U4 Helpdesk Query

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Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are usually created in environments in which regular - already existing - public service organisations fail to control the spread of corruption. They are typically modelled on the example of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was the first and arguably the most successful of its kind.

The variables that determine the effectiveness of an ACA are complex and include structural factors, such as the socio-political context and the institutional environment, and organisational features, such as the availability of human and financial resources and the degree of independence the agency enjoys from government interference.

Staffing and budgets clearly fall into the latter category.

Staffing

It is generally considered important for an ACA to have its own, dedicated staff, although recommendations concerning their number vary depending on the agency's tasks and the scope of corruption faced and can range from over 1,300 staff in Hong Kong to over 100 in Botswana and New South Wales.

Not all agencies recruit civil servants only; for example, the majority of the Hong Kong ICAC's officers are on contract, while Botswana's DCEC recruits its staff through the Public Service Management department without, however, giving it proper civil servant status. Comparative analysis of ACAs suggest that more important than the status of an ACA's personnel in determining the probability of success or failure are:

• Integrity. Integrity of staff is crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of an ACA. Staff members at all levels should therefore undergo some form of integrity checks, to minimise the risk of staff undermining the agency's role in curbing corruption. Some agencies even have its own internal oversight body to investigate breaches of its code of conduct, or a body that monitors and reviews all complaints held against the ACA.
• Regulation of appointments and dismissals. The regulation of appointments and dismissals by the ACA of its non-executive staff without the interference of third parties is an important asset which helps determine the quality of personnel - since managers will be able to dismiss staff if they fail to live up to professional and/or moral expectations - and works in favour of the agency's independence, since it acts as a safeguard against undue influence over appointments by the political elite, as well as a protection of officers from political, economic or personal interference and pressures.
• Expertise and continuous training are essential if the highest professional standard of an ACA is to be maintained.
• Adequate salary levels are necessary to keep up staff morale and to act as a disincentive to engagement in corrupt activities

Secondments can be a positive asset to an ACA, and have been successfully used by ACAs that are perceived to be effective. Examples include Botswana's DCEC, which was originally staffed with a combination of officers seconded from the country's other law-enforcement agencies, like the police and customs, and expatriate experts. Both Zambia's and Malawi's ACAs are said to have greatly profited from the secondment of expatriate expert respectively, and Singapore's CPIB is headed by a director seconded from the police after originally relying heavily on staff secondments from Singapore's national police force.

However, when Botswana stopped secondments to the DCEC in 2001, senior positions previously held by expatriates proved difficult to fill due to a lack of domestic expertise.

In sum, it appears that secondments can be successfully employed in the context of ACAs, provided that the same conditions and safeguards apply to seconded personnel as they do to regular staff. Secondments present the advantage of institutional flexibility, and facilitate the exchange of specialist knowledge and expertise, which can be a huge advantage given the complexities of the corrupt phenomenon. It is, however, crucial to ensure that, in particular where international secondments are used, this does not work against the building and sustainability of institutional expertise.

Budgets

The setting up and operation of a successful ACA is associated with substantial costs that have to be borne by the government, sometimes at the expense of other items on the national budget. Where anti-corruption efforts have to compete for limited resources with other, perhaps even more demanding issues such as national health and education, strong political will and commitment is required to attribute to an ACA the human and financial resources it requires. Indeed, many ACAs have failed or had in their history periods of relative failure, that were associated with a lack of resources.

In most countries, the executive has the mandate to prepare the budget, and parliament exercises oversight of the budget process, authorising the executive to raise revenue and spend it. The ability of parliament to actually change the budget is often limited. Since ACAs are often under the jurisdiction of the office of a member of the executive (e.g., the Prime Minister's office in the case of Singapore's CPIB, the President's office in the case of Botswana's DCEC), the allocation of their respective budgets usually follows the established pattern of the minister of finance reviewing it and the parliament approving it.

We are not aware of successful ACAs that have their budgets agreed directly by parliament, without its prior inclusion in the national budget prepared by the responsible ministry. We are, however, still waiting to hear back from a number of experts and will keep you informed should there be any new insights.

Links to selected ACA websites

• Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
• Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption
  
• New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption
• Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau