Corruption in Emergencies: What role(s) for media?
Report from U4 working meeting
Part 2: Working with Local Media
Edetaen Ojo, Director of Media Rights Agenda in Nigeria, emphasised the
link between a well-trained, effective local media and improved accountability
to affected populations. Drawing on his experience in Liberia, Ojo showed
how the local media is key in communicating information on entitlements
and should be well placed to investigate situations in which assistance
is diverted, or when sub-quality materials are used. However, given the
poor state of local media in many countries in which corruption risks
are acute, and local media's own vulnerability to corruption, Ojo focused
on the need to support and develop local media as part of an emergency
response or longer-term recovery and rehabilitation effort.
The opaque nature of many humanitarian assistance programmes makes
it extremely difficult for local media to access information about their
operations and unveil corrupt practices, where they might exist. Although
many relief agencies hold regular and frequent press briefings, these
usually focus of on disseminating humanitarian information or public
diplomacy. There is usually no mechanism for the local media to access
other critical information while there is little tolerance within such
agencies for probing questions.
In an emergency situation, whether due to natural disaster or conflict,
the media faces numerous challenges to its traditional role as watchdog
over power and vested interests. Local media infrastructure is often severely
damaged in emergencies, preventing outlets from operating as normal. Staff
and their families might be affected by the crisis. In areas where radio
is relied on as the primary source of information, radio sets may be lost
leaving communities without access to media. In addition, political and
financial pressures can make it difficult for editors to criticise the
powerful or resist financial rewards for painting people and programmes
in a good light. Media coverage of the humanitarian response in Liberia
illustrates some of these tensions.
The challenges for local media in Liberia
In August 2003, a transitional Government was established in Liberia.
The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) followed one month later. Over
the next two years, amidst widespread charges of corruption, relief
agencies and the transitional government failed to restore basic
services to Liberia. In early 2005, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) sent a team of auditors to conduct a comprehensive
and systematic audit of the transitional government. Endemic corruption
was confirmed.
Despite the prevalence of corruption and general awareness of the
problem, the local media failed to cover it in any depth. Among
the reasons cited by Edetaen Ojo for this failure were:
Difficulties in accessing information in order to assess whether
pledges had been honoured and how funds had been allocated. This
was partially due to the lack of precise information within the
UN coordinated system itself. In 2005, local media called for
the draft Freedom of Information Act to be applied to international
organisations as well as to Liberian Government institutions and
agencies. Though the proposal was unrealistic and never gained
ground, it indicated the serious frustration felt by the Liberian
media.
An unwillingness of international actors to engage with the
media. One example comes from the UN-supervised DDRR programme.
In 2004, the UN announced that 66,000 combatants had been disarmed.
However, UNMIL said it had destroyed only 20,000 weapons; a ratio
of one weapon to every 3 combatants. At the inception of the programme,
it was anticipated that an average of 3 weapons would be recovered
from each combatant. The Liberian media were sceptical about the
returns of the programme and attempted to probe the UN. They reported
an irritated response and an intolerance of any attempts to scratch
the surface.
Poor economic performance and dependence on advertising revenue.
Some agencies and organisations were known to withhold advertising
from media that had been critical. Certain media organisations
became fearful of criticising transitional expenditure.
Reliance on humanitarian agencies for logistical support. Local
media became too accepting of stories and information from relief
agencies without subjecting it to critical analysis. Aid agencies,
particularly the UN, were seen as good sources and not scrutinised.
Corruption within the media resulting from low pay and political
affiliations. In Liberia, there were cases of journalists writing
vanity pieces for money and, at worst, blackmailing those they
had negative stories about to avoid publication.
Lack of capacity for investigative reporting. The conflict
drove many of the more skilled reporters and editorial personnel
out of the country. Following the conflict, low salaries prompted
many in the media to search for more lucrative employment. Media
organisations in post-conflict situations do not have the funds
to support time-consuming and expensive investigations
Despite the weakness and bias of local media in some countries, participants
agreed that the potential for supporting serious journalists to address
corruption remains unrealised in most contexts. Kunda Dixit, from the
Nepali Times, offered an inspiring example of the way unflinching local
coverage of corruption can contribute to ending a long-running conflict.
Corruption coverage in Nepal:
paving the way for the Rhododendron Uprising
Nepal's recent history, a turbulent ride from autocratic rule,
through a flawed democratic transition to the King's resumption
of control and subsequent popular revolt, provides a case study
in how local media's investigations can contribute to transparency.
During the four years in which the democratic process was subverted,
investigative reports uncovered a systematic plunder of the national
treasury by the King and the military. Through contacts with ministry
officials, local media was able to use whistleblower's testimonies
to uncover systematic patterns of corruption.
Investigations showed how money from unspent development funds
would be transferred to 'Miscellaneous' or 'Contingency' budget
lines before being siphoned off for the King's personal use or unauthorised
military expenditure. Money earmarked for building roads, repairing
bridges and for health and education was shown to have financed
a royal tour of Africa (Rs 60 million) and the purchase of two bullet-proof
Jaguar limousines (Rs 55 million). In aggregate, successive royal
governments made illicit transfers of Rs 50 billion. Media investigations
also uncovered corrupt agreements between the King's son-in-law
and investors in telecommunications, hydropower and other lucrative
areas of investment.
During the period of royal rule, journalists feared that their
investigations would not lead to action. Now they believe their
contribution to the exposure of corruption registered with the Nepali
people and helped ground feelings of grievance and mistreatment
in objective facts.
Dixit argues:
Corruption is news if it is out of the ordinary. But what
do you do if it is endemic. We covered honesty, the exceptions,
the really good guys. We chose stories that would have maximum
impact - cases of money not reaching maternity hospitals - to
show that corruption can be a matter of life or death.
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in emergencies
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