|
U4 Briefs |
|
|
Estimates of the size of illicit financial flows have been questioned because data used to measure the phenomenon is fraught with problems. However, such estimates are necessary to inform policy making on this issue. Improving the quality of data gathering in poor countries and asking questions beyond statistics can improve the understanding of and response to illicit flows.
Social programmes have been increasingly used by developing countries to fight poverty and have attracted growing budgets. However, it has been empirically shown that there is a weak correlation between social spending and outcomes, even if we account for national incomes (World Bank 2008). Many factors have been identified as possible causes of this situation, including market failures, composition of spending, corruption and effectiveness of social service delivery. A body of research on public expenditure in democratic regimes argues that one of the reasons for such underperformance is manipulation by political leaders of the timing and allocation of expenditures with the aim of re-election. Increases in public expenditures have been timed to coincide with elections and expenditures have been directed toward areas in which their political impact was likely to be largest, discriminating against other areas on the basis of political calculus rather than social or poverty-based criteria.
Quite often, "lack of political will" is identified as the culprit for poorly performing anti-corruption programmes. Yet despite the frequency with which it is used to explain unsatisfactory reform outcomes, political will remains under-defined and poorly understood. Further, assessments are often conducted retrospectively, looking back at failed programmes. By applying a model of political will that specifies a set of action-based components that are observable and measurable, and amenable to external reinforcement and support, more clarity regarding the degree of political will can be achieved.
Most people are familiar with codes of conduct. Often overlooked, however, is the important role that organisational ethics policies have not only as the backbone for such strategies but also for more general policies - such as transparent accounting and non-discriminatory human resources practices - related to the ethical performance of an organisation. This U4 Brief describes the different dimensions of ethics policies and outlines elements of good practice in developing and implementing them.
Alors que la réussite de l’application des Etudes de suivi des dépenses publiques (ESDP) en Ouganda a reçu et continue de recevoir une grande attention, on trouve moins de documentation sur les expériences ESDP menées ailleurs. L’expérience tanzanienne montre clairement que les ESPD ne sont pas une panacée car des intérêts particuliers peuvent facilement faire dévier le processus.
Can Codes of Conduct set realistic ethical standards for officials? Can training in ethics and professional standards make any practical difference in the way public officials behave? Can the notions of ‘ethical competence’ and ‘ethical reliability’ help to identify new ways of thinking about ethical performance on the part of public officials? These and related questions have been the subject of widespread research over the past two decades. Even so, in seeking to establish ethical standards and norms of professionalism, most public sector agencies today have scarcely advanced beyond the mechanism of the traditional rule-based Code of Conduct, often based on the ‘core values’ of the institution. Such rule-based Codes of Conduct generally aim to prohibit corruption and misconduct, rather than promoting ethical conduct in the exercise of public functions. This U4 Brief outlines the main issues behind these concerns, looks beyond to some of the reasons why traditional methods of managing ethical problems encountered by public officials often fail, and examines how this important deficit might be remedied.
It has been recognised that the world’s failure to provide many of its citizens with access to water and sanitation is an issue of governance, and institutional reforms have been a constant feature in the drive for better sector performance. Reducing corruption is sometimes one of the objectives of decentralisation, privatisation, harmonisation and other reforms, but it is often not considered directly. Since institutional reforms may either reduce or even worsen corruption, it is important to include corruption risk assessments and mitigation measures in planning such interventions.
Si bien la exitosa ejecución de la Encuesta de Seguimiento del Gasto Público (PETS, por sus siglas en inglés) en Uganda ha sido y continúa siendo objeto de mucha atención, poco se ha dicho de las lecciones de PETS en otros lugares. La experiencia en Tanzania claramente demuestra que PETS no es un ejercicio a prueba de errores, ya que existen intereses personales que fácilmente pueden desviar el enfoque del proceso.
This U4 Brief assesses how banks facilitate illicit capital flows from developing countries. The shortcomings of the existing regulatory frameworks are discussed, and recommendations are made for donor governments on what can be done to curb the flow of corrupt money out of the developing world.
The water “business” involves large numbers of consumers using water in different ways including households, industries, and farms. Management of water at the user level, and the associated collection of charges or fees, carries a potential corruption risk. This U4 Brief focuses on the risks at the service provider-consumer interface associated with these small but numerous transactions, and how donors may help prevent so-called petty corruption. The related losses of revenue and harm to consumer confidence can seriously threaten the financial sustainability and viability of service providers.
Un sistema judicial independiente e imparcial es la plataforma que permite la ejecución efectiva de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción (UNCAC). Cuando no existe, puede que abogados, jueces y personal jurídico de escrupulosidad maleable ignoren o desestimen inapropiadamente los actos delictivos de corrupción. Los nombramientos, ascensos y procesos disciplinarios sesgados son señal de que el personal del sector justicia tal vez no esté bien preparado para manejar casos complejos, incluidos los que involucran corrupción. Las disposiciones singulares de la UNCAC con respecto a la cooperación internacional en una amplia gama de asuntos de aplicación de la ley dependen esencialmente de la existencia de sistemas judiciales transparentes y efectivos en los respectivos Estados.
L’efficacité de la mise en œuvre de la Convention des Nations unies contre la corruption (CNUCC) repose à la fois sur l’indépendance et l’impartialité des systèmes judiciaires. Là où l’appareil judiciaire ne répond pas à ces conditions, les procureurs, juges et fonctionnaires de justice malléables seront enclins à fermer les yeux sur les actes de corruption dont ils sont témoins ou à délibérément refuser de les considérer. La partialité des nominations, promotions et procédures disciplinaires contribue à diluer les compétences du personnel judiciaire, lequel ne s’en trouve que plus démuni face à certains dossiers complexes, y compris face aux affaires de corruption. Les dispositions uniques de la CNUCC régissant la coopération internationale en matière de justice sont assujetties à l’intégrité et à l’efficacité du système judiciaire des États parties.
An independent and impartial justice system underpins the effective implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Where it does not exist, pliant prosecutors, judges, and court staff may ignore criminal acts of corruption or have them improperly dismissed. Biased appointments, promotions, and disciplinary processes mean that justice sector staff may be ill-equipped to handle complex cases, including those involving corruption. The UNCAC’s unique provisions for international cooperation on a wide range of law enforcement matters especially rely on clean, effective judiciaries in the respective states. Given the centrality of the judiciary for a range of anti-corruption measures required by the UNCAC, ensuring that the judiciary is up to the task should be a primary concern of State Parties to the Convention – as well as their donor partners. The UNCAC itself, in Article 11, includes the requirement to ‘take measures to strengthen integrity and prevent corruption in the judiciary’. This Brief outlines the key requirements of, and considerations for, implementing Article 11.
La protection des dénonciateurs, c’est‑à‑dire des individus qui, dans l’intérêt public, signalent de bonne foi un acte répréhensible, est aujourd’hui largement reconnue comme étant un outil essentiel pour renforcer la responsabilisation et la lutte contre la corruption dans les secteurs public et privé. Les employés des organisations d’aide et de tout autre organisme public devraient être encouragés, au titre de leur devoir juridique et professionnel, à signaler les actes répréhensibles ou illicites dont ils sont témoins. Pour cela, ils doivent avant tout bénéficier d’une protection contre d’éventuelles représailles. Une méthode constructive de gestion basée sur la satisfaction des intérêts organisationnels plutôt que sur de seuls critères éthiques doit donc être mise en place.
La mejor defensa contra la corrupción son las cifras y los datos fidedignos. Un Sistema de Información sobre la Gestión Educativa que funcione de forma eficaz puede señalar transgresiones dentro de ámbitos tales como el mantenimiento de registros, el sueldo de profesores, la construcción de escuelas y los indicadores educativos. El costo de establecer dicho sistema se justificará con los beneficios fácilmente mensurables que éste puede aportar.
Le pétrole domine l’économie nigériane et alimente en grande majorité les recettes publiques. Parallèlement, le Nigeria est perçu comme un des pays les plus corrompus au monde et sa filière pétrole serait gangrenée par la corruption. Etant donné la complexité et la grande opacité des transactions pétrolières, il est difficile d’établir précisément comment, quand et dans quelle mesure la corruption se manifeste. Cette Note de synthèse U4 tend à montrer en quoi les institutions publiques qui régissent le secteur pétrolier du Nigeria favorisent l’existence de la corruption. Elle présente les risques de corruption dans six domaines en particulier : l’octroi de permis, l’octroi de contrats, les goulots d’étranglement et l’inertie, le rôle du bunkering, l’exportation du brut et l’importation de produits raffinés. Cette Note de synthèse est la première d’une série de deux. La seconde Note se propose d’aborder les politiques et programmes visant à enrayer les pratiques de corruption au sein du secteur pétrolier nigérian.
“…Les enseignants fantômes ? Avez-vous entendu parler des enseignants en taxi ? Nous en avons. Ils ont de multiples emplois et se déplacent constamment en taxi afin de parvenir, en quelque sorte, à être partout à la fois, aux dépens des élèves évidemment, qui voient rarement leurs enseignants.’’ Le Honduras investit d’importantes sommes d’argent dans l’éducation mais les puissants syndicats d’enseignants et les nominations politiques gênent les réformes dans un secteur vulnérable à la corruption et non contrôlé par la société civile. Pour que les plans actuels de décentralisation aient une influence positive sur les services éducatifs, il convient d’améliorer les capacités locales d’audit, il faut que les parents se voient accorder un plus grand rôle et que les syndicats adhèrent à des codes de conduite.
"… Maestros fantasma? ¿Has escuchado hablar de los maestros taxi? Nosotros los tenemos. Tienen empleos múltiples y están constantemente tomando taxis para estar presente en todos lados, a expensas, por supuesto, de los alumnos, que rara vez ven a su maestro." Honduras invierte grandes sumas en la educación, pero poderosos sindicatos de profesores y nombramientos políticos minan las reformas en un sector vulnerable a la corrupción y que carece de supervisión de la sociedad civil. Para que los planes de descentralización en curso tengan un impacto positivo sobre los servicios de educación, es necesario mejorar las competencias de quienes hacen monitoreo local, dar más participación a los padres de familia y los sindicatos deben adoptar códigos de conducta.
Une initiative anti‑corruption récente ciblant le secteur éducatif du Pérou a été lancée conjointement par le Bureau du Médiateur et le Chapitre péruvien de Transparency International, Proética. Cette initiative cherchait à façonner la discussion publique autour de la réforme de l’éducation en introduisant la question de la corruption – un des nombreux facteurs sapant le droit fondamental de tous à une éducation de qualité. Cette note de l’U4 passe en revue la méthodologie adoptée par cette initiative, ses conclusions et les enseignements tirés, notamment un survol des efforts de plaidoyer, couronnés de succès, qui ciblaient les autorités nationales d’éducation.
Education budget work conducted by civil society is a powerful way of holding governments accountable to their citizens, and drawing attention to corruption in the education system. This brief discusses the relevance of civil society budget work for anti-corruption initiatives, focusing on the experience of the Commonwealth Education Fund, in which budget monitoring is employed as an anti-corruption tool in the education sector. It presents its strengths and limitations - arguing for increased access to budget information and greater civil society participation in such processes.
El monitoreo de presupuestos en el sector de la educación, ejecutado por la sociedad civil, es un método eficaz para lograr la rendición de cuentas del gobierno al ciudadano y brindar una luz sobre la corrupción en el sistema educativo. Este informe examina la importancia de este trabajo en las iniciativas anticorrupción, con un enfoque en la experiencia del Commonwealth Education Fund (El Fondo de Educación de los países de la Commonwealth Británica, CEF, por sus siglas en inglés), quienes han usado el monitoreo de presupuestos como herramienta anticorrupción en el sector educativo. Se presentan los puntos fuertes y las limitaciones -argumentando por un mayor acceso a la información presupuestaria y por una mayor participación civil en tales procesos.
Des chiffres et des faits fiables constituent la meilleure défense contre les malversations. Un Système d’Information sur la Gestion de l’Education fonctionnant avec efficacité peut mettre en lumière de mauvaises pratiques liées à tout ce qui se peut : la tenue des registres, les salaires des enseignants, la construction d’écoles nouvelles et les indicateurs scolaires. Le coût de l’établissement d’un tel système sera justifié par les avantages facilement quantifiables qu’il peut offrir.
Le travail sur le budget de l’éducation effectué par la société civile est un instrument puissant permettant de rendre les gouvernements comptables vis-à-vis de leurs citoyens et d’attirer l’attention sur la corruption dans le système éducatif. Cette note débat de la pertinence du travail de la société civile sur le budget dans le cadre d’initiatives anti-corruption, en mettant l’accent sur l’expérience du Fonds pour l’Education du Commonwealth (Commonwealth Education Fund, ou CEF) qui utilise le suivi budgétaire comme un outil anti-corruption dans le secteur éducatif. Cette note en présente les points forts et les points faibles - tout en fournissant des arguments en faveur de davantage d’accès à l’information budgétaire et d’une participation accrue de la société civile à ces processus.
It is acknowledged by donors that the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) should play a central role in country-level dialogue, implementation, and monitoring of anti-corruption work. At the same time, when supporting UNCAC implementation, the principles of the Paris Declaration should be applied. This U4 Brief explores what this can mean in practice.
This U4 Brief explores why a traditional approach to teaching ethics is ill-suited in highly corrupt societies, and outlines key considerations with respect to timing, content, and method when designing and implementing ethics training programmes in such contexts.
This Brief reviews recent research on transition countries which suggests, conceptually and empirically, that lobbying is not only more prevalent in non–developed countries than currently thought, but can be more effective than corruption as a means of influencing policy, if adequately regulated.
Training and education programmes which deal with the topic of corruption and health can help change the way people approach their jobs as public administrators or development agency workers, and increase transparency and accountability. This U4 Brief summarises experiences and approaches to educating new and experienced public health professionals and donor agency practitioners about how to analyse problems of corruption in the health sector and design strategies to address them.
Per diems, or daily allowances, are an important mechanism for reimbursing work‑related expenses, encouraging participation in professional development activities, and motivating under‑paid employees. Yet, sometimes employees may abuse per diem policies by falsifying travel reports or inflating workshop budgets for private gain. In addition, the possibility of earning per diem can have a distorting impact on programme design, management decisions, and how employees spend their time. Drawing on a focus group and interviews with experienced development professionals, this U4 Brief explores the benefits and drawbacks of per diems, especially their potential negative impact on development goals.
Au Nigeria comme ailleurs, les pratiques de corruption entravent la performance du secteur pétrolier. Cette Note de synthèse U4 examine cinq démarches permettant de faire avancer la réforme anti‑corruption dans le secteur pétrolier du Nigeria : le cadre juridique et réglementaire, les procédures d’octroi ouvertes et compétitives, la transparence des procédures et des recettes, les investigations et les poursuites des infractions de corruption et les mesures de surveillance et de reddition de comptes. Elle aborde l’état d’avancement de la réforme dans chaque domaine ainsi que les perspectives d’avenir du pays susceptibles d’intéresser les bailleurs de fonds. Cette Note de synthèse est la seconde d’une série de deux : la première décrit les domaines les plus propices à la corruption dans la gouvernance de la filière pétrole du Nigeria. Cette série vise non seulement à fournir un aperçu des réformes anti‑corruption au Nigeria mais aussi dans d’autres pays riches en pétrole bénéficiant d’une aide au développement.
Sous l’impulsion d’un régime d’abattage durable et bien géré, la Papouasie – parée de la plus dense couverture forestière de l’Indonésie – aurait le potentiel de consacrer de larges revenus forestiers à son développement socioéconomique. Or la Papouasie demeure la région la plus pauvre du pays, notamment à cause de la corruption généralisée sévissant dans les secteurs public et privé. La maîtrise de la corruption doit passer par une refonte spécifique du système de gestion des revenus forestiers.
La corruption constitue un véritable fléau dans de nombreux pays riches en pétrole et autres ressources naturelles. Elle est en grande partie responsable du faible développement socio‑économique de ces pays. Depuis peu, il est envisagé d’inscrire la transparence dans un processus de réforme afin de lutter efficacement contre la corruption et d’autres problèmes liés à la malédiction des ressources. Ces constats nous amènent à nous interroger sur le véritable rôle de la transparence dans la lutte anti‑corruption des pays riches en pétrole.
Les ressources naturelles fournissent souvent un terreau favorable à la corruption. Etant donné qu’un grand nombre de pays partenaires de la coopération au développement sont riches en ressources naturelles, l’efficacité de l’action des bailleurs de fonds relève de la gageure. Le risque de corruption s’immisce dans plusieurs filières de ressources naturelles, allant des ressources non renouvelables telles que le pétrole, le gaz, les minéraux et les métaux, aux ressources renouvelables forestières, halieutiques et agricoles. Toutefois, les enjeux de ces filières en terme de corruption ainsi que les démarches permettant de les relever sont multiples.
Oil dominates the Nigerian economy and generates the vast majority of government revenues. At the same time, Nigeria is perceived as one of the world's most corrupt countries, and significant levels of corruption are said to exist within its oil sector. The complex and largely opaque operations of the oil industry make it difficult to establish exactly how, when and to what extent corruption takes place. This U4 Brief attempts to shed light on how public sector institutions governing the Nigerian oil sector permit the existence of corruption. Six areas of corruption risk are addressed: the awarding of licenses; the awarding of contracts; bottlenecks and inefficiencies; the role of bunkering; the exportation of crude; and importing refined products. The Brief is the first in a two-part series, the second of which addresses policies and programs that aim to stem corrupt practices in the Nigerian oil sector.
In Nigeria, as elsewhere, corrupt practices impair oil sector performance. This U4 Brief looks at five approaches to advancing anti-corruption reform in Nigeria’s oil sector: the legal and regulatory framework; open and competitive award procedures; process and revenue transparency; investigation and prosecution of corruption; and oversight and accountability measures. The state of reform in each area is addressed, as are ways forward of potential interest to donors in the country. The Brief is the second in a two-part series: the first describes the most likely sites of corruption in the governance of Nigeria’s oil sector. The series aims not only to provide insights into anti-corruption related reform in Nigeria but also in other oil-rich countries that receive development assistance.
Corruption plays a role in structuring wildlife governance systems in many African states. Donor efforts to support wildlife reforms in East and Southern Africa have often struggled to achieve impact due to continuing weaknesses in local rights to access and control wildlife’s economic value. Comparing wildlife governance in Namibia and Tanzania, this U4 Brief argues donors need to develop a clearer understanding of the political-economic dimensions of wildlife governance reforms and the role corruption plays in shaping policy-makers’ incentives.
Multi‑million dollar water infrastructure projects carry some of the largest corruption risks in the sector linked to the procurement of civil works and associated design, supply and consultancy services. The potential for grand corruption in big dam projects and upgrading urban water and sanitation systems can be so significant as to skew policy making towards the most lucrative investments. “White elephants” such as overly sophisticated new wastewater treatment plants may come at the expense of maintenance of existing assets and more appropriate lower cost technologies and approaches.
Humanitarian crises that call for international assistance almost always take place in countries that either can’t or won’t meet the needs of their population at risk. Vulnerable environments, poverty, and poor governance enable these crises. Given this reality, does humanitarian assistance actually increase corruption? How do aid workers and the populations they serve perceive the impact of corruption? Where and how is corruption most likely to occur? And finally, what do agencies do to reduce risk? This Brief summarises key findings from a set of studies investigating these questions, and offers some thoughts about how donors and implementing agencies could better address the challenges of corruption in the context of humanitarian action.
Natural resources often provide fertile ground for corruption. Since a substantial number of partner countries in development cooperation are richly endowed with natural resources, these contexts pose a particular challenge for effective donor action. The risk of corruption cuts across natural resource sectors - from non-renewable resources such as oil, gas, minerals and metals, to renewable resources such as forests, fisheries and land. There are, however, important variations in the challenges presented by these sectors and the manner in which corruption in relation to them can be addressed.
Tax and customs authorities are frequently among the most corrupt institutions in many countries For staff, opportunities for corruption and temptation to engage in it are numerous, including speeding up services, undervaluing cargo and helping with tax evasion. Based on experiences from a wide range of countries, this U4 Brief gives some examples of corrupt activities and outlines practical steps to minimise the problem through appropriate staff management, training, operational procedures, and internal investigations.
A recent and relatively successful anti-corruption strategy on value added tax refunds conducted in Bolivia, applied a process flow approach that appears to be powerful in preventing corruption in tax administration. This approach identifies corruption vulnerabilities, generates measurable indicators and helps design remedial efforts, and it may well be replicated elsewhere. This U4 Brief summarizes the experiences from Bolivia, highlighting how improved inspection control contributed to reducing corruption in the National Tax Service and stemmed the loss of public funds.
Pour endiguer la corruption rampante dont ils pâtissent, de nombreux gouvernements ont choisi d'adopter des stratégies nationales générales de lutte contre la corruption, avec des résultats cependant mitigés. Cette note soutient que les Etats Parties devraient adopter une vision stratégique lorsqu'ils appliquent l'Article 5 de la Convention des Nations Unies Contre la Corruption (CNUCC), qui stipule qu'ils doivent « élaborer et appliquer ou poursuivre des politiques de prévention de la corruption efficaces et coordonnées ». Ils affirment également que les politiques anti-corruption peuvent suivre des méthodes très différentes et ne sont aucunement limitées aux stratégies anti-corruption explicites.
En muchos países con corrupción generalizada, los gobiernos han elaborado extensas estrategias nacionales anti-corrupción para enfrentar este fenómeno. Los resultados, sin embargo, han sido mixtos. Este U4 Brief sostiene que los Estados Parte de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción (CNUCC) debieran tener una visión estratégica al "formular y aplicar o mantener en vigor políticas coordinadas y eficaces contra la corrupción" tal como lo estipula el Artículo 5. Los autores sostienen también que políticas anticorrupción pueden ser llevadas a la práctica en muchas formas distintas y que no son limitadas sólo a estrategias nacionales anti-corrupción.
Honduras invests large sums in education,but powerful teachers' unions and political appointments hinder reforms in a sector vulnerable to corruption and lacking in civil society monitoring. For current decentralisation plans to impact positively on education services, local auditing skills need to be improved, parents must be given a bigger role, and unions must adhere to codes of conduct.
En este texto se presenta una reciente experiencia anticorrupción en el sector educativo del Perú, llevada a cabo por una alianza entre la Defensoría del Pueblo y el capítulo peruano de Transparencia Internacional, Proética. La acción buscó incidir en la discusión pública sobre reformas educativas, introduciendo en ella el tema de la corrupción, en tanto es uno de los factores que afectan la garantía del derecho fundamental a una educación de calidad. Se expone la metodología de la intervención, los resultados expuestos públicamente, los logros en la incidencia en las autoridades educativas nacionales y se hace un balance de las lecciones aprendidas.
The best defence against malfeasance are reliable facts and figures. An effectively functioning Education Management Information System can highlight malpractices related to anything from local record keeping, teacher salaries, building new schools, and educational indicators. The cost of setting up such a system will be justified by the easily quantifiable benefits it can provide.
Broad national anti-corruption strategies have so far been a popular response by governments to wide-spread corruption in many countries. The results have, however, been mixed. This U4 Brief argues that States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) should have a strategic vision when they "develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies" as Article 5 stipulates. The authors also argue that anti-corruption policies may be conducted in many different ways, and they are not limited to anti-corruption strategies alone.
Protection of whistleblowers – individuals who make a principled public interest disclosure of wrongdoing – is now broadly accepted as an essential tool for strengthening accountability and reducing corruption in the public and private sectors. This U4 Brief argues that aid organisations and all other public organisations should encourage staff report misconduct and corruption as part of their legal and professional duty. Protecting whistleblowers from retaliation or reprisal is a central strategy for achieving this objective. A positive management approach based on securing the organisation’s best interests, rather than ethics alone, is the key to success.
Argentina and Bolivia have both attempted to curb corruption in procurement of hospital supplies. With varying degrees of success, their experiences tell a lesson: unless there are consequences attached to identified mal-practice, monitoring and publicizing information will not guarantee sustained gains.
Hospitals are vulnerable to corruption. In the U.S., health care fraud has been stimated to cost $60 billion per year, or 3% of total health care expenditures - much of it in the hospital sector. Hospitals account for 50% or more of health care pending in many countries. Fraud and corruption in hospitals negatively affect access and quality, as public servants make off with resources which could have been used to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures for patients, or improve needed services. This U4 Brief discusses common types of fraud which occur in hospitals in low-income countries, and suggests ways to prevent and control it.
Transparency is an important tool for good governance, helping to expose abusive practices including fraud, patronage, corruption, and other abuses of power. Increasing transparency can also enhance accountability by providing performance management information and exposing policies and procedures to oversight. This U4 Brief discusses the role of transparency in preventing corruption in the health sector.
The burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic means that more labor and financial resources are being dedicated to the procurement of antiretroviral (ARV) medicines for reatment. While patients, physicians, national governments and development partners are eager to see treatment programs expanded, rapid scaleup often results in circumstances whereby resources have to be spent quickly, and sometimes resources are added to systems that are already weak and vulnerable to corruption. Program expansion in these circumstances can result in more risk, waste and losses, especially in the procurement process. Transparency of ARV prices is the first step towards identifying and minimizing corruption in procurement. This U4 Brief describes how international partners and national procurement agencies have used information technology to improve transparency and increase accountability in procurement of HIV/AIDS medicines.
Donor funding has fuelled a vast increase in service delivery, medical research and clinical trials throughout the developing world. Yet, there is a dark side to this badly needed influx of funding: with pressures to spend funds quickly and achieve results, projects may not pay sufficient attention to internal monitoring and security systems to protect against embezzlement. This U4 Brief analyses how this type of corruption occurred in a donor-funded project, and what can be done to minimise the risk.
Theft, graft, absenteeism and soliciting bribes in the health sector in developing countries is often blamed on low pay. But does low pay actually explain corruption? Several studies of public hospitals in Latin America suggest otherwise. In particular, they show that low pay may contribute to corruption; however, without some form of monitoring to detect corruption and a real chance of penalties, raising wages is not likely to make a difference.
Corruption is a huge problem in many developing countries rich in oil and other natural resources, and is central in explaining why these countries perform badly in terms of socio-economic development. Transparency reform has recently been viewed as a key factor in addressing corruption and other resource-curse related problems. But what role does transparency actually play in tackling corruption in oil rich countries?
Under a sustainable, well-managed, logging regime, Papua - the most densely forested part of Indonesia - can potentially contribute substantial forest revenues for socio-economic development. Yet, it remains the poorest region in the country, in part due to widespread corruption involving public and private actors. Specific changes to the forest revenue management system are required to address corruption. Donors can support these changes by engaging in capacity building for auditors, accountants and investigators, and through technical assistance for improving forest monitoring and production reports.
Heightened competition and considerable illegal fishing by commercial boats, suggest that incentives for corruption in African fisheries are high. Dependence on revenues and investments from foreign countries, as well as conflicts of interests, are two factors that may limit law enforcement and the effectiveness of marine inspections. Law enforcement and prosecutions may also be thwarted by bribe payments and the complicity of officials in crimes. The most effective and realistic way of countering corruption appears to be through strengthening transparency and accountability. African civil society has an important role to play in scrutinising fisheries access agreements, tracking court cases and monitoring government budgets.
Improving the Business and Investment Climate (BIC) has become an important topic in the international discourse on private sector development. Partner governments and donor organisations alike have started to focus more and more on systematically analysing and shaping a country's BIC.
Corrupt dealings by companies are often only a way to avoid inefficiency caused by weak regulations and institutions. While the private sector is commonly perceived to be a source of corruption, it is also a victim - with considerable interest in contributing to solutions. Donors can help by engaging private sector representative organizations in discussions, develop local capacity to instigate and run anti-corruption programs, and support financial media in fulfilling a watchdog role that goes beyond simply reporting on corrupt individuals
A recent anti-corruption initiative targeting Peru's education sector was undertaken jointly by the Office of the Ombudsman and Transparency International's chapter in Peru, Proética. The initiative sought to help shape the public discussion surrounding educational reform by introducing the issue of corruption - one of several factors undermining the fundamental right of all to quality education. This U4 Brief reviews the initiative's methodology, findings, and lessons learned, including an overview of successful advocacy efforts targeting national educational authorities.
The issue of corruption featured high on the agenda of the two latest enlargements of the European Union, in particular with respect to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007. There were few assistance programmes in these countries that did not include a good governance/anti-corruption component. However, differences of approach between the EU and bilateral aid agencies were significant enough to allow some generalisations that could be of use to future efforts in this area. This brief seeks to summarize the lessons learned from the terms of engagement employed by the EU and aid agencies of individual governments in respect of Bulgaria. It highlights some of the inefficiencies, assuming worst practice can be as valuable a learning tool as best practice.
Modern politics face the challenge of reconciling the presence of money in politics with the risks it poses to democratic values and good governance. This U4 Brief describes the nature of common risks and challenges, and looks at avenues for mitigating the corruption-related problems with political funding.
Informal payments for health services are common in many transitional and developing countries. Informal payments are often claimed to reduce access to health services, especially among the poorest. Impacts on the quality of care are, however, less obvious. Both positive and negative consequences are conceivable. This Brief draws on a qualitative study among health workers in Tanzania to describe the nature of informal payments that are taking place in the health sector, and their potential impacts on access to and the quality of health care. Particular attention is devoted to the policy implications. A more comprehensive report from this research can be found in CMI Working Paper 5/2007.
Whereas the successful application of PETS in Uganda has received and continues to receive a lot of attention, less has been written about the experiences of PETS elsewhere. The Tanzanian experience clearly shows that PETS is not a silver bullet as vested interests can easily derail the process.
This U4 Brief argues that the key to more effective anti-corruption strategies is to think differently about governance. Instead of starting with an OECD model of governance in mind, and assessing the gap between the developing country reality and OECD institutions, policymakers would do better to start with fewer assumptions, and some questions. What are the underlying reasons for poor governance and high levels of corruption in so many poor countries? What do we know about the political processes involved in building more effective and acountable public institutions?
Recent initiatives such as the Global Compact (Principle 10) and the DAC Revised Principles for Donor Action in Anti-Corruption call for proactively engaging the private sector in anticorruption efforts. These are new, important and promising agreements for combating corruption worldwide. However, the precise nature of how to engage and support the private sector is not defined. This brief explores ways for donors to increase their engagement with the private sector through the support of business associations and chambers of commerce.
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) have been described as ‘the backbone' of the economy of the Western Balkans.Indeed, with SMEs making up 99% of Serbian companies, employing 53% of the working population, this is certainly true for Serbia. A significant amount of companies is still state-owned, but privatisation is anticipated for the majority of these companies in the years to come. Both private and state-owned companies experience corruption, though of different kinds.
La Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción (UNCAC), adoptada en Mérida, México en 2003, representa un espectacular logro para el movimiento anticorrupción internacional. Con el respaldo de más de 140 Estados signatarios que abarcan las distintas regiones del mundo, la UNCAC ofrece un marco integral y global para la lucha contra la corrupción.
L’adoption de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption (CNUCC), à Merida (Mexique) en 2003, est l’accomplissement remarquable des efforts internationaux de lutte contre la corruption. Ratifiée par plus de 140 États signataires représentant toutes les régions du monde, la CNUCC propose un cadre mondial de lutte contre la corruption.
Alors que l’aide atteint des centaines de milliards de dollars, les Nations Unies ont montré en 2004 qu’en 15 ans, 54 pays s’étaient appauvris. La plupart des analystes admettent désormais ce constat de la Banque mondiale, selon laquelle la corruption a été «le principal obstacle au développement économique et social». Face à ce problème, 80 pays ont ratifié la Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption (CNUCC) – un document d’une portée et d’une application sans précédent. Ses 71 articles couvrent différents instruments de lutte contre la corruption, tels que les codes de conduite, un contrôle accru des banques sur les «personnes politiquement exposées» ou des mesures visant à prévenir le blanchiment d’argent. Pourtant, c’est bien le «recouvrement d’avoirs» qui a été désignée comme «principe fondamental de la présente Convention». Cette note revient sur les raisons de ce traitement particulier, sur les obstacles au recouvrement des sommes d’argent volées et sur les solutions qui s’offrent aux bailleurs pour améliorer la situation.
Pese a los cientos de miles de millones de dólares en ayuda humanitaria, las Naciones Unidas determinó en 2004 que 54 países eran en efecto más pobres que 15 años atrás. La mayoría de analistas ahora coincide con el hallazgo del Banco Mundial de que la corrupción ha sido “el obstáculo número uno al desarrollo económico y social.” Con miras a enfrentar este problema, 80 países han ratificado la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción (UNCAC, por sus siglas en inglés), un documento de alcance y aplicación inéditos. La Convención contiene 71 artículos que abordan numerosas herramientas para combatir la corrupción, tales como códigos de conducta, mayor escrutinio bancario de “individuos susceptibles por su calibre político” y medidas para abatir el blanqueo de dinero. No obstante, la “recuperación de activos” ha sido señalada como un “principio fundamental de esta Convención”. En este informe se examina por qué es tan esencial recuperar los activos, los obstáculos que se anteponen a la recuperación de fondos robados, y las medidas que pueden tomar los donantes para mejorar la situación.
Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in aid, the United Nations determined in 2004 that 54 countries had actually become poorer than they were 15 years previously. Most analysts now agree with findings of the World Bank that it is corruption that has been "the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development."To confront this problem, 80 countries have ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), a document of unprecedented scope and application. The Convention has 71 articles addressing numerous tools to combat corruption such as codes of conduct, increased bank scrutiny of "politically exposed persons" and anti-money laundering measures. However, it is the "return of assets" that has been singled out as "a fundamental principle of this Convention". This Brief examines why the return of assets is so critical, the obstacles standing in the way of recovering stolen monies, and what donors can do to make the situation better.
Corruption has gained significant attention in development discourse and practice. While anticorruption (AC) training is identified as a useful approach to fostering the development of broadbased alliances for demanding reform and addressing demand side AC issues (in the public and private sector and in civil society), AC training is still very much in its infancy: AC training has not yet been mainstreamed into traditional development assistance (e.g. technical assistance); and also within development agencies there is scope for increasing AC training and broadening the audience. This Brief examines the foundations, objectives and scope of AC training and defines its target groups. It also looks into the design and methods of proper AC training.
This Brief discusses how corruption might threaten the benefits of competition in a market. Corruption can result in too much market power for some firms and thus increase prices and negatively influence the supply of goods and services in the private sector. While improved competition is important to cut prices, to improve the business climate, and to reduce the impacts of corruption, better regulation of markets is also an achievable objective in many countries, and an area where aid agencies can exert influence.
Do we know enough about corruption in the private sector? This Brief discusses gaps in our knowledge and how donors can help tackle the problem. The goal is to improve both the dialogue and outcomes of anti-corruption efforts, by facilitating a new kind of transparency.
How can donors engage effectively with new kinds of corruption - both in their home countries and in developing and emerging economies - and why is it important to act?
By probing projects in many different sectors and differing contexts it has been possible to find some striking similarities in terms of how fraud is taking place. This brief describes corruption and fraud schemes encountered by the author during investigations and consulting engagements.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted in Merida, Mexico in 2003, represents a remarkable achievement for international anti-corruption efforts. With endorsements from more than 140 state signatories representing every region of the world, the UNCAC offers a comprehensive, global framework for combating corruption.
Anti-corruption Commissions (ACCs) have, with one or two exceptions, been a disappointment both to the people of developing countries and to their development partners. As the 2005 UNDP report on institutional anti-corruption arrangements has noted: ‘several countries have opted for or are currently considering creating an independent commission or agency charged with the overall responsibility of combating corruption. However, the creation of such an institution is not a panacea to the scourge of corruption. There are actually very few examples of successful independent anti-corruption commissions/ agencies' (UNDP 2005: 5).
Fostering disclosure of political finance information regarding public as well as private funds is key to address money's undue influence over democratic processes. However, aid donors are still reluctant to engage in what they see as a country's ‘internal politics'. This case-based brief, based on the experience of the Crinis Project, discusses the issue of transparency in political finance as an attempt to curb money's disruptive role in politics.
Based on U4 Issue which aims to unpack and analyse the problem of corruption in aid-funded emergency procurement, for the purposes of mitigating risk. How and where does corruption typically occur, and what can be done?
This brief is based on the discussion and recommendations that emerged from a meeting of aid agencies, donors and media experts convened by U4 and NORAD in May 2006. For a more comprehensive report of the meeting, along with other relevant resources, please visit the U4 website at www.U4.no/themes/ces/
Designed to promote efficiency and expand access to health care services by leveraging financial contributions from patients, user fee systems are in place in government and private facilities throughout the world. Yet, without proper financial controls and personnel management systems, user fee revenue is vulnerable to corruption. This case-based brief illustrates how one hospital was able to introduce policy and system changes to reduce corruption and increase responsible stewardship of user fee revenues for the public good.
Drug supply is an essential component of health care systems, accounting for 10-30% of health care costs. Drugs can be expensive, and willingness to pay for drugs is high, creating the danger that employees will divert drugs for re-packaging and sale in the gray market, or for personal use. This case-based Brief describes how the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (the U.S. PEPFAR initiative) and the related Supply Chain Management System (SCMS) Project are working to increase transparency and provide a secure, high-quality supply of HIV/AIDS drugs to developing countries in Africa and Asia.
This case-based brief presents experiences of district health management teams in | |
| U4 Publications |
|
List only U4 Practice Insights |