Measures designed to address corruption have rarely, if ever, been
incorporated into peace agreements. Yet abuse and corruption by the
state is often a root cause of conflict. And, failure to control
corruption in the aftermath of war has, in several instances, undermined
objectives such as restoring state authority and delivering services.
Post-conflict environments present unique constraints and opportunities
in terms of corruption control. First of all, countries emerging from
conflict often have high corruption levels, low state legitimacy and
capacity, weak rule of law, and residual violence. Economic legacies
of civil wars involve concentrations of wealth flowing from illegal
or unregulated trade and unofficial "taxes" collected by soldiers,
rebel factions, etc. Some post-conflict countries are unable
to control corruption while others are unwilling. East Timor
is a country where credible leadership appears to exists, whereas post-war
leaders in Liberia and Sudan were associated with corrupt patterns of
governance.
On the other hand, new opportunities to address corruption may also
exist. When political and economic environments are fluid, shifting
alliances may create opportunities to sideline elites that would be
highly entrenched in more stable countries. International actors tend
to have a larger influence in these settings due to troop deployments
or massive infusions of aid. Finally, in their own assistance programs,
foreign NGOs can set an example of transparent and accountable practices.
The challenge for donors is to target the types of corruption
which, if not addressed, can derail the entire transition, but to do
so in ways that do not create large additional demands on already overwhelmed
reformers within and outside fragile state structures.
How have practitioners balanced these concerns in recent post-conflict
contexts? Examples from Liberia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo may provide some useful insights.
Liberia:
blue helmets helping reformers keep a lid on corruption
Since the end of Liberia's civil war in 2003, security has improved
thanks to the heavy concentration of UN peacekeepers. However, donor-financed
audits revealed massive fraud on the part of the transitional government
affecting all facets of society. In April 2005, the
BBC reported that "corruption has now replaced the AK-47
rifle as the preferred method of illicit enrichment."
In 2005, national reformers and international actors took several
steps to curb corruption. An Ad Hoc Committee in parliament opened
a corruption investigation against its own speaker and former
rebel leader, George Dweh. In March 2005, UN forces stepped up security
at the parliament and called for calm among Dweh's supporters as
parliamentarians called a Special Session and suspended him. In
April 2005, peacekeepers seized control of the Monrovia's notorious
freeport, the site of massive looting, while the World Bank began
preparations to award a contract for external management of the
port. In May 2005, corruption topped the list of international
priorities emphasized at an international donor conference with
Liberian government officials. In September 2005, the government
agreed to a comprehensive governance plan that introduced new international
checks and controls over award of concessions, revenue collection
and management of public spending in the coming months in order
to try to rein in corruption. In light of massive fraud, donors
pressed hard for the initiative despite objectives from Liberian
officials that it infringed on state sovereignty.
It is too early to tell estimate the likely impact of these measures
on Liberia's transition. A report by International Crisis Group
- Liberia
and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States - for example, argues
that nothing short of sustained international engagement for 15-25
years will create the conditions for new, less corrupt political
forces to develop. But it provides an example of a more "muscular"
approach that goes beyond simply providing technical assistance
in procurement and financial management. In the case of Liberia,
some action was taken to marginalize potential "spoilers"
in parliament and the port even at the risk of antagonizing LURD
supporters and other factions. Liberia's experience illustrates
the links between security and anti-corruption in post-conflict
settings. Without a strong security presence, there would have been
very little space to move against flagrant corruption within the
capital city itself.
Afghanistan:
acknowledging the corruption costs of keeping the peace
Afghanistan is an example of how initial efforts to bring potential
spoilers into the peace processes and into the state may have long-term
costs for the country. In the case of Afghanistan, the three closely
linked problems of warlords, drug trafficking and corruption
threaten to overwhelm nationally-led and internationally-supported
statebuilding and development efforts. Because international troop
deployments could not secure the entire country, warlords controlling
local militias were invited into the transitional government in
a power-sharing arrangement. Continuing US military cooperation
with warlords on efforts to root out Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters
further strengthened their hand. Finally, when opium production
exploded in the post-Taliban period, warlords quickly moved to control
lucrative drug trafficking networks, reasserting control at the
local level.
Observers have noted that corruption had actually increased since
the end of the conflict and appears to be driven from the top. It
remains unclear, however, given the uncertain security environment
and the slow pace of disarmament, how much space there is for maneuver.
Massive rents from drug trafficking now ensure that warlords have
an independent financial power base which they can use to buy state
influence even after they no longer directly control state ministries.
The drug trade represents more than half of Afghanistan's formal
GDP, constituting a tremendous risk of state capture unless
additional steps are taken quickly.
In Road
to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry, Barnett Rubin
recommends targeted sanctions against warlords/traffickers,
greater security and reconstruction aid, international cooperation
in Afghan counter narcotics efforts, support for improved rule of
law, and decreased emphasis on crop eradication.
Democratic Republic of Congo:
promising approaches at the local level
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a massive country with endemic
levels of grand and administrative corruption. The DRC's transition
from war to the 2005 elections began in 2003. But fighting continues
in the east as factions continue their deadly scramble for resources.
A report by the International Crisis Group: The
Congo's Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, criticized
the international community for its hands-off approach to corruption:
While donors finance over half the country's budget, they have been
unable or unwilling to take serious action against the transitional
government's own spoilers. Some members of the government have been
suspended for corruption but none has faced criminal charges.
In the midst of this environment, a local initiative to mobilize
against corruption along the Congo River is notable. An international
NGO, Innovative
Resources Management (IRM), began a program financed by USAID
to address the tracassaries or illegal taxation of river traders
in Western Congo, where 80% of commercial produce travels by water.
The massive illegal taxation by unsalaried civil servants stationed
at ports throughout the interior had effectively dried up river-based
commerce, devastating the rural economy which had served as a bread
basket for the capital, contributing to food scarcities in Kinshasa.
IRM obtained copies of legislation specifying that only four
agencies are authorized to collect fees in ports and determined
that the 90% of the unofficial payments were by agents linked
to the Ministry of Interior. They had a series of meetings with
officials in Kinshasa and secured the backing of the Interior
Minister to bring these payments in line with the law, arguing
that fewer payments would increase river traffic and legal government
revenues. Associations of transporters and communities were formed
along the river to share information on tracassaries and high-frequency
radios were distributed to communities allowing them to report
illegal payment points directly to the Interior Ministry. After
several months, a "critical mass" of community oversight
and state monitoring began to change practices in the first province
and efforts also began to build momentum in two additional provinces
as well.
These types of approaches are sometimes called "islands
of integrity" and, while they cannot substitute for political
will at the highest levels of government, they can achieve real
gains in discrete areas, such as revival of regional commerce
and livelihoods - an example of "quick wins"
so vigorously sought in post-conflict transitions.
Post-conflict lessons learned for donors
The examples above, along with others, suggest the following lessons
to keep in mind when developing anti-corruption strategies in post-conflict
settings:
Free-standing anti-corruption commissions are destined to fail unless
first tier legal, administrative and financial controls are functioning.
The Afghan constitution, for example, calls for the creation of an anti-corruption
commission to investigate acts of corruption. In 2005, the presidency
requested international assistance to train and equip this office. Meanwhile,
several line ministries did not even have Chief Financial Officers in
place. Primary systems should be in place before secondary bodies,
like anti-corruption commissions, are established as a watchdog over
those systems.
International actors should consider the risks carefully before
stepping in to substitute for the government in corruption-control
efforts. Although "shared sovereignty" might be necessary
in some situations (i.e. Liberia), failures still appear to outnumber
successes (i.e. the international administration of customs procedures
in Pakistan).
The pattern of early elections creates increased incentives for corruption
as political parties scramble for supporters and resources to finance
campaigns. Steps such as creating a trust fund for political parties
- as donors did in Mozambique - might be appropriate in some settings
and could help reduce such unhealthy pressures.
Support for vigorous and professional monitoring efforts can
provide an incentive for better state performance while diagnosing key
problems. Publication of all monitoring efforts can increase
democratic accountability. In Liberia, it was a series of EU-funded
audits that helped to document serious concerns and galvanize concerted
action around a broad-based monitoring effort. In Afghanistan, an international
monitoring agent helped to review expenditures for reimbursement through
the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, thereby helping to facilitate
budget support while addressing donor fiduciary concerns.
In post-conflict settings it is especially important for international
agencies to operate in a transparent manner with highly public accountability,
providing constant information on their programs, procurement and impacts.
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