shared with Heads of Mission and GoU counterparts. This
assessment forms the basis for dialogue and technical support.
The assessments are also shared with the World Bank for reviews
of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit facility.