U4 Helpdesk
Query
Political corruption in Zambia
How does the will to fight political
corruption / grand corruption in Zambia compare to other African
countries, for example, Kenya and South Africa? What is the
potential for success in the fight against corruption?
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Content
- Part I sets out a brief overview of issues
arising from the absence of political will to fight political corruption/grand
corruption.
- Part II describes the state of anti-corruption
efforts (including the level of political support) in Zambia and
makes comparisons with Kenya and South Africa.
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U4 helpdesk reply
The questioner wants to know how the will to fight political corruption/grand
corruption in Zambia compares with other African countries such
as Kenya and South Africa. We offer an overview of issues
concerning political will to fight corruption and describe anti-corruption
efforts in Zambia, making reference to Kenya and South Africa. The
questioner also wants us to comment on the potential for success in
fighting political corruption in Zambia.
Please also see:
Part I: Basic issues related to political will
If political will to fight corruption is absent amongst the political
class and institutions at the very top levels of society, it can be
difficult to bring about reform. Anti-corruption reformers must find
other avenues for pressing their concerns. Indeed as World Bank analysts
Shacter and Shah write in Look
Before You Leap, for countries where there are weak institutions
a more basic governance approach must be taken. Reformers should
not expect there to be a blue-print for fighting corruption. The "standard"
approach of setting up anti-corruption commissions, orchestrating
publicity campaigns and integrity training for public officials generally
only succeeds where there are solid institutional hooks on which to
hang such initiatives. Daniel Kaufmann also makes this point in his
article Back
to Basics: 10 Myths about Corruption and Governance.
State capture is often the biggest problem facing anti-corruption
reformers and can be the reason for an absence of political will to
tackle corruption (on this subject see for example Press
Reset Button, also by Daniel Kaufman. Political elites can also
abuse their power to fight corruption by targeting only their political
opponents.
Political will to fight corruption can rise and fall and there is
a clear role for other actors to help maintain pressure for anti-corruption
efforts and help maintain a government's political will to tackle
corruption. Opposition parties, where they freely operate,
can help put corruption at the top of the agenda. Development partners
can also take up the issue of corruption and push it strongly in their
negotiations with partner governments. Civil society organisations
(CSOs) also have a crucial role to play in raising awareness about
corruption and educating citizens about their rights and the proper
responsibilities of their governments. CSOs can also bolster political
will by supporting and advising governments on anti-corruption reform,
and monitoring government's actions.
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Part II: Political will to fight corruption in Zambia
It is important to bear in mind that it is very difficult to "measure"
or assess political will to fight corruption. One particular action
of a government may point to a positive anti-corruption agenda, whilst
another action might suggest a lack of concern about corruption: both
actions can only be assessed within the context of a considered understanding
of a government's political agenda. In this section political will to
fight corruption in Zambia is considered by reference to government
actions vis-à-vis prosecutions of corrupt officials and
by government action in developing a national anti-corruption strategy
for Zambia. The former seems to point to a waning political will to
prosecute corrupt officials, the latter to a rejuvenated political will
to tackle corruption. We recommend that the questioner makes an assessment
of political will to tackle corruption in Zambia by continuing to gather
different views from various stakeholders in Zambian society (we
offer some contacts at the end of this section).
Before addressing the Zambian case in more detail, it is worth noting
that there are a number of existing surveys that give indicators of
corruption experience and perceptions, which may be used to compare
different countries. The Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) indicates expert perceptions of corruption
on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being "clean". Zambia
scored 2.6 in 2005. In Kenya perceptions of corruption were scored
as 2.1 and in South Africa the score in 2005 was 4.5.
The Global
Corruption Barometer (GCB) polls citizens' perceptions of corruption
in their country and asks questions about a range of sectors and personal
experiences of corruption. Zambia is not included in the 2005 survey
although you can find information on South Africa and Kenya.
Governance indicators produced by the World Bank Institute
may also be useful tools to assess political will to tackle corruption.
Please see the governance
tools for Zambia for more details.
In Zambia it is now widely acknowledged that the current President
has compromised his formerly strong stance against political corruption
because he now permits people accused of corruption to remain members
of the ruling party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD).
For example, when the late Lindon Mfigwe wanted to stand for internal
party elections whilst he faced money laundering charges, the President
publicly issued instructions forbidding Mfigwe from standing until
he was cleared of all the charges by the courts. The President publicly
stated that he did not want people accused of corruption to stand
for elections in his party. This position has changed. Katele Kalumba,
a ruling party official accused of grand corruption and who was arrested
by the Taskforce on Corruption, was allowed to stand for internal
party elections in 2005 at the MMD convention and won to become the
Chief Executive Officer of the MMD party. The President did not comment
on the change in his anti-corruption stance and has remained silent
on the issue to date.
This situation appears similar to events in Kenya concerning the
Anglo leasing scandal, where two cabinet ministers resigned and the
Vice President refused to resign. The Kenyan President failed to act
to sack the Vice President and thereby demonstrated his lack of will
to fight grand corruption involving his political allies. By contrast,
the situation in South Africa inspires confidence in that President
Thabo Mbeki acted promptly when it became apparent that his Vice President
was involved in corruption. Mbeki's decision acts as a deterrent measure
and shows that he will not shield any wrong doers.
In Zambia, the failure to act against Kalumba and others has led
to a perception that the rule of law does not apply since some accused
of political corruption are prosecuted and others are let off and
indeed continue to flourish politically. The potential for success
in prosecuting political and grand corruption in Zambia is slim as
most cases have now dragged on for close to five years without signs
of being concluded. The few cases that have been concluded have resulted
mostly in acquittals. So far, only one person has been convicted
of grand corruption out of the 70 cases that the Taskforce on Corruption
is investigating. A number of factors have been attributed to
this dismal performance that range from delays in the court process,
the accused fleeing the country, complications in obtaining evidence,
selective prosecution targeting political opponents only, and so on.
The potential for success in anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions
is quite slim.
Although corruption investigations and prosecutions in Zambia have
been disappointing there is hope that preventive corruption work as
carried out by civil society and the government will be successful.
The government has constituted a five institution committee (made
up of the anti-corruption commission, Governance Development Unit,
Transparency International Zambia, the Cabinet Office and an independent
Consultant) to develop the draft National Corruption Prevention
Policy and Implementation Strategy, and consultations on the draft
are now being held in Zambian provinces. This is the government's
alternative to investigations and prosecutions and it promises to
have some high level of success if all the stakeholders fully commit
themselves to it. This leads us back again to the question of political
will: if political will is there the national strategy will succeed.
What would help achieve that success and maintain political will?
As mentioned in Part I the role of different actors is crucial
in maintaining pressure on the government to carry out its anti-corruption
strategy. CSOs will in particular play an important role in monitoring
government actions, demanding accountability and keeping anti-corruption
reform high on the agenda.
Contacts:
TI-Zambia: http://www.tizambia.org.zm/
or contact tizambia@zamnet.zm
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this response are not necessarily
those of Transparency International.
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