Scaling Up of Aid
What work has been done/what institutions or researchers are currently
considering the risks of corruption/impact on corruption associated
with scaling up of aid?
Purpose
Internal scoping exercise
Content
Part I provides summaries of relevant workshops
and expert remarks
Part II includes a selection of relevant resources
U4 helpdesk reply
While substantial amount of literature is available on corruption and
aid in general, there appears to be relatively little operationally-relevant
research on specific corruption risks associated with scaling up of
aid.
Most corruption risks applicable to aid in general will of course remain
valid. There are however additional risks associated with increasing
support related to pressures to disperse larger amounts more quickly,
absorption capacity of recipient countries,the potential for complacency,
etc. These will require even stronger governance, accountability and financial
management capacity both on recipients' as well as donors' side.
How significant are the risks? Experts disagree
In the wake of the recent aid drive and mobilization, corruption has figured
on the various agendas and platforms. Some have cautioned against increased
aid amidst corruption worries, others have stated that corruption should
not be used to stall the much-needed increases of aid.
The nature of the available materials seems at the moment to be of either
campaigning/advocacy (statements, press releases) or early research (workshop
proceedings, background papers, etc) character. A summary of the reviewed
sources is provided.
Part I: Summaries of Relevant Workshops and Expert Remarks
Increased Aid Flows and the Control of Corruption, Commonwealth
Club, London, May 2005
This meeting was coordinated by TI UK and speakers included Martin Wolf
(Financial Times), Hester Le Roux (Commission for Africa), Albert Tucker
(Twin & Twin Trading Ltd), Roger Ridell (formerly of Christian Aid).
Marin Wolf commented that although there was historical empirical evidence
that aid could achieve important developmental results, as demonstrated
in East Asia, it was clear that Africa presented important challenges. In
countries with poor governance and weak policies and institutions, increased
aid could exacerbate the problem because of the 'substitution effect'.
It could, perversely, increase incentives for the pursuit of bad policies
that led to corruption, inefficiency and waste.He identified five principles
for engagement:
Increase incentives for good governance/management and anti-corruption
reforms.
In countries with tolerable records of governance/ management, an increase
in aid (including through direct budgetary support) within a framework
of goals mutually agreed by donors and recipients, could strengthen
the incentive for better governance and additional reforms.
Avoid complex, detailed aid conditionality, which, experience
had shown, was unlikely to achieve intended objectives.
However, governments receiving aid need to commit to credible rules
and guidelines governing the use of aid that could be monitored effectively.
Civil society organisations could play a role in the monitoring process.
Reduce reliance on bureaucracy and bureaucratic processes (where
they were weak and themselves needed improvement) and make greater use
of market mechanisms wherever possible (but obviously not in situations
where market failures were a problem).
Untie aid and make aid flows more predictable.
Focus more on building effective institutions and policies
because this could make a big difference.
Other comments:
Direct budget support can work.....
Ms Hester Le Roux said that the Commission for Africa (CFA) recommended
an additional $75 billion in aid over the next 10-15 years, but this
was linked to recognition that Africa was responsible for its own development
as well as a requirement for aid recipients to make sustained improvements
in governance, economic and public financial management, and in anti-corruption
efforts. The Commission believed that aid should not be increased in
the absence of such improvement, particularly through sound public financial
management systems. The CFA also called on donors to make aid more effective
and to provide more grants, increase direct budgetary support, reduce
conditionality that was not directly related to effective use of aid,
and the untying of all aid. She pointed out that the Commission, based
on its review of historical evidence and case studies, had concluded
that the developmental benefits of increased aid flows to Africa would
outweigh the risks, provided improvements were achieved in accountability
and good governance. The experience of countries such as Ghana, Tanzania
and Ethiopia had shown that aid could be effective and that direct budgetary
support was less susceptible to corruption than project and programme
support.
...but not where political will is absent and corrupt elites are
entrenched
Some participants felt the panelists had taken too optimistic a view
of the impact of increased aid in a context of huge capital flight from
Africa and the plunder of state funds because corrupt elites had been
able to capture and subvert state institutions and policies. As long
as these elites remained entrenched wielding significant power and influence,
greater aid flows were tantamount to pouring more water into a leaking
bucket. It was pointed out that developed countries such as the UK
should be doing much more to clamp down on money launderers who
operated in their jurisdictions, and to freeze, confiscate and repatriate
assets looted by corrupt foreign officials and politicians. Improvements
in mutual legal assistance, the imposition of travel restrictions on
corrupt politically exposed persons and a few successful cases of asset
restitution would have an enormous impact, even if it was difficult
to prosecute offenders.
The Marshall Plan concept is not transferable to the African context
It was pointed out that those arguing for a 'Marshall Plan' for Africa
and the wider
developing world tended to forget that the Marshall Plan for Europe
had focused mainly on project finance (e.g. to rebuild roads and infrastructure)
with strong requirements for transparency and financial accountability,
and with a requirement for an initial outlay from governments. The Marshall
Plan had not involved the provision of direct budgetary support to governments
for sector-wide expenditure.
Quality of aid is as important as quantity
In a recent paper for the UK's Institute of Development Studies, Mick
Moore had argued that variations in sources of state revenue, especially
in circumstances such as those prevailing in Africa, affected three
major governance and developmental variables: administrative capacity,
political legitimacy and investment incentives. It was found that relatively
high dependence on taxation had positive outcomes for these variables,
whereas relatively high dependence on oil and aid as revenue sources
tended to have variable, often negative, impacts on these variables.
The challenge therefore was to find a balance among different sources
of income, including aid that would create positive incentives for
good governance, sound economic and financial management and anti-corruption
reforms. It was suggested that quick 'win-win' aid and development outcomes
- demonstrating tangible benefits to poor communities in recipient countries
- would help to build support for an expansion of aid programmes in
developed countries.
Tony Killick's key argument was that the emphasis on large and quick
increases in aid would undermine efforts to improve the effectiveness
of aid because (a) quality would suffer and (b) the resulting additions
to already high aid dependency would undermine accountability, ownership
and institution-building in African countries.
Aid was already very highly concentrated on Africa, and the region exhibited
a high dependency. For example, for the top half of recipients, aid accounted
for 17% of GNI, 108% of gross domestic capital formation and 49% of imports.
Risks associated with rapidly increasing aid include:
limited absorptive capacity (especially because of weak institutions
and a brain drain);
the undermining of domestic ownership;
high fiduciary risk because of weak budget institutions (associated
with fungibility, poor accountability and corruption);
macroeconomic problems created by large additional inflows, particularly
'Dutch Disease'; and
negative effects on domestic accountability, strength of local institutions
and governments' willingness to tackle deep-rooted problems (moral hazard)
A further point was that all the problems would be compounded by the pressure
on donors to spend quickly. This would undermine selectivity, multiply
problems associated with poor projects, and generally reduce the effectiveness
of aid.
A number of speakers addressed the issue of the trade-off between quantity
and quality. Was it possible to give more aid in ways that achieved MDG-related
objectives, but also protected quality and reinforced accountability?
There were various suggestions: ring-fence part of the additional aid
in order to build capacity; support the private sector rather than try
to channel all extra money through government; provide additional aid
direct to poor people rather than to institutions. The general tenor of
these arguments was to ask whether the scale of the need required that
additional money be spent - suggesting that the challenge was to find
a way of doing this successfully. Tony Killick commented on this and re-emphasised
the importance of a possible trade-off between quantity and quality. He
argued that increased spending would lead to a sacrifice of selectivity
and attempts at harmonisation.
a) Selection of relevant papers
Aid Effectiveness and Financing Modalities, Development Committee (WB/IMF),
September 2004
The paper starts from the premise that adequate, predictable and more effective
aid flows are critical to reaching the MDGs by 2015. Reaching the MDGs will
require a significant scaling up of the provision of publicly financed goods
and services. The literature shows that that aid can be effective in building
up government capacity to undertake needed development expenditure if sound
policy frameworks are in place. But larger aid flows are a not a panacea.
Indeed, increased aid in and of itself can distort incentives - for
example by weakening government's resolve to raise and better manage domestic
public resources, or by decreasing the incentives for domestic savings and
investment. Increased flows should be based on continued strengthening of
governance. The paper discusses new and stronger frameworks for aid effectiveness,
financing needs and mechanisms and issues of absorptive capacity (including
weak public expenditure management practices and corruption). The need to
raise absorptive capacity should not, however, be an excuse for holding
up aid mobilization. Efforts to increase aid can move in tandem with efforts
to address the effectiveness of aid by strengthening policy frameworks,
building institutional capacity, mobilizing the private sector and NGOs,
identifying innovative avenues for service delivery, and improving monitoring
and evaluation to learn from international experience.
Increasing
Aid Goes Hand in Hand with Fighting Corruption, OXFAM press release, June
2005
The release states that African organizations and international aid agencies
call on world leaders to see aid as a weapon through which corruption
can be fought rather than an excuse to stall on increasing aid pledges.
There are six main reasons why corruption should not be seen as a blockage
to further aid increases. These are:
Aid works and has been critical in getting 2 million children back
into school in Tanzania and ending diseases such as river blindness
and smallpox. Even in countries where corruption has been endemic,
aid has helped to alleviate poverty.
Aid can build governments' capacity to monitor the spending of aid
money and ensure that civil servants are paid a salary which they can
survive on.
Corruption itself is in part a consequence of poverty. "Petty"
corruption is more likely to take place when civil servants are paid
very low wages - a fact that has been acknowledged by both the World
Bank and IMF. In such circumstances, simply withholding aid is ineffective,
and can be counter-productive.
Corruption is a global phenomenon. It exists in rich and poor countries.
The trend of increasing democracy in Africa bodes well for reducing
corruption in the future. Better political accountability to electorates
can only lead to increased scrutiny of government and donors.
Donors must first lead by example by providing aid based on need,
not as a reward for countries that open up their markets or join the
fight against terrorism.
Western governments should focus on cleaning up systems that make
large-scale corruption possible. For example, they should ensure that
export credit agencies' distribution of money - often a source of corruption
- becomes more transparent, and take stronger action against suspicious
payments into Western banks.
Real
Aid: an Agenda for Making Aid Work (ActionAid), 2005
Poor quality aid from unaccountable donors is a blunt instrument in terms
of its impact on poverty. As this report argues, far-reaching changes
are needed by donors to make aid a sharp tool in the fight to realise
basic rights for all. Recipient governments also need to reform. Accountability,
transparency, democracy and the protection of human rights must all be
improved. But where donors promote these changes, they need to happen
in the context of genuine mutual accountability between rich and poor
countries.
b) Researchers
The workshops and papers listed above will certainly serve as references
to a number of researchers and organisations (ODI, Oxfam, ActionAid
and others) that have been working on the issue. In addition, if you are
further interested in the critical side of the debate on increased aid,
Brian Cooksey (Tanzania Development Research Group) has produced
a series of papers arguing that increased aid has failed to deliver on
a number of occasions as well as highlighting corruption issues: