These frequently asked questions reflect critical thoughs
on, or criticism, of the current focus on corruption in social theory
and international development circles. These answers outline main
arguments of the critical issues of contemporary debates in research
and politics.
Isn't the anti-corruption focus and agenda trying to inflict
a 'first-world' view of corruption on the rest of the world?
There are important arguments for both sides, and they each have
something to learn from the other.
The 'Yes' Arguments
The First World also has problems with corruption.
The pressure to tackle corruption highlights the unequal relationship
between the two worlds. First World countries have been rocked by
scandals in recent years, and it's questionable how they can require
higher ethical standards of Third World countries than they
themselves are able to achieve.
Even though the First World pays lip service to the need to fight
corruption at home, there has been a lack of commitment to real
change, with many countries still waiting to put the OECD
Bribery Convention into law, and a lacklustre attempt to
curb money laundering.
Corruption is just one more excuse to limit aid and add on
more conditions to existing funds.
The First World has been placing conditions on aid for over
two decades with little to show for it, other than a dramatic increase
in indebtedness. Using corruption as an excuse, donors are able
to appease tired publics who would rather see the money spent
at home.
Sometimes acts that would be considered 'corrupt' in the First
World are normal business practice in the Third World.
In many Third World countries, the giving of 'gifts' is an important
part of doing business, with strong links to existing cultural
traditions.
The 'No' Arguments
Yes, corruption is a global problem, and all countries should
do what they can to fight it.
Two global initiatives should be praised for drawing attention to
this problem. First, there is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Second, there is Transparency International's Bribe
Payers Index, which names and shames the worst offenders
for paying bribes, with First World countries making up the majority
of the list.
Even though implementation has been slower than many would hope
for, this is an ongoing process. It is being pushed along by the
same groups that support the anti-corruption agenda in the Third
World - civil society, development agencies, the international financial
institutions, OECD, TI and so on.
The First World is responding to calls from within the Third
World to end the practice of 'turning a blind eye' to corruption.
The call to combat corruption is strong throughout the Third World.
For decades, leaders have been toppled following corruption scandals.
Civil society within the Third World has been at the forefront
of the fight against corruption.
All countries need to develop country-specific responses for
an effective fight against corruption.
Traditions and normal business practice differ between countries,
within the First World as well as between the First and the Third.
Laws should develop that take these differences into account. If
a practice is common and has the legitimate support of the community,
it can be codified. For example, if gift-giving is customary, the
law can specify the value. This ends the uncertainty and eliminates
the chance that some will take advantage of the uncodified practice.
Are the western powers applying
double standards on the developing world in their anti-corruption
efforts?
Donors must focus on the international nature of the problem and rethink
the use of conditionality, in order to ease concerns about double
standards. Confidence in government and business is at an all-time
low, all over the world. Donors must acknowledge that the problem
of corruption has to be addressed at home before recommendations can
be made in other countries. Much has been done already, but there
is still a long way to go.
Corruption at home
Western countries have been rocked by corruption scandals in
the past few years. From 'Cash for Questions' in the UK, the Elf bribery
scandal in France, and the whiffs of scandal with Enron in the US,
corruption is a truly global concern. The question arises:
'Why are donors so confident that they can fight corruption in recipient
countries when they can't even control corruption at home?' The questions
continue when conditionality is brought to the table: 'How dare the
donors put conditions on us when they're in such a mess themselves?'
In developing countries, the West has contributed to corruption through multinational corporations paying bribes and donors turning
a blind eye to corrupt practices for geo-political reasons.
However, much has changed in recent years. All donors have made fighting
corruption within their own projects a foremost concern, and have
dedicated increased resources for this purpose. The World Bank provides
a public
blacklist of all contractors who have been found guilty of
corruption under World Bank contracts. All Western countries have
signed up to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention and are in various stages of implementation.
Commitment to these points - fighting corruption at home first, fighting
corruption in aid projects, and fighting bribery - is vital, if donors
are to avoid the accusation of double standards.
Concern with corruption is valid, despite criticisms
Western donors are all democracies and have an obligation to
their citizens to spend aid appropriately. Gone are the days when
the public would allow aid to be funnelled off to numbered bank accounts,
because 'at least they're on our side'. The public and the
media will not allow abuse of foreign aid.
Research has proven that corruption, even outside aid projects, disproportionately
impacts the poor. Helping the poor is, and should remain, donors'
number one objective. Fighting corruption is just one component,
and should not be seen as an end in itself. But aid will never be
effective while corruption siphons funding into non-productive
areas, and the poor are subject to the vagaries of fraudulent and
corrupt practices.
Conditionality and corruption
There is no indication that political conditionalities - linking
aid to democratisation, the rule of law, fighting corruption and so
on - will prove effective. Criticisms of conditionality range from
the difficulties in monitoring compliance all the way to the
imposition of a Western-designed 'new world order'. Donors
should be cautious in applying conditions to the fight against corruption.
Isn't corruption just a matter of
culture and seen as 'normal' or 'traditional' in some societies?
No, all cultures abhor corruption. However, the legal definition
of what constitutes corruption is likely to differ from country to
country because of different cultural and historical traditions.
Is there a link between culture and corruption?
Often people will refer to a 'culture of corruption', but the
linking of these two words is problematic. 'Culture' is a difficult
term to define itself, as is corruption, and determining what corrupt
practices are linked specifically to culture is extremely difficult.
Who speaks for the culture: the national representatives in
UNESCO, academics, or common people? Urban or rural? Local, regional
or national? Indigenous or immigrant? Male or female ? Religious or
atheist? White collar or blue collar? All of these factors make up
many facets of a 'culture', and each may have different ideas of what
constitutes corruption.
Even within similar cultures, there are differences in perceptions
of corruption. The Presidential spoils system in the US, and the practice
of MPs in the UK hiring spouses as secretaries, would be considered
corrupt by most countries in the world. In the US, hiring one's spouse
would be illegal for members of Congress and would be considered corruption.
However, few would argue that this means that UK MPs are more corrupt
than their US counterparts. It's just an example of different practices
being acceptable.
Is the West less corrupt than the rest of the world?
Absolutely not, according to a recent report by Frank Vogl, co-founder
of Transparency International. Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests
that all countries value integrity. Long before corruption hit the
international agenda, leaders in developing countries have been ousted
for corruption, through democratic means or otherwise. This proves
that corruption is not acceptable to the public in developing countries.
Indeed, many people in developing countries actually see corruption,
as they know it as originating in the West, largely through the actions
of multinational corporations. For these people, corruption
is an import and not a cultural tradition. Bribery is already illegal
in all countries, so it is important to support the strengthening
of states' ability to uphold the law.
The importance of legal distinctions
It is important that each individual country determines what is normal
practice and what is not and then legislates accordingly. If gift
giving in business transactions is normal business practice, then
it can easily be codified into law. For example, the US government
allows employees to accept gifts of no more than $20, with an annual
limit of $50. The process of codification, along with employee training
and public awareness, removes the uncertainty as to what is or is
not acceptable behaviour. Often it is the uncertainty of what
is and is not acceptable, by both locals and foreigners, that allows
abuses of the system, rather than any cultural propensity for corruption.
Why worry about 'petty corruption'?
Isn't this a necessary survival strategy of poorly paid public servants?
Perhaps. Not every corrupt public servant needs bribes to survive,
and a distinction must be made between those who do and those who
do not.
What is 'petty corruption'?
Petty corruption usually refers to low-level, small-scale corrupt
practices. This includes 'grease money': for example, paying
customs officials a small bribe to get goods cleared quicker. It also
includes extortion: for example, paying police officers to
avoid fines or imprisonment.
Unlike 'grand corruption', which impacts a country overall
by taking large sums of money away from the public purse, petty corruption
impacts the poor directly every day. It is often just as damaging
to the poor, if not more so, than the bigger corruption scandals
which get onto the news.
Do public servants need bribes to survive?
This is an important question to ask. In some countries, public wages
are not only well below private sector wages, but fall well below
the poverty line. Indeed, in some countries, wages do not even cover
the cost of food and may not been paid for months. In these cases,
bribery can be the only way in which to survive.
However, this is not the case in most developing countries. Public
wages may be low but not so low as to endanger lives. Indeed, in some
countries, the public sector is well-paid when compared to the private
sector.
Will raising wages help curb petty corruption?
It has been found that it isn't that wages need to be so high as to
make public servants incorruptible, but rather that wages need to
be high enough so that people don't have to resort to corruption in
order to put food on the table. If the public know that wages
are too low to survive on, then many may overlook petty corruption
out of empathy. Once this threshold of survival has been crossed,
higher wages make jobs more valuable to keep, and public servants
will want to avoid corrupt practices that may cost them their jobs.
However, governments can only raise wages so high. If it is found
that the level of wage increase is too costly, then punishments
for corrupt practices will have to be made stronger to discourage
the behaviour. At some point, raising wages won't make much difference.
An IMF study found that wage increases only help when 'bribe
levels are low or the possibility of detection is high'. Raising wages
as an anti-corruption strategy will only be effective if part of an
overall package of reform, including strong internal and external
controls, meritocratic hiring and promotion and proper training.
Internet links
Caroline Van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, 'Corruption and the
Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?',
IMF Working Paper No. WP/97/73, June 1997, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9773.pdf
Can 'accountability' and 'good governance'
really reduce corruption?
Good governance is about reforming institutions and procedures
to improve efficiency, effectiveness and accountability and to reduce
corruption. It is important to remember, however, that too many reforms
in too short a time can overburden the recipient and render reforms
useless.
What do we mean by accountability?
Accountability has been defined by the World Bank as 'the constraints
placed on the behaviour of politicians and public officials by organisations
and constituencies having the power to apply sanctions to them'. An
effective system of checks and balances, on every level of
government, provides a means by which the public can keep power in
check. A tax collector, for example, is accountable to the public
through procedures that eliminate discretion in levying taxes. Without
discretion, the tax collector is cannot over- or under-charge a tax
payer, regardless of bribes paid or demanded. A prime minister is
held accountable by the media, the judiciary, the legislation and
the electorate. S/he can be booted out of office by the government
or the people if corruption is found.
The public must understand its role in holding politicians and public
officials to account. Improving literacy and civic education
is key to improving the effectiveness of the most important constraint
on corrupt behaviour - the people themselves.
What do we mean by good governance?
For most donors, good governance equals democratic government, and
anti-corruption work tends to be placed within an overall strategy
of assistance for democratisation efforts, which also includes related
themes such as enhanced participation, strengthening of the
rule of law, multi-party elections, institution building
and making governments more accountable to their electorates.
This is not to suggest that all donors share the same priorities or
that approaches towards good governance within the donor community
are identical, but there are similarities. These include helping to
promote competition among political parties, high levels of participation
and sufficient levels of civil and political liberties.
Good governance is also about effective and efficient management
- the way that governments manage their resources and responsibilities.
Why is capacity so important?
Capacity building is sometimes used interchangeably with the terms
'institutional reform' or 'institution building'. It
can simply refer to skills training, such as computer classes for
civil servants, or it can refer to the bigger challenge of reforming
institutions, such as simplifying legal procedure to allow courts
to work more efficiently.
In order to fight corruption, many donors have a 'wish list' of reforms
linked to good governance. This should be approached realistically.
No country can simultaneously reform its legislation, judiciary, executive,
civil service and social services, no matter how rich or poor. Donors
need to prioritise and co-ordinate efforts to ensure
that recipients do not become overloaded with reforms. There is also
real danger that donors themselves can become overloaded with
this work as well.
Will decentralisation
make public officials more accountable, or simply decentralise corruption?
Although decentralisation may help curb some forms of corruption,
it opens up new opportunities for different corrupt practices. It
is important to keep this in mind when designing strategies.
Decentralisation to fight corruption
There are two major arguments for decentralisation. The World Bank
sums both up in a recent report, Reforming Public Institutions and
Strengthening Governance: '[t]he political rationale for decentralisation
is the desire to move decision-making closer to people to foster greater
democracy. The economic rationale is based on gains in allocative
efficiency'.
Moving government closer to the people - local government for local
people - should make it easier for the public to participate
in the political process. They will know their local officials and
will find it easier to influence decision-making and hold politicians
and civil servants accountable.
Economically, local government should be more efficient than central
government. Local officials should understand better how to match
resources to local preferences, will know how to use local
resources to keep costs lower and will have better overall knowledge
of the needs of the local community.
Decentralisation may increase corruption
Decentralisation is intended to bring political power and decision-making
closer to the people, but it can also create an entirely new level
of bureaucrats who may demand bribes or mismanage funds. For example,
cost recovery schemes for education and health, in which local schools
and hospitals are allowed to charge fees for services, or local NGOs
are given the resources to provide these services, have sometimes
resulted in excessive charges and outright bribery.
Using decentralisation as a tool to combat corruption assumes high
levels of local capability. It requires a number of tools: ombudsmen,
competition, laws, budget support, strong links to central government,
more civil servants, information, public literacy, more funding for
local elections, increased materials and supplies, and most importantly,
the authority to make important decisions. Many central governments
(including in some donor countries) would not support decentralisation
because of increased costs and decreased capacity.
This does not mean that decentralisation is not desirable for many
reasons, but that donors should keep in mind both borrower capacity
and changing opportunities for corruption before funding decentralisation
projects.
Isn't a strong/authoritarian government
more efficient in curbing corruption?
A strong state is vital in curbing corruption. However,
a strong state doesn't have to be an authoritarian one, but then again
it doesn't have to be democratic either. Many of the new democracies
have been called 'weak' democracies, with an impotent media and fragmented
civil society. There is little chance of an effective campaign to
fight corruption under these circumstances, whether the government
is democratic or otherwise. Indeed, a strong authoritarian state is
said by some to be preferable to a weak democracy, although others
might disagree on ideological grounds.
Pro-democracy arguments
Democracies can provide valuable tools for fighting corruption. Regular
elections help to ensure that leaders remain accountable to
their citizens. The World Bank claims that civil society and the media
are 'the two most important factors in eliminating systemic corruption
in public institutions'. Civil society includes both formal and informal
groups outside the state. Civil society can put pressure on the government
to fight corruption, ensure greater accountability and prevent other
government abuses. A free media assists civil society in providing
a check on those in power and a forum for discussion.
In democracies, evidence has shown that both civil society and the
media tend to be stronger than under dictatorships. Therefore, they
would provide a more effective check on corruption than under a non-democratic
system.
Pro-authoritarian arguments
Authoritarian states are free from some of the potentially corruption-generating
practices found in democracies. Political parties and elections require
finance and patronage, and there is considerable opportunity for corruption.
Combating corruption should be a long-term objective, and democracies
often lean towards short-termism.
Civil society can hinder the fight against corruption. The pro-democracy
camp has been accused of 'romanticizing' civil society, which includes
elements such as organized criminal gangs and groups based on ethinicity
(for example, the Ku Klux Klan). Also, with all the money out there
to fund civil society groups right now, it's hard to tell which groups
are legitimate and which have been formed to get a piece of this burgeoning
pie.
Likewise, there's no reason to suggest that a free media will help
in the fight against corruption. This depends on many factors - who
owns the media, what their interests are, and so on.
Dealing with reality
As of January 2000, there were 120 electoral democracies in the world,
many in developing countries. This means that donors need to find
solutions for curbing corruption in democratic countries, whether
or not it's the most 'efficient' method of government. Some would
argue that 'efficiency' should not be our main concern, and we should
instead focus on 'equity' and 'justice', more often associated with
democracies than with dictatorships.
Should offshore financial
centres and 'tax havens' be outlawed?
It is important that both onshore and offshore financial centres
(OFCs) become much more open and transparent.
Arguments for offshore centres
Some arguments for OFCs include:
Offshore banking facilitates international trade. If companies
were forced to return to onshore banking centres, with their increased
costs, and to pay tax in their home countries, prices on consumer
goods and services would skyrocket, standards of living would decrease
and economic growth would decline or reverse.
Most OFCs are located in small states with few other opportunities
for diversification because of a lack of natural resources ('no
soil, no oil').
Terrorists, drug dealers, corrupt dictators and so on do use the
offshore system; however, many more law-abiding citizens and corporations
do as well, and they should not lose their right to privacy because
of the abuses of the few.
Arguments against offshore centres
Some arguments against OFCs include:
OFCs enable many corrupt individuals and criminals to exist and
profit. Without these centres and their high levels of secrecy and
often inadequate security arrangements (especially in newer
OFCs), national governments will find it much easier to crack down
on drug dealers, organised crime, money laundering and corruption.
The probable effects on international trade are often overstated.
There would be an adjustment period - as with the introduction of
the minimum wage, for example - but the market would cope with the
increased costs.
The problem with small states is genuine, but other areas of diversification
can and must be found. Employees who work in the offshore sector
will be highly trained and well placed to find alternative employment.
The World Bank and other donors are aware of this concern and are
in dialogue with the small states regarding this.
A hypocritical stance by the OECD?
Many of the small states where most OFCs are located have cried 'foul
play' regarding the recent crackdown by the OECD. Many of the
older OFCs have highly respected disclosure systems and better records,
in fact, than some onshore banks in the US and Switzerland, for example.
Indeed, the OECD faces the accusation that pressure has been put on
OFCs, not because of fears regarding money laundering and corruption
but rather, shrinking tax bases in the West. OECD countries
might be concerned with 'unfair tax competition', but that has little
to do with fighting corruption.
OFCs are not entirely to blame for the billions hidden away by drug
dealers and corrupt dictators. More needs to be done by both onshore
and offshore banks to make it more difficult to launder or hide away
ill-gotten gains.
What is the role of international banks
and multinational corporations (MNCs)?
anks and MNCs facilitate corruption on the 'supply-side',
by turning a blind eye to corrupt transactions and by offering bribes
or other inducements. Getting these organisations to comply with existing
rules and develop new ones is vital in the fight against corruption.
What do we mean by 'supply-side'?
In a corrupt transaction, such as bribery, for example, there are
at least two parties: one demands the bribe ('demand-side')
and another provides the bribe ('supply-side'). It is not enough to
focus on the 'demand-side': one has to remove the money and temptation
by restricting the supply.
Multinational corporations (MNCs)
MNCs have not always been interested in fighting corruption. Although
bribery increases the overall cost of a transaction, it can be built
into the agreed price, maybe even entered as a tax deduction and can
help uncompetitive firms win bids. Thus, individual companies might
not want to see an end to the current situation. Fritz F. Heimann,
head of TI-USA, lists several ways MNCs contribute to corruption:
Bribery
Gifts and entertainment
Travel expenses
Political contributions
Facilitation payments to speed up red tape
Inadequate record keeping and internal controls
Hiding behind sales representatives and agents by paying these
unreasonably high compensation
Inadequate reporting mechanisms
Poor standards set by upper management
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has been calling
for rules of conduct on corruption since the late 1970s, and the 1999
'Rules of Conduct: Extortion and Bribery in International Business
Transactions' addresses this ongoing and long-standing concern with
business conduct. The ICC's self-regulated rules go a long way to
addressing the connection between business and corruption. Governments
are also called upon to enact legislation that holds businesses to
these rules.
International banks
International banks are used by corrupt individuals and businesses
for money laundering and to hide illicit funds. There
are regulations that make this difficult, but these are not always
adhered to. Banks are increasingly being asked to 'know-your-customer'
in order to find those using the system to hide corrupt acts. Tools
used for decades to find and punish drug dealers are now being used
in the fight against corruption.
There are issues that arise here: should these funds be frozen?
Who gets the money? What proof is required? What about legitimate
individuals or business that require privacy in their transactions?
The international regulatory bodies are currently attempting to deal
with these and other concerns.
Why is political will and commitment
necessary for an effective fight against corruption?
Without top-level support, sustained anti-corruption initiatives will
not succeed. Whether political will exists from the beginning or is
demanded by civil society, it is vital for the success of anti-corruption
work.
What is political will?
When we refer to 'political will', we mean an express,
and hopefully public, commitment from a country's leader(s) to a sustained
anti-corruption strategy. The World Bank and other donors sometimes
refer to this as a 'demand-driven' approach, with demand coming
from the country itself, rather than from outside.
Why is it necessary?
Without a true commitment from a country's leaders,
an anti-corruption strategy will have no chance of succeeding. Leaders
set an example to businesses, politicians, military, civil
service, civil society and ordinary citizens. If leaders behave corruptly
and are seen to profit from doing so, there is little incentive for
anyone else to behave otherwise. Leaders have the power to halt
anti-corruption initiatives, by, for example, appointing non-reform
minded judges, or by prosecuting journalists who report on corruption.
The possibilities are virtually endless and apply to both democracies
and authoritarian regimes.
The existence of political will also protects the interests of donors:
by ensuring that money spent on anti-corruption initiatives is not
money wasted, and by protecting donors from the criticism that work
on corruption is interfering in recipient countries' affairs.
Challenges for donors
Measuring political will
There has been some research done on measuring political will but
it is proving a rather elusive concept. One way to measure political
will is to find a 'champion' at the top. However, speeches
from politicians committing support do not necessarily translate into
concrete action. Another way is to only deal with leaders that
have actively sought donor assistance for anti-corruption work.
This can also be tricky though. If it is common knowledge that donors
have money available for this work, what's to stop a non-reform minded
leader from initially pledging support and then going back on his/her
word when the time comes for implementation? Donors must find ways
to 'lock-in' this support.
Generating political will
One method suggested for generating political will is to support reform
from the bottom up with civil society. The idea is that grassroots
movements will put pressure on leaders to fight corruption. Although
this approach has some merit, it depends on many factors (for example,
the strength of civil society within the country, the interests of
the groups used, and so on). Also, it opens donors up to the accusation
of interference in the politics of a country.
There is also the use of conditionality on aid/trade/etc. However,
donor conditionality has not proved an effective restraint on behaviour
in the past, and it seems unlikely that anti-corruption work will
be any different.
Isn't the question of economic
development and political democratisation more pressing than the problem
of corruption for most developing countries?
These issues - economic development, political democratisation and
corruption - are all inter-linked. A comprehensive approach that includes
each issue will be more successful than tackling each separately.
Economic development & political democratisation
There is a 'chicken and egg' debate going on regarding the
relationship between development and democracy.
One school of thought contends that democracy is not feasible
under conditions of extreme poverty. In order for democracy to flourish,
a country needs universal education, adequate health care and sanitation,
security and political stability. In other words, basic needs must
be met before democracy can be sustained. Democracy encourages consumption
over investment, reducing the funds available for development
projects, and potentially weakens the state by opening it
up to short-termism and reducing its ability to direct development.
The other school of thought sees democracy as key to bringing
about economic development. Democracies historically spend more
on basic needs, such as healthcare and education. People
have greater protection from persecution under democracies
and will feel freer to contribute to development. Finally, democracy
can actually strengthen the state by providing stability
and legitimacy.
Economic development & corruption
In the 1960s and 1970s, a group of scholars saw a direct link between
the modernisation process and corruption. These 'functionalists'
believed that corruption helped aid social and political integration
during times of great social change and filled needs not met by official
means.
Economists in the 1970s and 1980s turned this argument around, showing
that 'rent-seeking' actually added to red tape and closed access
to the poor. Corruption diverts resources from productive activities
and harms economic development.
There are still some who argue that corruption can serve a productive
purpose, especially in situations where ethnic tensions are high and
social stability is very low, but this is not a very popular stance
to take nowadays. Few people now believe that corruption, in any form,
is beneficial for economic development.
Political democratisation & corruption
The relationship here is quite complex.
Democracy is said to curb corruption by ensuring the accountability
of politicians and civil servants through checks and balances,
provided by institutions, elections, civil society and the media.
Corruption is said to harm democracy by weakening institutions,
diverting resources and decreasing legitimacy.
Democracy is said to increase corruption through the need to fund
political parties, find supporters and respond to interest groups.
Regular elections can also lead to a 'get it while you can'
mentality among those who see public office as a means of personal
enrichment.
Corruption is said to foster democracy when it allows access
to power those who may not ordinarily gain access, such as minority
groups.
It is important here to always remember the complexity
of this relationship. Assuming that democracy will help curb corruption
ignores the opportunities for corruption that democracy brings. Likewise,
assuming that corruption will help provide access for some groups
ignores those who lose access because they cannot afford to pay for
it.
Although some donor countries allowed the tax deductibility of bribes,
this is no longer the case following the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery. This sends out a strong political signal to would-be
bribe seekers that bribes are no longer 'business as usual'.
The arguments for allowing the tax deductibility of bribes
Several countries used to allow companies to deduct the cost of bribes
as a normal business expense. There were three major arguments for
this practice.
1. All business expenses are usually taken into account for tax
purposes, and bribes are just one of many kinds of business expenses.
Even if bribes were made non-deductible, bribery would still take
place.
Finally, if paying bribes is normal business practice, then companies
who do not pay up will lose out to those who do.
Which countries did and which did not?
Countries
Deductibility of Bribes (pre-1997)
Canada, US, UK, Poland
Denied because bribery illegal within
own country
Czech Republic, Japan
Bribes seen as gifts/entertainment
expenses, which are non-deductible
Non-deductible, although no legislation
existed to disallow them
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
Only deductible if documented and
customary practice in recipient's country
Australia, Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand,
Switzerland
Allowed, although often
conditional on appropriate document and disclosure of recipient
The OECD Convention
The OECD Working Group on Bribery produced the 'Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions'
in November 1997, which went into effect on 15 February 1999. The
Convention was originally signed by all 29 member countries and 5
non-member countries, while 26 of these countries have 'commit[ted]
themselves to ensuring that their national parliaments approve the
Convention and pass legislation necessary for its ratification and
implementation into national law' (OECD website).
The Convention sends out a strong signal that bribery is not
'business as usual'. It argues against all three points above. Bribery
is not a normal business expense and should not be treated
as such. By offering a tax deduction, there is no deterrent
for offering one in the first place. Finally, by agreeing to the terms
of the Convention, countries create a 'level playing field',
where businesses can turn down the request for a bribe, safe in the
knowledge that their competitors will do the same.
Progress reports
Implementation of the Convention is ongoing. A
progress report is available from the OECD. Read also Transparency
International's 'Monitoring
the OECD convention. Monitoring this process is essential for
the Convention to maintain credibility and for it to work.
What is the problem
about political party finance?
Political parties can become 'bottomless pits' for money, both legitimate
and illegitimate. Strategies must be in place to control fund-raising,
spending and access.
Common methods of political party finance
In democracies, political parties act as intermediaries between
the public and the state, so access to the parties becomes vital.
The more money a party has, the more influence it is likely to wield.
There are several ways to raise money.
Direct state funding: An amount is set aside from the central
budget for political party financing.
Party membership: Party members are charged fees, as individuals
and/or as groups.
Individual ownership: If someone is wealthy enough, s/he can self-finance
a political party.
External funding: Donations can come from individuals and groups.
Opportunities for corruption
In each of these methods there are clear opportunities for corruption.
Direct state funding: This gives the existing leadership
a considerable amount of power over finance. Who sets the amount?
Who determines the distribution? Who decides when a 'raise' is appropriate?
Although it releases parties from obligation to individuals or interest
groups, it also could make parties less responsive to the
needs of the public, which it no longer directly relies upon for
finance. In the developing country context, it is also more expensive
than many budgets will allow.
Party membership: Wealthy individuals and groups can wield more
influence than others, especially if different levels of
membership (and access) are allowed.
Individual ownership: Few others within the party are likely to
have any control. Access to the one individual becomes all important,
and outright bribery can occur.
External funding: 'Whoever pays, calls the shots', so to
speak. This is money from individuals or groups seeking influence,
through legitimate and illegitimate means. It's important to remember
that just because a donation may be legal and thus, non-corrupt,
it may be illegitimate in the public's mind. For example, in the
US, 'soft money' donations are legal but seen as wrongful
in the mind of the public. So whether money is in the form of bribes,
from illegal sources or through legal but distrusted sources, this
sort of finance can undermine public trust in the entire system.
Suggestions for controlling corruption
One method is to require disclosure of all donations, both the amount
and the donor and to ensure that this information is disseminated
to the public. Another is establish limits on external donations.
Yet another is to limit the ways in which parties can spend the money.
Finally, another way is to eliminate private finance and rely on state
finance, but that method can be problematic, as we've seen. The
key here is transparency and diligence, and accepting that
where access to power can be bought, there will always be those who
try to find a way in. There have been many suggestions for trying
to deal with political party finance, but it must be seen as an ongoing
concern, in both the developed and developing worlds.