Anti-corruption clearing houses
What is an Anti-Corruption Clearning House? What would be
the potential of such a structure / institution? What experience
is available?
Purpose We intend to appraise a proposal
for the establishment of an anti-corruption clearing house
as a supplementary initiative to a national anti-corruption
commission. The purpose would be to strengthen the capacity
of the commission, contribute to dialogue and cooperation
with a larger number of potential partners that have a mandate
in addressing corruption and finally, to give anti-corruption
work a more solid base.
Content
Part I gives a description of the functions
of an anti-corruption clearing house, as well as examples.
Part II provides further reading about
anti-corruption agencies, including summaries of the papers
cited, that may help the questioner to appraise the effectiveness
of an anti-corruption clearing house proposal.
The questioner would like information on the purpose and functions of
an "anti-corruption clearing house" that is intended to supplement
the work of a national anti-corruption commission. In answering this
question, one must consider the rationale of an anti-corruption clearing
house in the specific context and how it might complement the functions
of the national anti-corruption commission.
Part I:
Questions to keep in mind when considering the desirability
of an anti-corruption clearing house are:
What is the institutional arrangement of the clearing house, i.e.
its location within the government structure, its powers and functions?
What is the added-value of an anti-corruption clearing house?
What problems would an anti-corruption clearing house solve?
What is the multi-institutional environment? Too many institutions
can create confusion and inefficiency.
To clarify the subject, it is worthwhile, briefly, going over the
functions and types of anti-corruption clearing houses. An
"anti-corruption clearing house" is typically a body that
facilitates the dissemination, use and collection of data to
monitor private and/or public sector accountability and transparency
and raise awareness, generally at national level.
Many different names are given to these types of bodies. Indeed the
above mentioned previous U4 Response, describes a number of entities
that carry out this information-gathering and dissemination function:
National Corruption Observatory, Morocco
Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres (ALACs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia and Romania
Anti-Corruption Resource Centres (ACRCs) in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. See for example the ACRC
in Moldova.
A clearing-house could also be a web-based information clearinghouse,
for example see the USAID funded entity
in Tanzania.
The term "clearing house" is not used on this website. Indeed
this initiative is called the "Tanzania Governance Noticeboard"
and it describes its function as collating and presenting information
that is useful for the strengthening of accountability, transparency
and integrity in Tanzania. This facilitates the work of, in particular,
its host organisation, the Research on Poverty Alleviation, REPOA,
a non-profit, non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Tanzania.
Anti-Corruption Clearing-Houses that Serve National
Anti-Corruption Commissions
This section looks at what kind of platforms serve national anti-corruption
commissions. We have not found examples of anti-corruption clearing
houses as such, however there are some examples of National Anti-corruption
Commissions that embody a information-dissemination and awareness-raising
function.
1. Community education service of Hong
Kong Independent Commission against Corruption
The Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) is
considered a model. Prevention as well as prosecution is a core-activity.
Prevention includes community education and awareness -raising.
In this section some papers that may help the questioner consider
the desirability of an anti-corruption clearing house, and what makes
an anti-corruption clearing house effective, are summarised.
P. Meagher "Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality",
The Journal of Policy Reform, (Vol. 8, No. 1, 69-103, March 2005)
This study charts the emergence of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs),
and then examines experiences with these bodies in developing countries.
It describes the genesis and functions of several ACAs in different
countries (Argentina, Australia, Botswana, Ecuador, Korea, Malaysia,
The Philippines, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda). Meagher comments that
when a country with an ACA experiences a serious outbreak of corruption,
plans for next-generation ACAs are often devised. He goes on to define
what ACAs can be expected to achieve, and how to determine when they
have done so. The study collected information on some 30 ACAs, and
from this information six functions that ACAs commonly perform were
identified. The six task areas are
(a) Receiving and responding to complaints;
(b) Intelligence, monitoring, and investigation;
(c) Prosecutions and administrative orders;
(d) Preventive Research, analysis, and technical assistance;
(e) Ethics policy guidance, compliance review, and scrutiny of asset
declarations;
(f) Public information, education, and outreach.
These six functions were compared against a list of the broader set
of tasks involved in restraining corruption (see Table. 1 on p.81).
Meagher reaches the conclusion that the value-added of an ACA is that
an ACA can "(i) centralize all necessary information and intelligence
about corruption, and (ii) resolve coordination problems among multiple
agencies through vertical integration … In other words, the agency's
main contributions are synergy, coordination, and concentrated power."
Meagher goes on to assess and compare a number of agencies on performance
of the six task areas.
The focus of the paper is what makes anti-corruption agencies succeed
or fail in their mission. Wider conclusions drawn from the study include:
(a) "Where the ACA is not structurally independent, it can be
no more powerful than its bureaucratic and political patrons can"
(at p.100)
(b) "ACAs are … largely incapable of addressing the larger
forces driving systemic corruption." (at p. 101)
(c) "[S]uccess in Hong Kong or New South Wales does not mean
that the same blueprint will produce positive results elsewhere."
(at p.101)
Council of Europe, "Anti-Corruption Services: good
Practice in Europe" (August 2004)
Chapter 1 of this report provides a conceptual framework for the
design of anti-corruption services. It discusses the purpose, the
different types and factors of success or failure, as well as the
steps taken towards the establishment of such services. In Chapter
2 the report gives an overview of anti-corruption services in Europe
and draws conclusions on their strengths and weaknesses. Conclusions
drawn include the finding that public education and support functions
have been neglected throughout Europe, even amongst those anti-corruption
services that have a mandate in this field. In many countries anti-corruption
services have not been fully resourced with the necessary staff, financial
and other means. Furthermore the independence of anti-corruption services
remains an issue; indeed their precise role and relationship to other
institutions and actors may need to be defined more clearly. A positive
conclusion is that in some countries anti-corruption services have
had an impact not only in terms of convicting corrupt officials and
bribers, but also in reducing tolerance of corruption in society and
improving transparency and accountability in public administration
and politics. Finally, the performance of anti-corruption services
depends to a large extent on the quality of its staff and the determination
of its leadership.
Chapter 3 profiles many of the anti-corruption services in European
countries.
J.R. Heilbrunn, "Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea
or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?", World Bank Institute
(2004)
This paper argues that anti-corruption commissions fail to reduce
public sector venality in all but a few special circumstances.
It notes that those governments that have established successful anti-corruption
commissions have done so in response to demands for reform from a
broad base of domestic constituents. Demands for reform generally
occur after a precipitating crisis has caused deep economic hardship
and a national consensus exists that reforms must be implemented.
Anti-corruption commissions are effective when they respond to that
national consensus and a broad domestic coalition supports reform.
Without the precipitating crisis, building such domestic coalitions
is a challenge for even the most popular leaders. When support is
more tenuous, policymakers have an incentive to weaken reforms and
avoid any threat to powerful constituents who profit from official
inattention to expenditures, access to governments contracts, and
other manifestations of public sector inefficiency.
The argument in this essay is that an anti-corruption commission is
all too often nothing more than a token effort without the difficult
reforms in procurement practices, financial management, internal and
external audits, and conflict of interest laws necessary to improve
public sector management and reduce corruption.
To distinguish among the multitude of anti-corruption commissions
in the world the paper looks at their functions and to which branch
of government the commission is accountable. It differentiates among
four types of anti-corruption commission:
(i) the universal model with its investigative, preventative,
and communicative functions. The universal model is typified by Hong
Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).
(ii) the investigative model is characterized by a small and
centralized investigative commission as operates in Singapore's Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Both the universal and investigative
models are organizationally accountable to the executive.
(iii) the parliamentary model includes commissions that report
to parliamentary committees and are independent from the executive
and judicial branches of state. The parliamentary model is epitomized
by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption that
takes a preventative approach to fighting corruption.
(iv) the multi-agency model includes a number of offices that
are individually distinct, but together weave a web of agencies to
fight corruption. The United States Office of Government Ethics with
its preventative approach complements the Justice Department's investigative
and prosecutorial powers in a concerted effort to reduce corruption.
Council of Europe, "Implementation of National Anti-corruption
Plans in South-eastern Europe (PACO IMPACT): Strengthening anti-corruption
services in south-eastern Europe. Current status and needs for reform.
Results of a regional meeting held in Skopje (31 March - 1 April 2005).
This seminar discussed the design and effectiveness of anti-corruption
agencies in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, "the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Kosovo (S&M), Montenegro
(S&M) and Serbia (S&M). The report includes detailed profiles
of anti-corruption services in these countries and recommendations
for improvements and reforms, as well as risk assessments of each
country's anti-corruption services.
Different countries and areas have adopted different types of anti-corruption
services. Common issues of concern regarding the existing anti-corruption
services and anti-corruption plans in the south-eastern European region
were:
(i) There is no blueprint for anti-corruption services. Therefore,
determining a) an appropriate model and b) appropriate features are
crucial to the success of such services - both depend on the political
will of the respective governments.
(ii) There is a growing number of arguments in favour of allocating
a set percentage of state budget funds to the work of anti-corruption
services/bodies. The funding allocated should be determined through
a careful costing exercise.
(iii) The need for specialised staff, including the secondment of
designated personnel from prosecutorial services and law enforcement
agencies has become a growing concern that needs to be seriously addressed
in order to strengthen the work of anti-corruption agencies.
(iv) More efforts should be geared towards making anti-corruption
policies, institutional working methods, as well as reforms part of
a sustainable institutional memory.
(v) The drawbacks of an unclear definition of the role of anti-corruption
services - be they policy advice or law enforcement bodies-, are increasingly
evident. They include difficulties in intra-governmental coordination
and cooperation, and low acceptance of and support to these services
by line ministries and other relevant institutions, which is reflected,
for example, in the submission of mechanic reports by these stakeholders.
As a result, monitoring of the implementation of anti-corruption measures
becomes less effective.
(vi) Public education and awareness campaigns often appear to lack
a clear link with the relevant government actions and new policies
that are launched in the fight against corruption.
(vii) The existing anti-corruption services/commissions have to initiate,
facilitate and be more pro-active towards new work methodologies,
including surveys which could measure the impact of their work and
give credibility to the governments' reforms vis-à-vis the
public.
