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FAQs:

Corruption and possible cures:

Government oversight and control bodies

 

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What is the role of, and what can be done to reduce corruption in and strengthen the prevention and control capacity of:

 

Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies/Commissions

Increasingly, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), such as independent anti-corruption commissions, prevention of corruption bureaus and standing inquiry commissions are used as institutional pillars for combating corruption. Often, though not always, initiated in response to a particular case or scandal and benefiting from a culmination of public attention driven political will a number of these agencies transform into permanent independent anti-corruption bodies.

There can also be instances, however, when the same "political will" may reversibly hit back trying to diminish and deligitimize the powers of the agency, often when political executives themselves become targeted by the agency.

Structure

Anti-corruption agencies vary in their structure, functions and powers. While most countries establish stand-alone agencies (with the most common model being the independent anti-corruption commissions, along with 'bureaus', 'directorates', 'authorities', etc.) with a sole function of countering corruption, there are others that choose to combine anti-corruption commissions with other oversight bodies - often the ombudsman, such as, for example, Uganda and Papua New Guinea.

There are also models based on standing public inquiry bodies, such as Queensland Australia's Criminal Justice Commission, which has investigative jurisdiction over the police, public sector employees, state and local politicians.

Functions

  • Prevention. Prevention is an essential, if only sometimes overlooked, function of an anti-corruption agency. Most of the ACAs have corruption prevention departments that provide advice on systemic and organisational strategies for preventing corruption (such as for example Australia NSW). In addition, education and training prove to be of immense value (the all too-often cited Hong-Kong ICAC being a good example indeed) with activities ranging from specialised anti-corruption workshops to advisory and guidance functions.

  • Investigation. Independent investigative capacity is a function shared by most of the ACAs and indeed an essential one for ensuring the credibility of agency's decisions and judgments.

  • Research. In addition to prevention and investigation, certain agencies undertake a broader role to conduct research and monitor and promote reform in the public service and/or the criminal justice system generally.

Prerequisites for success

It goes without saying that by far not all ACAs prove to succeed in their task. Among the complex prerequisites for maintaining ACAs' success levels are:

  • Existence of and compliance with a tailor-made national strategy
  • Government commitment and political will
  • Concerted action with all other stakeholders
  • Adequate laws with inclusive offence definitions and enforcement provisions
  • Impartiality and independence from political influences
  • Transparency and effective accountability mechanisms
  • Credibility and public trust
  • Consultation with civil society
  • Appropriate expertise and specialisation
  • Adequate resources and funding
  • High level of ethics and codes of conduct

Resources and Links

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Auditor General and National Audit Offices

Independent Supreme Audit Institutions producing professional and timely reports foster financial transparency and accountability in government actions. As such, they are a crucial national instrument for curbing corruption.

The institution of the Auditor General or National Audit Office exists in most countries. It is an independent expert institution designed to oversee the financial management of government bodies and thus help parliament fulfil its oversight function.

Supreme Audit Institutions can undertake four different kinds of audits:
  • Financial audits, which assess the accuracy and fairness of accounting procedures and financial statements.

  • Compliance audits, which scrutinise whether funds have been used for approved purposes. Here, auditors examine, whether funds were authorised by the correct institutions and whether all laws and regulations were complied with.

  • Performance audits (also known as "value for money" audits), which analyse the operational efficiency and general effectiveness of government programmes.

  • Ethical audits, which assess the ethical environment of an institution with the goal of identifying high-risk areas, are a recent trend introduced by Auditor Generals among others in the UK and Canada.
While Supreme Audit Institutions are not primarily designed as anti-corruption organs, they can play a central role in preventing and detecting corruption:
  • By auditing the accounts, procedures and sometimes effectiveness of government programmes, SAIs can detect fraud and abuse. While actual discoveries of corruption are comparatively rare, the deterrent effect of audits should not be underestimated.

  • SAIs can have specific anti-corruption programmes, including definitions of risk-areas, the establishment of task-forces and the implementation of special audits. (Examples: NIK Poland, NKU Czech Republic.

  • Credible audits create public trust in the accuracy of government actions. Thereby, they increase the legitimacy of government and strengthen the institutional framework of a country.

  • SAIs work to improve financial management systems and internal controls. Their reports can trigger reforms, which increase the transparency and accountability of government operations.

  • SAIs publish reports about government operations, which are understandable for non-experts. Thereby, they increase transparency.

Prerequisites for success include:

  • Institutional, personal, financial and operational independence of the SAI is an indispensable prerequisite for objective auditing and public trust in the institution. Independence should be constitutionally guaranteed and the appointment procedure should provide Auditor Generals with a strong and independent standing.

  • SAIs usually publish reports (only in some systems enforceable judgements). There is a high risk that these reports "land in the drawer". The timely publication of the reports, as well as the design and implementation of effective follow-up measures are therefore crucial.

  • The SAI's mandate should be clearly defined by law, the scope of audits should be broad (i.e. go beyond pure financial auditing) and the SAI's access to all information guaranteed.

  • The SAI should be able to determine which institutions to audit and how to audit them.

  • SAIs should adhere to international auditing standards and to high standards of professionalism and ethics. Continuous capacity building through training and international co-operation can help ensure high quality auditing. The work of SAIs should be subject to external quality reviews.

  • When SAIs discover corruption or fraud and have no judiciary powers of their own, they should be able to request investigation by law-enforcement agencies.
Resources

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Ombudsmen and Inspectorates of Government

While dedicating the function of countering corruption to an already established public oversight body may have certain advantages, there is a risk of it getting somewhat marginalised in the already stretched specialised portfolios of those bodies. The Office of the Ombudsman (and/or sometimes Government's Inspector General) is among the institutions most typically chosen for this purpose.

Among the approaches most commonly used by the Governments are:

  • Dedicating the Ombudsman's Office as the main and/or sole anti-corruption agency

  • Combining anti-corruption commissions with the Ombudsman (for an example refer to Uganda; in Australia's New South Wales, a proposal was put forward to appoint the Ombudsman to also head the Independent Commission Against Corruption, but it was not implemented)

  • Or, simply leaving the Ombudsman to deal with anti-corruption when it crosscuts through areas of its core functions (for example, given the causal and reciprocal relationship between corruption and such typically core Ombudsman functions as mal-administration, corruption would need to be addressed for the Ombudsman to have any comprehensive impact).

While it is difficult to single out a particular approach as a success model to follow, since the suitability of approaches would vary depending on country's overall legal and administrative system in place, it is possible, based on experiences and practices, to draw an outline of an Ombudsman's possible role in countering corruption.

Possible Functions

  • Inspection: as traditional means for obtaining impartial and independent investigation of complaints against government agencies and their employees, the potential role of Ombudsmen in investigating, particularly through informal procedures, of certain calibre of corruption related complaints and providing often more tailored remedies than available through legal proceedings and other mechanisms should by no means be underestimated.

  • Ethics and standard setting: another mainstream Ombudsman role that could be of immense value in countering corruption is that of educating public officials in appropriate standards of conduct, where necessary adjusting and monitoring the implementation of codes of ethics and conflict of interest and other similar public service standards.

  • Whistleblowing: resident Ombudsmen in public agencies and institutions (reporting back to the Office of the Ombudsman) can be designed to provide through their direct and immediate presence a deterrence to corruption by acting as whistleblowers along with conducting fact-finding investigations of allegations of corruption (practised by the Philippines).

  • Whistleblower protection: ensuring that adequate whistleblower protection mechanisms are in place and are enforced.

Possible Setbacks

As the Ombudsman process is usually complaints-driven, it can limit the agency's competitiveness in tackling corruption in broader sense and in generating research or policy-related information. Some ombudsmen do, however, compile reports analysing their caseloads or have powers to make general recommendations to governments where complaint patterns suggest that there are some deeper institutional, structural or similar problems.

Prerequisites for success include:

  • Independence and impartiality
  • The commitment and leadership of the Ombudsman
  • Adequate resources and capability
  • Effective cooperation and institutional links with other anti-corruption actors
Resources and Links

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Public Accounts Committees

A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is that group of parliamentarians charged with exercising parliament's oversight function over public expenditures and revenues. Through investigations, public hearings and the debate of audit reports, PACs hold government bodies accountable and make public finances more transparent. As such, the PAC is parliament's single most relevant institution for curbing corruption. In some countries, PACs have become the driving force behind anti-corruption reforms.

PACs exist in systems that follow the Westminster parliamentary model (in other systems, such as the Napoleonic model, Supreme Audit Institutions report directly to parliament or pass directly enforceable judgements). Composed of parliamentarians, their mandate usually covers the examination of public receipts, expenditures and assets. Parliament usually refers all reports issued by the Supreme Audit Institution [link FAQ 11] to the PAC, the committee then conducts public hearings including the Auditor General, the financial heads of the institutions under investigation and other witnesses and reports its conclusions and recommendations to parliament. Often, PACs can also examine questions independently, review relevant draft legislation or ask the Supreme Audit Institution to perform specific audits.

PACs perform the following functions relevant to the fight against corruption:
  • PACs design the recommendations for actions following up on audit and investigation reports and present them to parliament. Credible and effective follow-up activities after the discovery of inefficiencies or fraud are indispensable for actual reforms of the system and for the credibility of the parliamentary system of control.

  • PACs provide control and scrutiny over the actions of the Supreme Audit Institution. By conducting public hearings to verify the reports, in which witnesses from all stakeholder groups are called, the system of auditing itself becomes more transparent and the objectivity and thus legitimacy of the reports is increased.

  • Finally, PACs play an important role by publicising the results of audits and inquiries. Ensuring public debate about audit reports not only reinforces the institutional framework, but also creates the public pressure to follow up on these reports.

Prerequisites for success include:

Prompt action. The credibility and effectiveness of the auditing system depends on the fast reaction of PACs to audit reports and on the timely implementation of the recommendations.

  • Non-partisan and de-politicised operations. The opposition should be strongly represented in PACS and ideally hold the chair of the committee.

  • Independent action. PACs should be in a position to initiate investigations and audits, not just to receive reports from the Auditor General.

  • Openness. PAC sessions should be open to the public and the media to encourage debate and generate public pressure for follow-up actions. Good relations to the media can be essential for the effectiveness of PACs

  • Access to information should be unlimited and it should be possible to call on all officials for questioning.

  • Formal mandates for PACs should include the investigation of all government agencies and corporations.

Resources

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Parliament and Parliamentary Committees

A key component of a National Integrity System, the Legislature has a prime and comprehensive role in curbing corruption, ranging from building political will and adopting the necessary legislation to promoting public debate and holding the government accountable for its actions. In order to implement these crucial functions, the legislature itself must uphold highest standards of integrity.

Legislature's oversight of the Executive

There are various ways in which the Legislature (Parliament) can exercise its oversight role, including:
  • Ongoing oversight such as regular questioning of Ministers in Parliament and tabling motions for debate drawing out explanations for actions.

  • Parliamentary committees can develop specialist skills and insights in particular areas of administration. Among the prominent Parliamentary oversight mechanisms are the public accounts committees [link FAQ 13] and the finance committees - ensuring that the budgets are presented, debated, adequately disclosed and accounted for. There are also different new national approaches. A number of African Parliaments have "Committees of Assurances" to hold ministers accountable for statements and promises they have made to the parliament. Such committees can be useful in exposing incidents of corruption.

  • In addition, there are various watchdog agencies that can be accountable to the Parliament. The Auditor-General [link FAQ 11] is pre-eminent, but other anti-corruption agencies [link FAQs 9,10] may be subject to parliamentary rather than executive accountability as a means of ensuring greater independence and impartiality.
The basic foundations for anti-corruption reforms should be laid by Parliament through:
  • Building political will and government commitment to anti-corruption reform

  • Stimulating and promoting informed public debate

  • Adopting adequate anti-corruption legislation, including the legislative framework for strengthening the key institutions in the fight against corruption
Prerequisites for ensuring Parliament's own integrity and fitness to undertake the reforms include:
  • Democratically elected Parliament, free from undue influences and dependence

  • Parliamentary ethics, codes of conduct and conflict of interest regulations (including public disclosure provisions), accompanied by effective enforcement, monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms

  • Transparency and accountability in practices and procedures

  • Effective mechanisms for citizen participation in legislative processes and public debate

Resources and Links

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Investigation, Police

Detection, investigation and successful prosecution lie at the heart of a successful system for containing corruption. However, surveys in most countries around the world rate the police as the most corrupt arm of government. Often underpaid, usually under-trained, almost invariable under-equipped, the police and investigators are very much a part of the problem as well as being part of the solution. Working on the street in close proximity to organised crime, and exercising considerable discretion, ordinary policemen and women are especially vulnerable.

Road traffic police are a particular problem, as in many countries vehicles are not road-worthy so that drivers who refuse to pay bribes can be fined heavily for breaches of the law. However, in Pakistan the formation of a special Road Police United, with good pay and reasonable working hours, has dramatically reduced complaints from motorists.

INTERPOL, the world police organisation, is launching an initiative designed to raise police standards worldwide, as corruption in police is by no means confined to the developing world and countries in transition. Cities such as New York and London have experienced major scandals, and an Australian police chief has been jailed for corruption. In all three countries it has been realised that corruption has to be fought continuously, not just blitzed when major scandals show. Specialised groups have to be developed to deal with corruption both inside and outside the police, but they, too, can become infected with the virus.

"Integrity tests" have been found to be particularly effective in countering corruption in police forces. A wallet full of money may be handed in to a police station and then its contents monitored. Specific police may be informed of a drugs stash, which is then covered by hidden video monitors to see if the drugs are stolen. Bribes are offered to see if they are reported. Random testing in New York and London is believed to have reduced corruption radically, as a policeman usually does not know if an offer is a genuine bribe or a staged integrity test, and so tends to report it.

Resources

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Judiciary: independence - integrity - efficiency

An independent, impartial and informed judiciary, both efficient and timely in its dispensation of justice, holds a central place in the realisation of a just, honest, open and accountable government. The principle of judicial independence is asserted internationally in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the Bribe Payers Index (2002) disclosed that corruption in the judicial process is the greatest concern of the private sector interests polled.

Judicial independence is secured constitutionally, through safeguards concerning appointments, removals, protection of salaries and benefits. It is further protected by practices of openness, such as sitting in public, giving reasons for decisions and, for the most part, subject to appeal to higher courts. However, individual members of the judiciary must be both appointed and held directly accountable in ways that do not compromise the institution's independence. Therefore disciplinary tribunals should have a majority from the judiciary but be rendered more legitimate by the inclusion of non-lawyers, but never politicians.

Such accountability strengthens the institution's independence: it increases integrity and helps to protect the judicial power from those who might want to erode it. Otherwise a judiciary can become simply a tool in the hands of a powerful - and corrupt - elite. On the other hand, most successful anti-corruption drives have relied on a capable and independent judiciary dedicated and equipped to uphold the Rule of Law. This includes access to up-to-date case law.

Judicial integrity is best built and sustained by the judiciary itself, through clear, well-publicised and enforced codes of conduct and role modelling high personal standards. Leadership has to be asserted from the top, and instances of judicial malpractice disciplined. Courts should be inspected and judgments examined for their consistency. Court staff should be properly supervised and complaints mechanisms established for the public. Adequate personal security, adequate facilities, appropriate salaries and status are also important. Subjecting the lower judiciary in particular to examinations has proved a success in weeding out incompetent judges in the former Soviet Union.

"Investigative judges" are found within the Napoleonic tradition, as a blend of investigators with some judicial powers.

Resources
  • Kirby, Michael: A Global Approach to Judicial Independence and Integrity
    University of Queensland Law Journal

  • Hammergren, Linn: Diagnosing Judicial Performance: Toward a Tool to Help Guide Judicial Reform Programs

  • Cumaraswarmy, Dato' Param: Some Thoughts on Judicial Code of Conduct and Mechanisms for Disciplining Judges

  • Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts, Kenya, May 17 2002

  • Buscaglia, Edgardo: An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts: A Governance-Based Approach.

  • A Global Programme Against Corruption, Research and Scientific Series, Ref: GPAC-RSS-2-2001. Also published as a full draft in the International Review of Law and Economics (2001), Elsevier Science Press

  • Ethical Principles for Judges (Canadian Judicial Council)
I. International Conventions
  • Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 10, 12/10/1948, United Nations, G.A. res. 217A(III)

  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(1), 12/16/1966, United Nations, entered into force on March 23, 1976
II. International Guidelines and Principles
  • Amnesty International Fair Trials Manual (1999) 2. First published December 1998, AI Index: POL 30/02/98

  • What is a Fair Trial? A Basic Guide to Legal Standards and Practice, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, March 2000

  • Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Italy, 08/26-09/06/1985

  • Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Italy, 08/26-09/06/ 1985

  • Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 08/27-09/07/1990

  • Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 08/27-09/07/1990

  • Draft Body of Principles on the Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy, Annex II, in The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and Measures Necessary for its Strengthening, Final Report, Commission of Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Session, E/CN.a/Sub.2/1994/24, June 1994

  • Universal Charter of the Judge, General Council of the International Association of Judges, Taipei, Taiwan, 11/17/1999
III. Regional Conventions
AFRICA
  • African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 06/27/1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on October 21, 1986
AMERICAS
  • American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, OAS res. XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter- American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992)

  • American Convention on Human Rights, 11/22/1969, OAS Treaty Series No.36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/ II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992), entered into force on July 18, 1978
EUROPE
  • European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 11/04/1950, Council of Europe, European Treaty Series no. 5
IV. Regional Guidelines and Principles
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
  • Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, 07/17-18-1982, Tokyo, Japan, LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee

  • Revised Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, 09/13-15/ 1993, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 5th Conference of the Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific

  • Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, 08/ 19/1995, Beijing, China, 6th Conference of the Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific

  • Commonwealth (the United Kingdom and the former British colonies)

  • Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth, Joint Colloquium on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence...towards a Commonwealth Model, Latimer House, United Kingdom, June 15th- 19th, 1998
EUROPE
  • Judges' Charter in Europe, 03/20/1993, European Association of Judges Recommendation no.R(94)12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence

  • Efficiency and Role of Judges 10/13/1993, 518th Meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Council of Europe

  • European Charter on the Status of Judges, 07/08-10/1998, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France
MIDDLE EAST
  • Recommendations of the First Arab Conference on Justice, Beirut Declaration, 06/14-16/1999, Conference on The Judiciary in the Arab Region and the Challenges of the 21st Century, Beirut, Lebanon
LATIN AMERICA
  • Caracas Declaration, 03/04-06/1998, Ibero-American Summit of Presidents of Supreme Justice Tribunals and Courts, Caracas, Venezuela

Article

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Prosecution, discipline and sanctions

Any anti-corruption strategy must include an appropriate sanctions element. The objective is usually to alter the risk versus reward equation so that the risks of detection and punishment are such as to outweigh the prospects of reward. Prosecution and retribution can seldom be used as the primary weapon in a country where corruption is a serious problem, as generally in such a country the judiciary and legal profession themselves are also corrupt and unreliable.

One theory is that reformists must "fry big fish", but in practice the biggest "fish" to be prosecuted is usually a leader who has fallen from favour. Certainly the rule of law requires that all government takes place "under the law" and is accountable to the courts for its lawfulness and constitutionality. However, prosecution is frequently abused as a cover for political purges.

Prosecution is best seen as being second in the line of defence to a prevention policy. Sanctions only come into play when prevention fails, and the more effective a preventions policy, the less the need for sanctions. Laws and civil service rules should be simple to understand and simple to enforce. A high probability of detection, prosecution and punishment is the greatest deterrent to the would-be corrupt.

Those accused of corruption should be proceeded against in ways consistent with universally recognised human rights standards, given a fair hearing and be able to defend themselves. "Internal justice" disciplinary procedures should be as constitutionally fair as those in the criminal courts.

Immunity from prosecution should be extremely limited, and able to be lifted without difficulty in appropriate cases. Some countries have so many categories of officials immune from the criminal law that tens of thousands of state officials are beyond the reach of the law. It is usual for a President to be immune from criminal prosecution while in office, although some countries extend this into retirement, for no justifiable reason. A sitting President can be impeached by the legislature and then prosecuted.

Limitation periods (the time within which prosecutions must be brought or completed) ought not to be too short, at least for serious corruption cases. Major corruption can lie hidden for lengthy periods. Nor should time continue to run against the prosecutors while a case is being heard, or defence lawyers will prolong hearings simply to have the prosecution run out of time (such as in Italy, where lawyers can drag out proceedings through the appellate courts leaving the convicted and the corrupt to walk free).

An important sanction is an ability for the state to trace, freeze and recover the proceeds of corruption wherever in the world these may be.

Resources
Legislation

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Local government

Local governments offer an environment, which is at the same time particularly vulnerable to corruption and which offers special opportunities for effective anti-corruption programmes. The recent trends toward decentralisation [LINK FAQ 34] increase the focus on local governments for the fight against corruption.

  • Opportunities for corruption abound in local governments, as local officials often have very close contacts to citizens, contractors and interest groups.

  • In addition, in many countries local governments make a large part of total public expenditures. Local anti-corruption campaigns therefore often target public contracting and service provision.

  • Local governments, however, also offer opportunities for concrete and effective anti-corruption campaigns that are cost-effective in their implementation. These opportunities arise, as the smaller size of institutions makes them more accessible and potentially easier to reform. At the same time, local politicians are very close to their constituents and might therefore be won more easily as partners in the fight against corruption.
Anti-corruption activities by special anti-corruption commissions or civil society institutions at the local and community level can focus on one or more of the following:
  • Make information [LINK FAQ 7] available to citizens and increase citizen participation, e.g. through public hearings or participation in the budgetary process and oversight mechanisms.

  • Raise public awareness about corruption and thus change public attitudes and expectations. Public opinion surveys are good tools to raise awareness and diagnose problems.

  • Train local officials [LINK FAQ 31], e.g. in new accounting tools, e-government applications, information provision.

  • Design and implement codes of conduct [LINK FAQ 21].

  • Implement e-government strategies to enhance transparency and the flow of information.

  • Design open and participatory public procurement procedures [LINK FAQ 4].

Hong Kong provides a good example for a fairly comprehensive local anti corruption strategy.

The following factors enhance the likelihood of success of local anti-corruption programmes:
  • Anti-corruption programmes need to address problems that are perceived as pressing by the local public.

  • Projects and reforms should fit the technical capabilities, resources and needs of the community. This is especially relevant for e-government solutions.

  • Information and involvement of the local community are crucial for two reasons: First, public awareness and involvement increases the incentives for officials to co-operate with anti-corruption programmes, as their legitimacy depends on co-operation. Second, many anti-corruption projects rely on transparency and access to information as a tool to prevent corruption. Active citizens seeking and obtaining access to information are therefore crucial to success.

  • Controls of and sanctions for public officials should be combined with positive incentives to increase the political will of officials to fight corruption. Positive incentives can include integrity awards, salary reforms and the introduction of new tools and training, such as new budgeting and accounting software.

Resources

  • De Asis, Maria Gonzalez, (2000): Reducing Corruption at the Local Level (includes Case Study), World Bank Institute

  • Klitgaard, Robert and MacLean-Abaroa, Ronald and Parris, H. Lindsey, (2000): Corrupt Cities. A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention. ICS Press, 2000. Click here for an earlier version of Corrupt Cities

  • Transparency International Local Government Page

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Public complaints mechanisms

Public complaints mechanisms are indispensable tools for raising and measuring government's accountability - which is not simply an end in itself but in turn boosts its legitimacy, credibility and strength to undertake anti-corruption reforms.

Main Methods for collecting and acting upon citizens' complaints
While some of the methods are designed to encourage citizens to provide feedback by submitting complaints or comments after they have had contact with a public service others are more pro-active, involving public sector organisations seeking feedback from individual citizen or particular groups of citizens on specific issues that can be analysed and fed into the decision-making mechanisms as on-going input.

One way of encouraging informal citizen feedback rather than more formal complaints is the use of comment, report or suggestion schemes. This might involve the provision of suggestion boxes, report cards, etc. Whatever methods used, it is crucial that they are adequately publicised (through posters in public offices, leaflets, publication of dedicated hotline numbers, etc.). Methods most commonly used are:

1. Preventive Advising

Citizen's advice centres are commonly used by civil society groups in many parts of the world to ensure that citizens - and especially the poor and the marginalized - can obtain free advice on how to deal with government agencies (e.g. housing, benefits, pensions, etc.) and about their legal rights in general. Principal elements of citizen's advice centres (or advice bureaus) include:

  • Disseminating information on public services;
  • Providing free and independent advice to citizens;
  • Providing a two-way channel of communication between citizens and the government.

2. On-going Collection of Citizen Feedback

Citizen's Charters are often used to set out the procedures for making complaints. The intention is to shift the emphasis from complaints as something negative to viewing complaints as an important form of communication and feedback. Citizens' comments can then be analysed to target improvements in public services in areas seen to be failing.

The report card approach, where users are questioned about the public services, is another increasingly used mechanism for collecting citizen feedback, with India and Bangladesh being good examples [link Tool Kit, http://www.transparency.org/toolkits/toolkit_toc.html].

3. Advocacy and Litigation

Main Institutions

Among the institutions successfully used to channel public complaints are:

  • Independent Anti-corruption agencies - Botswana's Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) is a good model on the role of anti-corruption agencies in handling public complaints and collective pro-active citizen feedback.

  • Ombudsman and Inspectorates - for complaints channelled through the office of the Ombudsman refer to the respective FAQ on Ombudsmen. [Read about Ombudsmen]

  • Inspection Panels - the World Bank's Inspection Panel created in 1993 to provide an independent forum to private citizens who believe that they or their interests have been or could be directly harmed by a project financed by the World Bank - the first body of its kind to give voice to private citizens in an international context - sets a good precedent in this regard.

  • Committees of Concerned Citizens - Bangladesh's Model and experience are of interest in this regard.

Protective Framework

For public complaints mechanisms to be widely used, in addition to laying the necessary legal and institutional framework for their operation, it is equally essential to put in place provisions ensuring adequate safeguards and protection for citizens using or contemplating to use those mechanisms. Such safeguards include:

  • Whistleblower Protection mechanisms - providing safe channels for employees to complain [More about Whisleblowers]

  • Public Disclosure Acts - promoting accountability and sound governance in organisations by reassuring workers that it is both safe and acceptable to raise concerns [More about Public Disclosure]

Prerequisites for effectiveness include:

  • Ensuring that there is accessibility and confidence in the utilisation of the complaint services by the general public and also that public complaints receive due attention;

  • List of complaints received by an organisation are made public;

  • Complaints are recorded and analysed as on-going feedback and the results fed into the public service reform decision-making processes.

Resources and Links

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Whistle blowing

"Whistleblowing" is an issue in both the public and the private sector. In both, employees can become aware of malpractices of superiors where the public, or the public interest, is put at risk.

The first people to know of misconduct inside an organisation are usually those who work there, yet employees often fear the loss of their jobs or the friendships of colleagues.

Employees aware of misconduct have four options:
  • To remain silent
  • To raise the concern through an internal procedure
  • To raise the concern with an external body, such as a regulator, or
  • To make disclosure to the media.

Unless the culture in the workplace is one that allows employees to speak up without fear, each of the options can have adverse repercussions. Faced with uncomfortable choices, most choose to remain silent. This is seen by some managers as being the safest approach, but it means that the door is left open to further malpractices, that a responsible employer is denied an opportunity to protect its interests, and that unscrupulous competitors or managers may start to assume that "anything goes". It can also provoke employees to go to the media with unfounded allegations that they believe to be true.

It is widely recognised that internal procedures alone are insufficient, as they tend to become adversarial and the individual is expected to "prove" his or her case. For this reason there should be an external complaints channel for use where a worker has either raised a matter unsuccessfully or where he or she reasonably fears victimisation.

Increasingly, governments are enacting legislation to establish whistleblower protection schemes. As well as giving them legal protection, "whistleblowers" can be encouraged to complain to new institutions such as anti-corruption commissions or Ombudsman offices, or through anonymous telephone "hotlines".

In some countries, strong social taboos about "denouncing" fellow citizens have to be overcome. Some have enacted laws making it a criminal offence to fail to report bribery and corrupt acts. In the United States whistleblowers can commence court proceedings ("qui tam" actions http://www.quitam.com/barg1.html) claiming damages, which they then share with the government.


Resources

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Frequently Asked Questions
Causes and consequences
Some critical questions
Corruption and possible cures
Anti-Corruption glossary

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U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre http://www.u4.no